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Abstract 
The guiding research question in this thesis is how to improve our understanding of the global 
dynamics in both the process of establishing and the actual content of the EU's foreign economic 
policy. To answer this question this study has raised, first, in terms of the concept of FEP, the 
question of whether traditional accounts of inter-mestic policy, centred around economic 
performance, i. e. mono-dimensional FEP, are reasonable or not. As a result, this study suggests 
that it is desirable to take into account other dimensions of FEP, such as economic diplomacy 
and foreign economic policy, in order to generate a multi-dimensional account of FEP. 
Second, this multi-dimensional account requires us to establish a new framework, and to 
deal with issues related to the establishment df methodology. There have been a series of debates 
between those who emphasise comparative politics and those who emphasise international 
relations. In addition, those who suggest the analysis of foreign policy have been contending 
with those who are in favour of an international political economy approach. This study 
recognises that all of those approaches have individual merits and discovers the possibility of 
convergence in terms of a meta-theoretical dimension. 
Ultimately, this study suggests an analytical synthesis of the traditional foreign economic 
policy approaches, which is based on the dialogue of agent-structure and structure-structure 
relationships. This cognitive framework of dialogue encompasses a series of concepts such as 
order, power, heterogeneity, similarity, justice and distribution. The account of such a series of 
concepts constructs the epistemological components of meta-theoretical convergence between 
comparative politics, international relations, the analysis of foreign policy and the international 
viii 
political economy approach. Consequently, general explanation and explanations of the timing 
and content of policy outputs are provided. 
On the other hand, in accordance with the theoretical suggestions above, this study suggests 
the following agent-centred scenarios of the likely course the EU might take in the formation of 
the EU's foreign economic policy in the near future. We may distinguish these visions from 
those of the traditional realists in IR or interest-centric foreign economic policy-making 
processes based on intergovernmentalism and undertaken in the bounds of foreign policy. These 
are the three models of `civil society democracy' in the citizen-friendly institutional or regulatory 
structures, and the European and international public spheres, where international and domestic 
structures or other political, economic and social agents are conferred the recognition of true 
partners with legitimacy in their own right to civil society organisations. 
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Part I. Introduction 
Chapter 1: Conceptual definition of Foreign Economic Policy 
and Research Questions 
1.1 Conceptualisation of `Foreign Economic Policy' and objectives 
of research 
1.1.1 What is Foreign Economic Policy?: conceptual definition or ontology 
One way to understand the basics of foreign economic policy (FEP) is to deconstruct its name. 
FEP consists of the three words `foreign, ' `economic' and `policy', which individually have a 
distinct sense. First is the word foreign indicating that the target space for the formulation and 
implementation of policies, i. e. the actions and their resultant impacts, is not the home country, 
but another one. Such a context would support groups that recognise FEP as a particular 
country's actions, i. e. decisions and policies, with more than one objective, aimed at an external 
environment. This orientation has a connecting thread to the analysis of foreign policy with 
respect to the meaning of an action in terms of methodology. However, given that one-way 
actions of a country are transferred to actions and reactions between and among nation-states, 
FEP would shift into the realms of international politics or international relations including 
International Political Economy (IPE) (Holsti, 1995, ch. 1, Sondermann, 1961, pp. 8-17). 1 
Constrained by this boundary, the meaning of action does not exist any more. Furthermore, the 
changing nature of the contemporary global political economy such as interdependence and 
1 
interpenetration gradually makes unilateral actions meaningless. As such, all the states 
demonstrate a structural shift towards a concentration on the concept of interactions. 
Meanwhile, it is time to expand the scope of applying FEP to encompass issues both at home 
and abroad. This is necessitated by the fact that the features of contemporary global political 
economy induce an interconnection of the domestic and the international. In addition, under the 
multilateralisation of world politics and economics, the number of forms of actors increase, and 
as a result "interests of various actors are responding to events within an even more complex 
policy milieu" (Hocking and Smith, 1997). Such a domestic-international linkage and the 
increase of actors blur the distinction between the domestic and the international. 
The same blurring of domestic and international levels is also the case in the EU's FEP, 
which is shaped at the Community level. At the Community level, the feedback between internal 
negotiations and the processes of international actions are intertwined. The continuous 
negotiations concerning the EU's FEP progress at this very level (Smith M., 1994a, p. 463). In 
doing so, even internal policies such as agricultural, industrial, and technology policies have 
never been exclusively in the domain of the EU. All of these policies are subject to the co- 
ordination process between internal negotiations of the EU and changing environments of 
international political economy. In the same context, Katzenstein (1978) expresses "[the] main 
purpose of all strategies of foreign economic policy is to make domestic politics compatible with 
the international political economy". 
Attached to this complexity, the case of FEP yields greater complexity in the sense that 
unlike foreign policy, it also has a direct linkage to the societal level as an indispensable 
condition. The evolution of FP is associated with the common value of the state and society. That 
is the value of military security that has been principled as a common value, whilst it has no 
2 
direct connection to civil life (or individual interests). In contrast, FEP is characterised by deep 
linkages to domestic politics because its results directly impact on civil life (Hocking and Smith, 
1997). 
Such a competition of socio-economic interests is not confined to the domestic economy. 
The process of formulating FEP is exposed to the influences of external actors and foreign 
governments. It also gradually expands through diverse transnational actions and connections 
with societal actors in foreign countries, including a number of types of non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs). In addition, to understand the EU's FEP-making it is imperative that 
institutional perspectives be taken into account along with the divergence of member states' 
interest. The reason why is that there is a difference of opinion within EU institutions. 
Consequently, the EU's FEP represents the outcomes of multi-level negotiations up to domestic, 
national, the EU and international levels (including even on a local level). In this process, the 
EU's FEP-making process assumes an aspect of a complex system of governance in which 
domestic groups, governments, the Community institutions and external state-actors and non- 
state actors are interlocking. 
Foreign Economic Policy is secondly economic, meaning that it deals with economic issues 
such as trade, monetary issues including investment and finance. FEP is also based on economic 
rationality and economic analysis that focus more on issues of income, wealth and individual 
interest compared to the issues of power and national interest. In fact, however, FEP also 
involves IPE topics such as the use of state power to make decisions about who gets what, when, 
and how, between and among nation-states. On this point, FEP study may be classified to the 
sub-field of IPE combining economic analysis and political analysis. 
3 
Foreign Economic Policy has developed as a part of IPE as the interest in IPE increases 
(Tooze, 1994, p. 64). IPE addresses the power gap or asymmetry between the state and market 
that decides the matters of how scarce resources are used, 2 where the power of collective action 
is used, 3 who gets resources, 4 and who gets to use the powers surrounding the allocation and 
distribution of resources (Strange, 1995). FEP studies shares these basic implications of IPE 
(Tooze, 1994). 
In defining FEP, above all, the comparison with external economic policy or commercial 
policy is required, since their use in conjunction with one another is based on their similarities. 
Generally, research on external economic policy or commercial policy can be divided into two 
methods: one focuses on trade as an international economic activity and the other focuses on 
policy as a part of the general decision-making process of public policy. As for the latter, it is the 
one that places a heavy weight on analysing the policy-making activities of a state relevant to 
external trade rather than trade itself. FEP is closer to the perspective of the latter. Unlike the 
traditional term of external economic policy or commercial policy, it seems that in foreign 
economic policy the perspective of international political economy or economic diplomacy 
receives greater emphasis. 
Today, the increase of basic interconnections between politics and economics has resulted in 
a meaningless dichotomy between `low' politics and `high' politics, which is traditionally used 
as a means of describing policy environments. As a result, demise of traditional dichotomy 
"challenge[s] key traditional assumptions regarding both the nature and conduct of the two 
forms of external policies: foreign policy and foreign economic policy" (Hocking and Smith, 
1997, p. 7). 
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In the post-1945 context, FEP has been counted as a form of economic diplomacy (Tooze, 
1994, p. 64) utilising economic tools for political purposes (Pastor, 1980). In the same context, 
FEP is sometimes considered in tandem with the term `economic' foreign policy, which is 
separate from `political' foreign policy (Richardson, 1936, pp. 12-16). Simply, the definition of 
FEP encompasses decisions and actions of government that affect both foreign and economic 
concerns. More practically, it includes government actions with important impact on a certain 
country's relations with other governments and on the production and distribution of goods and 
services at home and abroad. On this point, Tooze (1994, p. 65) would call FEP a'direct foreign 
policy'. 
Finally, the aspects of FEP characterise different forms based on the diverse purposes or 
intentions of decision-makes in targeting the final goal, as described in Figure 1.1. In Figure 1.1, 
the two big rectangles present the domestic and international levels respectively. All of those 
areas are divided into politics and economics alongside the dotted line. This distinction is 
nothing but convenience without any meaning for the size. FEP is established in the overlapping 
area of these two levels that blankets economic and political areas. 6 Square Al, A2, A3 and A4 
represents the form of policy with four different purposes. Angular point Al indicates to achieve 
a domestic political purpose through the external policy. Angular point A2 intends to realise a 
domestic political goal via external policy. Unlike all of these, angular point A3 represents the 
intention to obtain an international economic goal, while angular point A4 sets up its goal as an 
international political end. 
Triangle A2, A3, and A5 represents the form of policy with three different purposes. 
Angular points A2 and A3 are the same as the above-mentioned, whilst angular point A5 
functions as A4 does. Whether a policy shape is triangular or rectangular depends on the 
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decision-maker's intention. For example, if a decision-maker has intended to make an impact on 
global inequality, as usually shown in development aid policy, then it would be classified as 
FEP. Meanwhile, the intention to inspire human rights or democracy leads us to the term of 
economic diplomacy (Pastor, 1980). A series of agreements on development aid that the EU has 
concluded with third non-EU member states is an example of the former. By contrast, a number 
of trade and association agreements between the EU and third countries (including Eastern 
Europe) in which provisions for human rights and democracy are introduced are a demonstration 
of the latter. 




1. = purpose node 
2. A 1, A2, A3, A4, A, = angular points of the 
different type of policy 
3. This schematic is modelled in the basis of Pastor (1980)'s idea by the author. 
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International Level 
It is, meanwhile, the dimension of inter-mestic policy when decision-maker's purposes or 
intentions set up on domestic-economic goals such as the promotion of exports, or domestic- 
political goals like domestic political stability and staying in power (Pastor, 1980). That is, if the 
purpose orientates ultimately towards political affairs, then it would belong to the category of 
economic diplomacy, whereas FEP sets the ultimate purpose of economic affairs including IPE 
to be justice and distribution. 
The significant element in such a distinction lies in the definition of national interests and its 
time-point. The first two forms focus on the long term, whilst the latter takes account of the short 
term. Inseparability of those purposes, however, is proved in the sense that the effects of those 
policies do not appear independent of each other. In other words, the goals of FP in a particular 
country aiming at the solution of global inequity and the inspiration of human rights and 
democracy may impact on the domestic level via their economic effects. As such, those 
consequent impacts trigger the evaluation of policies at the social level across the support for or 
protest against them. Ultimately, this kind of evaluation leads all actors to the confidence or non- 
confidence in decision-makers, imposing constraints on or offering opportunities to agents who 
are politicians in reality. 
Lastly, insights into the meaning of policy involve the issues of functional policy areas and 
the difference in the methods of FEP analysis caused by diverse understanding of the concept of 
policy. As for functional policy areas, three functional policy areas of trade, monetary issues 
including investment, and aid are generally covered above all by the definition of foreign 
economic policy (Destler, 1980). Besides, looking at FEP in terms of diplomacy, issues such as 
food, the import and export of energy, domestic economic stabilisation and taxes could be 
included in the delimitation of FEP. The reason why is that they potentially involve diplomatic 
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affairs. Thus it can be said that the distinction of FEP from the other areas that affect 
international economic relations is mostly a technical matter (Destler, 1980). 
As for a major area of FEP, the focus on trade issues is a time-honoured approach for both 
FEP analysis and international political economy. This trend is based on the assumption that 
other issues become important only if they have a remarkable impact on trade. This trend, 
however, is widely criticised by a number of scholars (Michalet, 1982, Tsoukalis, 1991, Dicken, 
1992, Reisen, 1999, Keohane and Nye, 1977, Cerny, 1989, Strange, 1986,1988, Tooze, 1994). 
In particular, Strange (1988) defined trade as a secondary and derived activity of the global 
economy that is led by other structures and forces such as finance, credit, technology, and 
production (Tooze, 1994). In doing so, she focused on financial structures, capital flows and the 
informal regimes governing the allocation of transnational credit. Meanwhile, Tooze (1994, p. 
74) argues that FEP's focus on trade is not suitable for understanding Europe in the 1990s, and 
should incorporate finance, currency, ' and investment as long as it is connected to theory. 
Going back to the keynote of policy study, the word `policy' generally also refers to the 
principles that govern action directed at achieving a given end (Boulding, 1958). On the other 
hand, FEP study can be divided into two directions: one is an IPE approach in which FEP is 
recognised as actions of the state to influence the international economic activities centred on 
economic diplomacy. This approach mainly employs a factor-centric macro analysis. The other 
direction is a decision-making approach in which FEP is treated as the formal decisions of the 
state that are related to a certain country's foreign economic activities. A relatively micro and 
process-oriented analysis surrounding a specific mechanism is employed in this framework. 
From the viewpoint of the former, Cohen (1968, p. 1,10) defines FEP as "the sum total of 
actions by the nation-state intended to affect the economic environment beyond the national 
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jurisdiction", and as "a part of a country's total foreign policy and to some extent [it] serves the 
same goals. " In the meantime, Tooze (1994, p. 65) indicates its implications as follows, rather 
than suggesting a direct definition of FEP: 
"Foreign economic policy implies an empirical domain constituted by economic 
activity between and among states where the identities of these entities/processes 
are secure and the boundaries of the processes are discernible - between 
economics and politics and between the international and domestic. It also implies 
a model of international political economy and the way national economies fit into 
this IPE in order for policy to have the desired outcome. " 
Finally, to summarise all the aforementioned viewpoints, this study would define FEP as the 
principles that govern the decisions and actions or interactions of a government that affect 
relationships with other governments (IP or IR including IPE) in terms of both foreign (military 
and security) and comprehensive economic concerns (production and distribution of goods and 
services, investment, finance, credit and technology at home and abroad). In terms of its 
character, those principles would influence both the domestic and international economic 
environments and its realm is of IP or IR including IPE, away from the realm of a simple FP. 
Those principles would be embodied into the direct means for achieving national interest 
representing the keynotes of consistent orientation of foreign actions. In addition, unlike FP their 
direct linkage to civil society (or individuals) would yield different impacts on domestic politics 
(Skidmore and Hudson, 1993, p. 38). 
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1.1.2 Why should it be studied?: objectives and the contributions 
of the research 
Based on the above-mentioned definition, the study of FEP would yield a systemic focus on the 
politics of international economic relations. In doing so, all kinds of matters would be defined as 
international and basically economic. 8 Then those internationally and economically defined 
events are subject to analysis of their natures in terms of politics. The outcomes through such a 
process of research would help a country's national economy harmonise with the international 
economy, and simultaneously discover methods of achieving national economic goals. 
Furthermore, FEP would help individual states acquire the means and methods for the ultimate 
objectives of survival, prosperity and prestige, i. e. national interest. That is what the central value 
of FEP study offers in terms of economic diplomacy. 
Another value of studying FEP lies in the realm of economic security. As since the middle 
1970s, the structural shift from the security state to the trading state has developed (Rosecrance, 
1986) the keynotes of national security has been doomed to the continued build-up of national 
strength through reinforcing its economic power. Even within the viewpoint of foreign policy, 
trading-centric economic diplomacy formats another significant pivot of a country's FP, away 
from the traditional arrangements centred around political and military diplomacy. Furthermore, 
with the Asian crisis of 1997 and 1998, and the subsequent crisis in financial markets in Brazil 
and Russia in 1998, economic issues in far-reaching sectors such as finance, investment, 
scientific technology, and resources have entered the stage as the main tasks of FP. In this 
context, the study of FEP by examining its attributes and structures closely and generally, and 
inducing methodological implications, would shape theoretically and empirically positive 
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reactions to the changing features of contemporary global political economy. Consequently, such 
a shaping would result in protecting the value of a country's economic security. 
In the meantime, FEP has a deep linkage to domestic political stability that is derived from 
direct linkage to civil society. This attribute indicates another potential value of the study ofFEP. 
In the realm of domestic politics, where actual politics takes place, and further in the 
transnational realm, FEP study offers the fundamental insights into the issue of `justice and 
distribution'. Through such insights, individual countries can try to resolve inter-class and inter- 
state conflicts by finding out the ways to balance domestic demands and international pressures 
(constraints). It is palpable that such an individual countries' endeavour would contribute to 
achieve domestic political stability, but also peace or equality in the global political economy. 
In particular, the EU, the object of this study, is currently the world's largest trading power, 
a principal target and source of foreign direct investment (FDI) and foreign portfolio investment 
(FPI) (Reisen, 1999, Laffan et al., 1999). In addition, it is an increasingly influential force on 
world currency values and movements. 9 The sense that "the policy agenda for the EU is shaped 
fundamentally by the development of the global economic arena, and the EU has become an 
active player in some of the most dynamic parts of that arena (Laffan et al., 1999, p. 51)" also 
deserves study. On this point alone the EU's FEP merits great attention. 
Meanwhile, given that great attention is paid to regional economic blocks as a new 
regionalism rises to the surface, the EU becomes a good model for comparison. Thus, this study 
will function as a flagship for intercontinental studies in the broader scope and in the near future, 
as the Asia-Europe relationship is gradually developed. 
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1.2 The Issue Area and Research themes: what to ask and how to 
answer 
The debates surrounding the analytical framework for the analysis of the EU's FEP have been 
constantly developed within the stop-and-go process of the literature concerning European 
integration. Above all, in terms of macro-level, such development is summarised by the debate in 
the subfields of political science of comparative politics (CP) and international relations (IR) in 
the study of the EU, and that of foreign policy (FP) and international political economy (IPE) in 
studying foreign economic policy. At the same time, the debate of state-centred, society-centred 
and system-centred approaches has developed in terms of a micro perspective surrounding what 
is focused on. All these debates are fundamentally associated with the issues of the EU's 
actomess, agent and structure, and the level of analysis deriving from the difference in thinking 
about the influential forces operating between them. 
One of the guiding research questions in this thesis is: to what extent can an analytical 
synthesis of the traditional foreign economic policy approaches based on the dialectic of 
agent-structure and structure-structure relationships improve our understanding oftheglobal 
dynamics in establishing foreign economic policy. The shortcut answer to this question is that it 
provides an important analytical perspective to analyse the linkage between the domestic and 
international level, the issue of actorness, the blurring of subfields' boundaries in political 
science, and agent-structure and structure-structure dynamic interactions. Such a research 
question is induced from sub-questions concerning methodology, which are raised by a range of 
debates centred around the appropriate framework for foreign economic policy analysis and its 
application to the EU's FEP analysis. 
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Meantime, in terms of policy-making process, policy content and policy evaluation, general 
analytical statements of FEP may be divided into three categories: to characterise FEP as 
consistent, coherent and liberal; to prescribe a proposition of how it is formulated; and to 
evaluate its efficiency (Pastor, 1980, p. 9). Smith M. (1994b) would add an issue concerning the 
nature of the EU's statehood to those general three categories, in which the fundamental question 
of whether the EU has FEP is asked. 
In general, until the late 1990s, the EU's FEP study tends to (1) state how the EU performs 
in a particular negotiation, (2) analyse the preference of the EU's FEP to liberalism or 
protectionism, and (3) research how the EU interacts in the system of the global political 
economy (Young A., 2000). As mentioned before, the word `policy' generally refers to the 
principles that govern action directed towards given ends. Any study on policy therefore should 
concern itself with three things: what we want (the ends), how we get it (the means), and who are 
we, that is, what is the nature of the organisation or group concerned? Unlike those general 
statements Tooze (1994) would suggest a question of `who benefits' from the perspective of IPE, 
i. e. `Who-gets-What', as another issue for the EU's FEP study in contemporary global political 
economy. Additionally, he argues that it is necessary to answer a series of questions: "how the 
processes of interdependence work, how and to what extent each national economy/state is 
embedded in the European and global structure, what policies bring about the changes we 
desire, what are the appropriate political, economic and social structures that will facilitate our 
aims, [and] how we can maintain a democratic control in Europe (Tooze, 1994, p. 67). " 
In this study, beyond the prescriptive and normative questions, a series of questions 
concerning the EU's FEP will be asked surrounding who-gets-what, when and how as follows. 
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" First, it will be a good idea to start with a question of `does a specific propensity exists in the 
EU's FEP-making processes? ' That is, `whether a specific route to reflect the desires of interest 
groups, for example labour and capital, and transnational actors exists in the formulation of the 
EU's FEP' is going to be asked. 
" Second, as a sub-question to the first question, the question will be continued to explore `what 
influences or effects the attributes of individual member states' domestic structures such as 
political, economic and social systems would have on the formulation of the EU's FEP and their 
own external policies? 
" Third, as the second sub-question, `what kind of opportunites and constraints produce the 
international structural contexts on the EU's and individual Member States' FEP-making? ' is 
going to be asked. 
" Finally, this study will examine closely `how the EU interacts with the system of global 
political economy. ' This examination involves a question of the relationship between the EU's 
economic weight and its political and economic influence. 
It will be possible to obtain answers to that series of questions through insights into the 
features of dynamic interactions among multi-level structures: the domestic/societal structures of 
the member states, the EU's institutional and regulatory structure, the market and the structure of 
the international system. In doing so, such insights will be necessarily followed by the account of 
the EU's actomess, the effectiveness of its FEP, institutional perspectives, interactions between 
agent and structure, domestic-international linkage, and structure-structure interactions. lo 
Ultimately, these insights will lead us to ontological, epistemological and methodological 
understanding of the EU's FEP-making. 
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1.3 Literature Review 
The literature on the EU's Foreign Economic Policy may be divided into two categories: general 
literature on Foreign Economic Policy and on the EU's Foreign Economic Policy. In particular, 
for the former, the general literature is divided into three categories: international system-centric, 
domestic approaches and linkage theory. In those literatures, FEP is treated as a part of foreign 
policy or diverse approaches derived from comparative politics, international relations and 
international political economy are introduced. 
Meanwhile, for the latter, besides the works of economists and political scientists, " there are 
many exclusive works that have been undertaken by lawyers concerning the issue of authority. 12 
In such cases, the EU's FEP is addressed within the boundary of empirical issues concerning 
contemporary policy formation and its implementation beyond the theoretical arena that has been 
shown in the former case. This section, on this point, will summarise those research orientations 
and clarifies the central approach of this research. 
1.3.1 General literatures on foreign economic policy analysis 
Above all, in terms of the general literature on FEP, the approaches of FEP can be classified into 
three categories: system-centred, society-centred and state-centred approaches (Ikenberry et al., 
1988a, 1988b). A system-centred approach explains American policy as a function of the 
attributes or capabilities of the United States relative to other nation-states. The society-centred 
approach views American policy either as reflecting the preferences of the dominant group or 
class in society, or as resulting from the struggle for influence that takes place amongst various 
interest groups or political parties. Fundamentally, this approach is the function of domestic 
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politics. Finally, a state-centred approach understands FEP as highly constrained by domestic 
institutional relationships that have persisted over time, and also by the ability of state officials to 
realise their objectives in light of both international and domestic constraints. 
To address the view of explaining Foreign Economic Policy at the international level by 
domestic conditions as merely `residuals' results in missing the interactive dynamics between 
domestic and international variables. 13 In fact, `which one has a relative dominance between 
domestic and systemic variables' is more an empirical issue than a logical issue. Depending on 
domestic factors only to explain `residuals' would just mass-produce ad hoc or post hoc 
hypotheses that explore anomalies thus cutting reasoning dead (Moravcsik, 1994, p. 14, Milner, 
1992, pp. 466-96). In the same critical context, Krasner (1978a, 1978b), Katzenstein (1976, 
1978), Rosenau (1966), Lowi (1967) and Pastor (1980) highlight the importance of domestic 
perspectives. 
Krasner (1978b), in the same context as Katzenstein's viewpoint, would focus on the 
domestic constraints on a state and reject the concept of a state that is regarded as a billiard ball, 
which is impenetrable by external pressures, i. e. structuralism. It seems to him that a central 
analytical attribute in deciding the capacity of a state is the strength of that state to its society. 
Such a strength is embodied as a capacity to resist societal pressures, to shift behaviour in private 
sectors and to shift societal structure, and according to these, he proposes four ideal types 
concerning the relations between state and society as weak, moderate, strong and dominant 
states. 
Katzenstein (1976,1978) points out that traditional FEP research focuses exclusively on 
international sources and structure in contrast to relatively great nonchalance to domestic sources 
and structure. He disregards claims about the existence of a unique explanatory variable of 
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power distribution, away from the traditional realists paradigm in which the state plays, as a unit 
of construction, and exercises a unique function. He tries to explain the causation between the 
attributes of state structure and the main orientations of foreign policy by comparing market- 
orientations in the U. S. A, UK and Germany with managed policies in France and Japan. 
A domestic structure-centred approach provides more abundant academic insights from the 
perspective of opening a black box. Thus, a domestic approach brings internal attributes of states 
such as individual society, culture and political institutions into perspective. However, it does not 
cater for the dynamic interactions between those domestic attributes and their explanatory factors 
at both an individual level14 and system level's in a framework. 
Such an individual view may prove effective in comparing the similarity and differences of 
individual countries' FEP, and yield parsimony that is a component of building a theory. By 
contrast, its shortfall is that it lacks predictability and accuracy, which derives from the negligent 
linkage of systemic, societal and national levels. In addition, it shows another disadvantage 
caused by not taking account of an actor's cognitive level. 
On the other hand, unlike such individual approaches, another approach tries to explain the 
contents and timing of policy-making through collective frameworks such as markets, domestic 
politics, power politics, and men and ideas supporting the insights of multi-perspectives and the 
synthesis of diverse frameworks (Story, 1988, Odell, 1990, Pastor, 1980). In particular, Story 
(1988) explores changes in the EU's Foreign Economic Policy around the EMS (European 
Monetary System) in the late 1980s using a collective approach. His research rejects analysis 
from a neo-classical perspective of markets, and instead analyses through the lenses of primary 
actors and their ideas, power politics and domestic context. 
17 
Pastor (1980) examines the U. S. A. 's Foreign Economic Policy through a set of theoretical 
models that consists of one system-level model and four domestic-level models. 16 His research 
asks which model is reasonable for fully understanding the U. S. A. 's Foreign Economic Policy, 
and is distinct from most other studies that take a domestic approach without theorising systemic 
variables. He concludes, via such a model, that no one of those five conceptual lenses does 
directly indicate the dependent variables of Foreign Economic Policy. 
However, this collective approach based on synthesis would yield a disadvantage as it does 
not capture the interactive dynamics among diverse levels. Due to such criticism, Gourevitch 
(1986), Rogowski (1989) and Putnam (1988,1993) suggest more dynamic linkage theories such 
as `The Second-Image Reversed' and `Two-level Game' and the extension of linkage theory that 
was provided by Rosenau and Lowi in the 1960s. Their claims are contrary to a Singerian belief 
that the accumulation of empirical generalisation cannot be obtained through an analysis of a 
multi-level game, i. e. the mutual exclusiveness of domestic and international levels of analysis. 
Gourevitch (1986) and Rogowski (1989) explore the linkage between the international system 
and societal construction, and Putnam (1988,1993) inquires into the linkage between the societal 
construction of a state and that of the other states through a two-level game metaphor. They are 
basically based on the domestic-international linkage, and introduce not first the simple sum of 
individual approaches, but the dialogue of interlocking a group of three variables such as the 
international system, societal construction and national structure in a more dynamic way. 
1.3.2 Literatures on the EU's FEP analysis 
On the other hand, unlike the above-mentioned approaches, some endeavours exist that examine 
the EU's FEP directly (Smith M., 1994a, 1994b, Hocking and Smith, 1997, Tooze, 1994, Young 
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A., 2000). Smith M. (1994a, 1994b) examines the EU's FEP from the viewpoint of a system of 
governance or multilateral diplomacy. In doing so, he explores the issues of `statehood' that are 
caused by the structure of state and the nature of authority, and the `effectiveness' of the EU's 
FEP starting from the perspective of traditional state-centric analysis. In addition, centred around 
the concept of `externalisation' he inquires into the phenomena whereby the internal concerns of 
the EU spill-over into international contexts by examining the mixed nature of the EU's policy- 
making and institutionalised processes of negotiations. 
By contrast, he also explores what is happening to the `spillback' of external concerns 
centred around the concept of `internalisation', and questions the way in which the EU's FEP 
reflects the changing nature of the international domain. Finally, Smith reaches the conclusion 
that, under the changing features of a contemporary global political economy such as 
interdependence and interpenetration, the EU tends to orientate towards multilateral policy- 
making. In the same time, besides him, there are many other scholars who examine the EU's 
FEP in terms of governance (Marks et al., 1996, Marks, Hooghe, and Blank, 1996, Scharpf, 
1994, Wallace, 1994). 
Young A. (2000) scrutunises the EU's FEP from the perspective of historical 
institutionalism. What he is trying to say is that in the features of the EU's FEP, changing 
dynamics exist depending on the results of the European Court of Justice (ECJ)'s judicial 
explanations for all institutional regulations including treaties, i. e. the impacts of the EU's 
institutional framework, as authority is transferred from the member states to the EU. The core of 
his argument is that the EU's institutional framework would structure the choices of member 
states in new arenas of co-operative policy. His framework refutes the assumption of two-level 
game that internationally negotiating governments should not be structured by institutions, 17 thus 
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the European structure is attached to domestic and international structures, and takes account of 
acquis'8 as an institution that structures inter-member states' interactions. 
Meanwhile, in terms of methodology, Tooze (1994) suggests an arbitration of international 
political economy (IPE) and foreign policy analysis as a theoretical basis for the study of the 
EU's FEP. He regards the view that the theoretical device of foreign policy that does not contain 
FEP, and vice versa, as nonsense. Finally, what he tries to suggest as his reasoning is to adopt a 
post-positive theory that reflects intersubjective meaning very well, takes into account the 
structuration processes of agent and structure, plus the understanding of historical structures, and 
build a model that encompasses the global production of ideas and knowledge, and the analyses 
of foreign policy and international political economy are incorporated also. 
1.3.3 Theoretical proposition 
In practice, this study will adopt the conceptual lenses of two-level game, even more extended 
level games, `The Second-Image Reversed' and actor-centred multi-level governance as a basic 
approach, which are based on the skill of inter-field and meta-theoretical dialogues, not a simple 
synthesis. Above all, this study pursues dialogues by arbitrating not only international political 
economy and foreign policy analysis, but also comparative politics and international relations. 
As such, theoretical bases and rationale of framework for this study accord with the complex 
metaphors of domestic-international linkage and systems of governance. This metaphor 
interlocks a group of variables such as the international system, societal construction, domestic 
structure and market with each other in a more dynamic way. As a result, this model may 
generate the dialectical synthesis of individual state-centric, society-centric and system-centric 
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approaches. This metaphor also assists our discovery of any similarity or difference in individual 
states' FEP, and political order or power relations in the international economic structure. 
In terms of building a theory, the metaphors of two-level game and the Second-Image 
Reversed represent a theoretical construction comprising a generally parsimonious theory of the 
international system with that of domestic politics that focuses on prescriptive and explanatory 
accuracy. In such a framework, it is possible to pursue parsimony via the shift of analysis level 
from a domestic level to an international level, while predictive quality would increase by 
addressing incorporate variables. That is, it may provide explanatory power as well as predictive 
quality by integrating middle-range theory and utilising more than one level of analysis. 
The logic of two-level game is suitable for an analysis of specific events in the sense that it 
takes account of situational contexts of policy-making or agreement based on agent-structure 
interactions and the intersubjectivity of domestic political conditions and those of international 
politics (Caporaso, 1997b). Methodoligically, the concepts of `context' and `intersubjectivity' 
are against the high level of generalisation such that it is necessary for specific events under 
contexts and intersubjectivity to be analysed in the middle level of abstraction. This implies that 
the two-level game metaphor can be used as an appropriate analytical tool for pursuing a middle- 
range theory. The intra-EU study is essentially intra-regional comparative analysis in 
comparatively homogeneous contexts. On this point, the appropriate level of abstraction for 
researchers lies in the middle-range, which is based both on generalisation and differentiation. 
On the other hand, another reason for a middle-range abstraction in the intra-EU study derives 
from the general fact that it is relatively easier to get the quality of predictability in the middle- 
range of abstraction rather than in high generalisation. 
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In the meantime, from the meta-theoretical perspective, this study adopts the concept of 
agent-structure dialogue based on the assumption (or probably the fact) that they have always 
been interacting in the process of policy-making. A simple causation based on the dichotomy of 
agent and structure cannot provide a sufficient explanation of changing features in contemporary 
global political economy. In fact, agent and structure is not subject to ontological distinction. 
Even when the distinction between agent and structure is necessary for an analytical background, 
this distinction has no other reason than the analytical aims (Patomäki and Wight, 2000, p. 30). 
The agent-structure dialogue adopted by this study is that structural inconsistency provides 
relatively better opportunities for agents' actions. Consequently, the structural inconsistency 
might create a new actor, whilst this actor might generate significant impacts on structural 
contexts. These significant impacts might create a new structural context, and the creation of a 
new structure and actor reiterates as the reasonable accumulation of a contextual shift proceeds. 
In this process, dialogue access is undertaken through the expansion of an agent's cognitive 
scope of objectives, agenda-setting capacity and political actions associated with structural 
contexts. However, agent-structure interactions cannot occur without the arbitration of 
knowledge system between them. Agents recognise constraints or opportunities from structures 
via the knowledge system, and reflect structural cognition on their choices. Knowledge can be 
used as a resource of power, whilst through agent-structure, agent-agent or structure-structure 
dialogues, knowledge leads to coordination. As such, it is possible to recognise agent-structure 
dialogue via the arbitration of the knowledge system. This dialogue results in status quo or 
movement to a new structural context. 
On the other hand, the conceptual lens of the system of governance above is a framework 
that integrates domestic and international domains in which actors are governmental, political, 
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economic and social agents in the national and transnational levels. In this conceptual lens, the 
state is regarded as a set of institutions. Thus, it is possible to explain the institutional structure of 
the state, and to grasp the diffusion of authority from central state to supranational and sub- 
national institutions. In addition, the logic of two-level game convincingly grasps changes in 
inter-state foreign economic policies through setting inter-static or inter-governmental relations 
as well as transnational actors including societal forces, for example civil society organisations, 
as the unit of analysis. Thus, the issue of the state as a dominant actor in traditional IR theories 
would be resolved. 
In particular, as for the case of the EU, such an actor-centred conceptual lens on a system of 
governance is useful as an analytical framework because governmental agents play the role of 
manifest actors in domestic power locations and international regimes. Furthermore, such an 
actor-centred approach to a system of governance tries to incorporate comparative politics with 
international relations by posing actors as agents between domestic and international contexts 
(Marks, 1997). Finally, the arbitration among diverse approaches above makes it possible to 
conduct cross-level linkages and make insights into agent-structure interactions, and it involves 
interdisciplinary research among sub-fields of political science (Caporaso, 1997a, 1997b). 
Furthermore, analytical approaches based on negotiations (bargaining) such as two-level game is 
better than static regime analysis in taking account of dynamic causation (Strange, 1995). 
1.4 Research Structure 
As this study aims to suggest a theoretical account and a middle-range empirical review, it is 
reasonable to construct the whole frame of the dissertation in three parts: introduction, 
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methodological review and empirical domains. Above all, the establishment of method should 
proceed prior to the others. Thus, chapter 2 addresses the analytical implications of FEP in terms 
of ontology, epistemology and methodology, and suggests the basic modelling including basic 
assumptions and experimental hypotheses for this study. The basic modelling is based on a 
revised actor-centric multi-level game model. This modelling also illustrates the bargaining 
structure and bargaining procedure at domestic and international levels. In doing so, a number of 
empirical utility functions are suggested by utilising theoretical bases of game theory. 
In part II (Methodological Review) Chapters 3 and 4 review methodological debates 
between CP and IR, and between FP analysis and IPE aiming to arbitrate these sub-fields of 
political science. Such a review is undertaken in terms of meta-theoretical issues such as the 
nature or actorness of the EU, agent-structure and level of analysis and the comparison of 
differences in recognition of major research themes. Only an empirical study linked to a broader 
conceptualisation of the nature of the EU can reveal the complete significance of its actorness. 
Nevertheless, the exploration of the other perspectives enables us to find some points of 
arbitration from which other sub-fields of political science can be analysed. 
Meanwhile, in part III (Empirical domains) the agent-structure and structure-structure 
interactions are explored in every chapter. This separation derives from the sense that it is more 
advantageous that agent-structure and structure-structure interactions are examined in a separate 
way. According to the logic of two-level game, chapter 5 compares the domestic ratification 
games of Germany, France and the UK in the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) 
negotiation of 1998. The reason why these three countries are chosen is that even though they do 
not represent the EU, they describe political heterogeneity and increasing potentiality for 
conflicts that is characterised by political relations in the North. Besides, economic resources 
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controlled by these countries are overwhelming such that they construct the core of the 
international economy. 
Chapter 6 takes insights to agential perspectives in international negotiations in terms of an 
actor's interest, preferences or knowledge, as well as the timing for his or her actions, i. e. 
choices. Civil society organisations and decision-makers are assumed to be significant agents in 
the MAI negotiation of 1998 and concerning individual Member States' foreign direct 
investment (FDI) policies. As for civil society organisations, it is the expansion of an agent's 
cognitive scope of objectives, transnational linkage to activities, agenda-setting capacity and his 
or her knowledge system that are adopted as an angle. The reason why civil society organisations 
are assumed to be agents is that FEP is directly connected with civil life, and that civil society 
organisations were significant as agents in the MAI negotiation of 1998. Meanwhile, as for 
decision-makers, their strategic choices vary among unemployment, balance of trade and balance 
of payments. Their political survivability as politicians is adopted to verify this variety. 
Chapter 7 addresses `political conditions' concerning human rights and democracy that the 
EU has inserted in a series of trade and cooperation agreements with Latin America, Asia and 
Central and Eastern Europe and Newly Industrialised States (NIS). The account of this 
perspective constitutes three contexts of FEP objectives associated with economic diplomacy and 
foreign economic policy. As such, all of these issue areas contextualise third generation 
agreements, which represent the Millenieum Round. 
Finally, all the resultant implications from every chapter are going to be assembled and 
summarised in chapter 8, in which the interdisciplinary and meta-theoretical implications in 
terms of methodology are suggested. Besides, in terms of policy content and evaluation, three 
25 
agent-centred scenarios of the likely course the EU might take in the formation of FEP are 
suggested. 
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Chapter 2: 
Revised actor-centred approach for FEP analysis and Modelling 
of negotiations 
2.1 A revised actor-centred multi-level game 
Contrasting methodological advantages that are suggested in the previous chapter, the metaphor 
of two-level game brings out some issues in undertaking conceptualisation: first, the analysis of 
negotiations such as two-level games admits the importance of domestic politics through 
examining the linkage of agents into domestic constraints, and recognising the non-monolithic 
nature of negotiation parties. The analysis of domestic factors, however, is so limited and tends 
to be descriptive in its account. Thus, this model has a demerit in that it overlooks the dynamics 
of processes driven by giving undue value to policy outcomes. Furthermore, as for the EU's 
FEP-making processes and its implementation, looked at from the perspective of three-level 
game, two-level game metaphor omits deliberate insight over issues, which are caused by the 
EU's institutional and regulatory structure. On this point, it is required to develop a more 
detailed account of the perspectives of domestic and EU politics. ' 
Second, it is when domestic politics is meaningful that the logic of two-level game can 
occur. The existence of domestic politics does not always imply an inevitable two-level game 
(Caporaso, 1997b). If societal preferences, for example, transmit very fast to central decision- 
makers, then domestic politics would lose its meaning resulting in a two-level game between 
domestic politics and international politics would not occur. By contrast, if the preferences are 
divergent or variable, i. e. the case in which central decision-makers' preferences are different 
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from those of social actors, then the two-level game could happen. This study is going to fix this 
issue by setting an assumption: societal preferences do not converge with those of central 
decision-makers. 
Third, this model does not properly incorporate international factors in the sense that it does 
not theorise systemic or structural factors. It just focuses on the issue of power relations among 
groups in societal structure, domestic political institutions and negotiators' strategies. With such 
an architecture it is impossible to take a reasonable insight into the logic of agent-structure and 
structure-structure interactions in IR, even though it may provide a minimal hypothetical context 
to examine the agent-structure and structure-structure interactions. This metaphor, therefore, 
needs to encompass the theorising of systemic variables to avoid the troubles or limitations, 
which the general analysis of domestic level would confront. 
Fourth, two-level game would be applicable only to the cases in which the negotiations are 
able to generate joint gains in general. In case of disagreement, both actors get the payoff of zero. 
The disagreement is thus the worst outcome. This implies that no actor has an incentive to 
deliberately strive for a disagreement, and that no player has true alternatives or valuable outside 
options. 
Fifth, only in a case where strategies are linked to each other, i. e. the outcome of many 
actions taken by one actor tend to be contingent upon another's actions, is two-level game 
applicable. This situation is called `strategic interaction' (Buzan, Jones, and Little, 1993, Milner, 
1998), and "negates a purely individualistic theory of action expressed only in terms of the 
intentions, goals, desires, and beliefs of individual agents" (Buzan, Jones, and Little, 1993, p. 
105). This implies the meaninglessness of simply agent-centric analysis, and suggests the 
appropriateness of interactions among agents as an analytical basis. Furthermore, it points out the 
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importance of insights into agent-structure from the viewpoint that structural factors would 
influence the agent's attributes, and structure-structure interactions in terms of structural 
changes. This study aligns its fundamental starting point with this series of viewpoints. 
Sixth, in terms of methodology, if uncertainty were introduced to the two-level game, then it 
would be impossible to explain the outcome (Dupont, 1994). Uncertainty would force the 
significance of negotiator's strategies in the international level (Level I). 2 This is because the 
outcome of negotiations may vary according to the extent uncertainty is utilised as an 
opportunity or resource. This point, therefore, would lead the analysis of negotiations to focusing 
on means or strategies, and in the same context, result in its necessity as the core parts of this 
study. 
Finally, it is doubtful whether actors act in practice being conscious of themselves as 
components of a two-level game. That is, it is only when actors take a simultaneous account of 
domestic and international political situations as decisive factors to make political decisions that 
the two-level game metaphor would be valid. The empirical conclusion for this issue is still 
unsettled (Dupont, 1994). This study would set up an assumption for this issue: individual actors 
do act aware of themselves as components of a multi-level game. 
2.2 Basic assumptions and experimental hypotheses 
2.2.1 Assumptions for a basic framework 
The completion of a basic framework for the EU's FEP analysis would consist of a series of 
assumptions as follows. Above all, for the parsimony of a theoretical model, it is necessary to 
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suppose at least two points: there are only two players with opposed preferences, i. e. Actor A 
and B, who act between domestic and international levels on the one hand; and on the other hand 
they play in two periods such as periods 1 and 2 in order. Actor A prefers a lower agreement 
price, like the buyer, representing an international actor, while actor B prefers a higher 
agreement price, like the seller, representing the EU or its member state actor. Thus, for actor A, 
the `minimum requirement level' or the `reservation value', say, a, is the highest price that would 
be accepted in the ratification process, while for actor B, it, say, b, is the lowest price that would 
be accepted in the domestic or European ratification vote. 
Negotiation game would be infinite in practice meaning the demand for attaching the 
terminal node for the form (P, t) presenting an outcome of agreement, P, and time period, t, 
when an agreement is reached. For the theoretical parsimony, however, the hypothetical choice 
of period 1 for actor A, and period 2 for actor B is required. Thus in period 1, actor A offers an 
agreement outcome, and actor B decides to accept or reject it. If actor B does reject it, then the 
negotiation game would move on to period 2. In period 2, in turn actor B offers an agreement 
outcome, and actor A would decide to accept or reject it. 
Assumption 1: There are only hvo players with opposed preferences, who represent domestic 
and international levels respectively. 
Two actors =A, B 
Actor A's reservation value or minimum requirement level for ratification =a 
Actor B's reservation value or minimum requirement level for ratification =b 
Assumption 2: Two actors play in two periods in order, i. e. period 1 and then period 2. 
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The finite set of times =T= [1,2] 
Actor A= an offer in period 1, while actor B= an offer in period 2 
The model adopted by this study is non-cooperative zero-sum bargaining, which means that 
actors typically are uncertain about the value to others of reaching an agreement. Each of the 
actors knows what kind of strategies a counterpart holds, but do not know which strategy a 
counterpart would choose. On the other hand, the sum of two actors' gains or losses is always 
zero. 
Assumption 3: Game is a non-cooperative zero-sum bargaining. 
In the next stage, from the structural perspectives, assumptions are required to make domestic 
politics get significance (assumptions 1 and 2) and provide applicability to the logic of two-level 
game (assumptions 2 and 3). 
Assumption 4: The international system does not have an overriding force. 
Assumption 5: Societal preferences do not converge with those of central decision-makers. 
Assumption 6: Negotiations in principle generate joint gains. 
Assumption 7. " The outcomes of negotiations tend to be contingent upon interactions taken 
by actors. 
On the other hand, a traditional causal and conceptual statement concerning the state as a major 
actor would be the object to redefine. This viewpoint derives from the logic when representatives 
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of individual countries act as a mediator under the constraints of domestic and international 
structures. At this time, it would be useful to recognise the state not as an actor, but a set of 
institutions. In doing so, the state is a set of rules, and provides contexts of rules for authoritative 
decision-making resulting in the structuring of authoritative relations in a polity. 
Assumption 8: The major actors are governmental agents, and the state is not an actor, but 
a set of institutions. 
Governmental leaders possess the authoritative positions in the state, are elected by the people, 
interact with sub-national actors and have political aims. Finally, it is not the state itself, but 
governmental leaders that are involved in international negotiations (Marks, 1997, p. 22). 
Intergovernmental negotiations are more inter-actors bargains than those of inter-state, who 
represent the state. They, governmental leaders, can take goal-oriented actions as distinct actors 
in the location of domestic authorities, the intra-EU location of authorities and international 
regimes. They are, however, just principal actors in the international system. It is not to say that 
they are sole actors in the international system. 
Sub-assumptions are required corresponding to assumptions 8 as following: 
Sub-assumption 1: Individual actors act aware of themselves as components of a multi-level 
game. 
Sub-assumption 2: Inter-state negotiations reflect involved political leaders' interest and 
their relative abilities to realise it 
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In inter-state negotiations, the concept of national interest and state interest refers to subjective 
and competitive explanation by actors who represent the state. That is, these concepts are an 
abstraction that does not refer to objective reality, and further do exist outside political actors' 
preferences (Marks, 1997, p. 34). Consequently, inter-state negotiations reflect not national 
interest or the relative power, but the relevant political leaders' interest and their relative ability 
to realise it. At this time, the state provides actors with the institutional contexts, who would like 
to pursue their goals. 
Sub-assumption 3: Co-operative gains are those ofpolitical actors. 
Above-mentioned sub-assumption 1 implies that co-operative gains from interactions are more 
political actors' gains rather than national gains. Governmental leaders act based on practical 
benefits such as re-election, strengthening of their political party, and intensifying their own 
position in their political party. This means that it is possible to give answers to the question of 
`why relevant political actors would reach a specific outcome' outside a framework in which 
political actors' preferences and resources are involved (Marks, 1997, p. 35). 
2.2.2 Experimental hypotheses 
2.2.2.1 Structural hypotheses 
The experimental hypotheses of this study are both structural and agential. Here, only trunk 
hypotheses are referred to, and branch hypotheses concerning international (globalisation, capital 
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mobility and security interest) and domestic contexts (political, economic and social system) are 
addressed in chapter 6 and 7 respectively. 
Hypothesis I. The EU's Foreign Economic Policy is the interactive outcome of domestic 
politics and international politics. 
Hypothesis 5.1: The impacts of the international structure depend on the elasticity ofpolicy 
preference of domestic authorities to the changes in the international 
structure 
Hypothesis 5.2: There is no influential balance between domestic context and international 
context on the foreign economic policy-making of a country. 
To what extent do structural influences depend on the elasticity of domestic policies to the 
changes in international environment? For instance, if the policy preference of domestic 
authorities on a national investment policy were reasonably elastic to the structural changes such 
as the changes in the international financial market and global changes, the choice of policy 
authorities would positively reflect the changing environment. By contrast, if inelastic, the 
changes in the international environment would be reflected negatively on domestic policies. 
This is saying that there is no influential balance between domestic context and international 
context. Thus the explanation of the relationship of domestic and international variables is 
developed in the two technical terms of `elasticity' and `balance'. 
Hypothesis 5.3: The more sensitive national economy of a state is to the international 
economy, the more constraints it confronts from the international structure. 
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From the viewpoint of IPE, international structural factors such as industrial capital and financial 
capital, rapidly changing technology and the increase in capital flow reveal the sensitivity of 
national economy to international developments. They also constrain the political strategies 
including foreign economic policy of individual states. Such constraints vary depending on the 
sensitivity or elasticity of individual national economies to the international environment. 
Hypothesis 5.4: The increase in capital mobility as a structural impact makes agents' policy 
preferences convergent. 
The consequences of international structural impacts imply that an increase in capital mobility 
strengthens agents' (mainly investors) negotiating power with institutions, including the state, 
such that it is more likely that agents can push their policy preference onto domestic decision- 
makers. Dialectic relationships are thereby established between them, such that the increase in 
capital mobility causes an increase in foreign direct investment (FDI) flow that leads to the 
convergence of agent's policy preference. 
Hypothesis 5.5: The dynamics of demand and supply spur today's global production, and this 
structural change brings out inward FDI shifting balance. As a result, the policy preferences 
of individual states result in to a positive consensus on international investment rules. 
The market-based perspective that this study adopts is based on the neo-classical logic of market 
analysis, `market leads changes in policy'. Market is the place where demand and supply meet 
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and exchange occurs. Households, firms and governments are fundamental agents operating in 
dynamic interactions. The core logic that decides interactions among agents in markets is the 
dynamic of demand and supply. 
Hypothesis 5.6: The difference in domestic structure dominates different strategic choices in 
the formation of foreign economic policy of individual states (Katzenstein, 1984, p. 3). 
Hypothesis S. 7: Foreign economic policy of a country is a continuum of its domestic politics. 
Sub-hypothesis 1: Domestic politics does not provide any input, while international 
factors structure Foreign Economic Policy. 
Sub-hypothesis 2: The reason of the consistency in the EU's Foreign Economic Policy 
derives from the fact that external factors are not able to change on a 
large scale. 
Sub-hypothesis 3: The reason of the consistency in the EU's Foreign Economic Policy 
derives from the immutability of domestic factors. 
To the extent consistency in the EU's FEP may be object to the analysis of exogenous factors 
such as inter-state balance of power being equivalent to reasoning unchangeable nature on a 
large scale of external factors. On the other hand, the attention to domestic factors may give an 
answer to the question over such a consistency suggesting that policy-makers or policy-making 
processes do not change, and even if they do change, it is steady and trifling enough to be 
disregarded (Viotti and Kauppi, 1993). Verifying these hypotheses may provide a vital 
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implication to the debate between comparative politics (CP) and international relations (IR) in 
EU study. 
2.2.2.2 Agential hypotheses 
Hypothesis II. Foreign Economic Policy is generated through the interactions of agent and 
structure 
Hypothesis 6.1: Policy outputs are not produced or given by the structural variables, but by 
agents' interactions with the structure. 
Hypothesis 6.2: An agent is not simply reactive to, but intentional and proactive regarding the 
structure. As such, it results in structural change. 
Sub-hypothesis 4: The formation of Foreign Economic Policy operates by the dynamic 
interactions with societal level 
Sub-hypothesis 5: Individual actors' responses to similar exogenous impacts or similar 
input variables differ. 
Sub-hypothesis 6: It is impossible to reduce the EU's response to exogenous impacts to that 
of actors in individual levels. 
There are many types of actors in the EU: domestic actors in individual member states' level, 
supranational actors in the EU level, and international or transnational actors. Such a series of 
actors respond to exogenous impacts in different ways implying that it is impossible to reduce 
the EU's response to exogenous impacts to that of actors in individual levels. In addition, interest 
groups need to be taken into account. Interest groups not only form agendas through lobbying 
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and campaigns, but also suggest political threats and compensations to policy-makers. In doing 
so, they play an important role in deciding domestic win-set. 3 For example, the French 
government did withdraw at the meeting for the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) 
after taking domestic civil societies' arguments most seriously. 
2.3 The Basic Modelling 
2.3.1 The bargaining at the international level 
2.3.1.1 The bargaining structure and procedure 
2.3.1.1.1 The bargaining structure 
Figure 2.1 Effects of reducing win-set size 
P 
AM 
b b' P' a' a b" 
Source: Putnam (1988). 
BM 
Figure 2.1 illustrates the structure of bargaining. `A1s'and `BM'are Actors A and B's maximum 
outcomes respectively. `a' and `b' are two actors' valuations for `reservation price' or the 
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`minimum requirement level' of domestic ratification. They represent the worst utility for actors: 
zero. `P' represents the zone of possible agreement between actors, and is called `win-set'. 
Actors A and B act according to, and are bounded by `a' and W. At this stage, any agreement in 
the range between `a' and `b' could be ratified by both bargaining parties. 
Furthermore, `a' and 'b' are defined by information distribution about an actor's valuations, 
and are also bounded by international and transnational constraints or opportunities being 
reduced or extended. Conversely, constraints or opportunities caused by the distribution of 
power, preferences, and possible coalitions between domestic and EU level (Levels II and III) 
constituents will influence `a' and `b', thus resulting in a shift in the size of the win-set. So do 
political institutions at domestic and EU level (Levels II and III), and negotiators' strategies at 
international level (Level I). In particular, negotiators' strategies may disguise the size of a 
domestic win-set on purpose to get the increase of their own bargaining power or control that of 
a bargaining partner's win-set to assure that an agreement is reached. 
If the win-set of Actor B were contracted to b', outcomes between b and b' would no longer 
be feasible, and the range of feasible agreement would thus be truncated in Actor B's favour. 
However, if Actor B, emboldened by this success, were to reduce their win-set still further to b", 
the win-sets no longer overlap at all. As a result, the set of agreement P would be an empty set 
and this results in the deadlock of negotiations. To put it in another way, a small exaggeration of 
win-set by Actor B has a high possibility of being successful, and therefore, they may confront a 
`dovish' bargaining partner. By contrast, a large exaggeration may be counterproductive 
resulting in meeting a `hawkish' Actor A. As for Actor A, he may regard Actor B's exaggeration 
as an attempt to get a `free ride', because Actor B will be able to win greater concessions from 
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Actor A who wants to reach an agreement. Consequently, Actor A would have no reason to 
believe that Actor B is really facing tight domestic constraints. 
On the other hand, if b is smaller than b', say, b< b', then the bargaining power of Actor B 
would increase from AMb to AMb' by bb'. At this time Actor A's bargaining power is BMa. 
The contraction in size of Actor A's win-set also results in the increase of their bargaining 
power, for example, from B: Ma to BMa'. 
Individual Actors A and B are rationally concerned with the outcomes from the zone of 
agreement, say, P, and have different preferences for the outcomes, say, pi and p1, i :; J, which 
expressed inpj, pj eP orpi, pj 0P with i orj = {1,2, ..., n}, i #j. 
2.3.1.1.2 The bargaining procedure 
The procedure for negotiations can be expressed by a game tree, which consists of one actor's 
`offer node' and the other's `decision node'. In the former, every actor may have no restrictions 
when choosing an agreement outcome and there is a continuum of agreement outcomes, say, p; 
orp; with i orj= 11,2, ..., n}. In the latter, an actor may accept or reject the other's offer. This is 
illustrated on Figure 2. The players can only make an offer at times in the finite set such as 
periods 1 and 2, say, T= {1,21. In period 1,4 Actor A proposes an agreement with an outcome p, 
such that pl is an element ofAMa, say, pi E AMa, and Actor B confers this offer to the process 
of domestic and the EU ratification. According to the result of that ratification, Actor B would 
accept or reject that offer when he meets Actor A in Level I, say, r1=1 for an acceptance, and rl 
=0 for a rejection. If Actor B accepts an agreement in Level I, i. e. pl E P, then the procedure of 
negotiation would end, which is expressed as Agreement (p1,1). 
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By contrast, if it were rejected, i. e. pi P, then the game would move to period 2 of 
negotiation. In period 2, Actor B offers an agreement with an outcome p2 such that p2 is an 
element ofbB\l, say, P2 E bB\i, and Actor A would accept or reject it, say, r2 =I for an 
acceptance and r2 =0 for a rejection. In this case, p2 EP is for an acceptance resulting in 
Agreement (p2,2), while P2 P is for a rejection. In doing so, if Actor A accepted, then the 
negotiation would end, while if it was rejected, then the negotiation would be broken off, and 
consequently both actors would receive a disagreement payoff, D, zero. All these relationships 
are formulated as appendix 2.1. 
Figure 2.2 Hypothetical Game 'free 
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2.3.1.2 Strategies and equilibrium under various information distributions 
A strategy includes the basic procedural strategies such as an acceptance and a rejection 
throughout the whole bargaining processes and the dynamic ones that are used as bargaining 
means by negotiators confronting domestic and endogenous pressures. As for the basic 
procedural strategies, in period 1, Actor A's strategy is to suggest pl, at this time pi lies in the 
continuum of agreement outcomes, i. e. p1E [b, a], while that of Actor B would be a response, i. e. 
rl(pl) E {0,1} meaning 0 for a rejection and 1 for an acceptance. By contrast, in period 2, Actor 
B's strategy is to offer p2 within limited agreement outcomes, i. e. P2(=- [b, a], while Actor A 
would decide to accept or reject it, which is equivalent to r2(p2)E {0,1) with 0 meaning for a 
rejection and 1 for an acceptance, respectively. Therefore, the equilibrium would be a set of 
strategies as (pi, p2, rl, r2). 
In period 2 Actor A can accept the outcome of p2, say, r2(p2) = 1, as long as it does not 
exceed a. By contrast, if the outcome, p2, were greater than a, he would reject it, say, r2(p2) = 0. 
This is Actor A's equilibrium strategy in period 2, which is equivalent to appendix 2.2 (A). In 
period 1 Actor B would accept the outcome ofpi, i. e. rl(pl) = 1, as long as it does exceed b. By 
contrast, if the outcome, p1, were smaller than b, he would reject it, say, rl(pl) = 0. As a result 
his equilibrium strategy in period 1 would be formulated as appendix 2.2 (B). Here, attention 
must be paid to the fact that such a set of strategies is bounded by various information 
distributions. Aforementioned, and particularly, it is individual actors' belief system or types and 
their direct strategies, i. e. agential factors that play an important role under the condition of 
incomplete information. By contrast, with complete information, individual actors' agential 
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factors may not be the main variables. Thus, the understanding of agential perspectives is 
necessary to explain the formation of decision-making under the condition of incomplete 
information. 
It would be a good idea to start with a complete information game that establishes the 
framework of an incomplete information game, since its outcome would provide a benchmark 
for evaluating the outcomes of incomplete information games. Strategies with Incomplete 
Information about the Actor's Valuations are going to be explored later in chapter 7 concerning 
agential perspective. 
2.3.1.2.1 Strategies with Complete Information about the Actors' Valuations 
Under complete information it is Actor B's time preference, i. e. whether he is patient or 
impatient, that is the driving force for a negotiation structure. In addition, the loss of bargaining 
gains would not happen and the negotiation would end in period 1. 
As mentioned in the part of explaining `discount factor', if under complete information 
Actor B were fully patient, i. e. SB =1, then Actor B would receive the outcome of a, i. e. the 
largest utility, while it would result in Actor A's payoff of zero, say, UA(a) = 0. Consequently, in 
period 1 Actor B would reject a smaller agreement outcome than a, which is suggested by Actor 
A. In period 2 Actor B would like to suggest an agreement outcome of a, while Actor A would 
accept the outcome of p2 if it is equal or smaller than a, which is expressed as p2 S a. In doing so 
Actor B's utility would be SB (a - b), i. e. UB(a, 2) = 8B (a - b) resulting in Actor A's utility of 
zero, say, UA(a, 2) = 0. Since rational Actor A fully understands this point, under the condition 
of complete information, they would want to reach an agreement in period 1. In period 1 to avoid 
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delay costs, Actor A suggests p1, and Actor B would accept an outcome of pi that provides an 
equal or bigger utility than that with the outcome of a, i. e. the biggest outcome, in period 2. This 
is formulated as appendix 2.2 (C). As a result, Actor A, who fully understands Actor B's 
preference of valuations would offer the agreement outcome of pl so that Actor B's utility with 
p, in period 1 would become equal to that with a in period 2, say, UB (pl) = UB (a, 2). This is 
formulated as appendix 2.2 (D). 
Finally, it is `p1= b(1-88) + 8B a' that Actor A would like to suggest. By contrast, if Actor 
B were fully impatient, i. e. 8B = 0, then Actor A would offer the outcome of b in period 1, and 
fully impatient Actor B would accept it as a point of agreement meaning Actor B's pay-off is 
zero, say, UB(b) = 0. Finally, with complete information negotiations can be happened between 
aand b 
2.3.1.2.2 Strategies to control the size of a win-set with Complete Information 
What would happen if the size of a win-set were changed by domestic and international 
constraints or opportunities? To answer this question, what would happen could be divided into 
three situations. 
2.3.1.2.2.1 The contraction of Actor A's win-set only 
The case of Actor A's win-set is reduced to a' by domestic constraints or external constraints, 
say, a' ( a, while that of Actor B is still the same. In this case, in period 1 Actor A would suggest 
the agreement outcome of p1= b(1-SB) + 8B a', say, p! = a' if SB = 1, and P1= b if3B =0 and 
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Actor B would accept it. Ultimately, this case would, in theory, generate lower agreement 
outcomes than that in unconstrained cases because of the loss of the agreement zone a'a. Thus, 
Actor B's utility would lower, which is equivalent to appendix 2.2 (E). Such severe domestic 
constraints affecting Actor A would change the general nature of the case where Actor B is fully 
patient, i. e. SB = 1. As for Actor B, their profit with pl = a' may lower in relation to the case with 
p1= a resulting in a negative effect for them. 
By contrast, in the case where Actor B is fully impatient, say, SB = 0, the contraction of 
Actor A's win-set may not change the nature of bargaining for Actor B. Thus, UB (b) with a= 
UB (b) with a= 0. Meanwhile, as for Actor A in the case where Actor B is fully patient, i. e. SB 
= 1, Actor A may enjoy relatively greater profits, say, Un (a') (UB (a). Moreover, the case where 
Actor B is fully impatient, say, 5B = 0, results in the loss of Actor A's absolute utility. However, 
such a loss of absolute utility may confront the opportunities to get offset. The loss of absolute 
utility indicates a lower probability of reaching an agreement caused by the contraction of the 
overlapping zone between two actors' win-sets. This condition may lead Actor B not to avoid the 
greater concessions aimed at reaching an agreement in theory. Such a relative profit is expressed 
in the increase of Actor A's bargaining power, say, from BMa to BMa'. Finally, Actor A may be 
in a better position than in SB =1 because of reduction of a domestic win-set. All these 
relationships are formulated as appendix 2.2 (F). 
2.3.1.2.2.2 The contraction of Actor B's win-set only 
We may assume the case where Actor B's win-set is reduced to b', i. e. b' ) b, while a is still 
maintained. This results in Actor A's suggestion of an agreement outcome of p1= b' (1-SB) + 
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8B a in period 1 and Actor B's acceptance of it. Looking at this happening in theory, this case 
would generate relatively higher agreement outcomes than that in unconstrained cases. Thus, it 
would operate as a disadvantage for Actor A meaning that his utility would lower relatively. In 
doing so, if Actor B were totally patient, i. e. 8B = 1, then severe domestic constraints of Actor B 
would not shift the negotiation outcome in a sense that Actor A's utility with b' is the same as 
that with b, say, UA (a) with b' = UA (a) with b=0. 
By contrast, if Actor B were fully impatient, say, 88 = 0, then the agreement outcome 
would be settled at higher levels, i. e. b', resulting in negative effects and would provide a lower 
utility to Actor A than that with an agreement outcome of b, say, UA(b) =a-b. In this case 
Actor B's utility with b' is the same as that with b, say, UB (b') = UB (b) = 0. Moreover, in the 
case where SB = 1, Actor B's absolute utility may lower, i. e. UB (a) with b' =a- b' ( UB (a) 
with b=a -b. However, Actor B may enjoy relatively greater profit derived by confronting their 
increased bargaining power. This is caused by a contraction of win-set. In addition, Actor B may 
benefit from causing negative effects to Actor A when 8B = 1. This relation is equivalent to 
appendix 2.2 (G). 
2.3.1.2.2.3 The contraction of two actors' win-sets 
Finally, the case where the two actors' win-sets are reduced to a' and b' respectively. In this 
instance, the agreement outcome ofpl is b' (1-(5B) + 8B a', which is equivalent to appendix 2.2 
(H). The agreement outcome in this case also depends on the value of SB E [0,1]. The 
contraction of Actor A's win-set brings out a relatively lower agreement outcome, while that of 
Actor B's win-set results in a relatively higher agreement outcome. In this case, the size of bb' 
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and a'a is the main variable. If the size were same, the mixed outcome of the first two cases 
where only one actor's win-set is reduced would be generated in this case. This mixed outcome 
is equivalent to an equal increase in the two actors' bargaining power, say, NB = NA, and the 
contracted zone of feasible agreement, i. e. relatively smaller zone, say, ba ) b'a', which is 
equivalent to appendix 2.2 (1). 
By contrast, if two actors had different variations of win-sets, say, bb' : pl- a'a, then one of 
two actors would be at an advantage, while the other would be disadvantaged in terms of 
bargaining power, say, NB # NNA, and consequential concessions in international negotiations, 
say, CB for Actor B's concession # CA for Actor A's concession. These relations are equivalent 
to appendix 2.2 (J). 
In sum, relatively positive outcomes of controlling the size of win-set may encourage actors 
to contract or strategically disguise the size of their domestic win-set. Such strategies may 
generate absolutely greater profits for actors whose strategy does work in the end. By contrast, 
bargaining parties in international negotiations may also try to extend the size of bargaining 
partner's domestic win-sets in a strategic way aimed at obtaining relatively greater benefits. 
Transnational actors, mobilisation of bargaining partner's domestic actors, and threats to 
bargaining partner's government via sanctions to make it to extend its own domestic win-set can 
be used for this trial. 
2.3.2 The Dynamic Ratification Game 
As figure 2.3 shows, bargaining parties bring the price that is suggested at an international level 
into the process of domestic ratification. After that they start the international bargaining at the 
international level again with the outcome of domestic ratification. The significance of a 
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ratification game derives from the fact that the veto of constituents may lead governments into 
decision-making traps such as ratification failure and negotiation breakdown. In particular, rigid 
ratification procedures in the weak states may prove disadvantageous to internationally strong 
governments because the latter may provide more concessions to the former to reach an 
agreement. 
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Figure 2.3 consists of two large branches for two types of government, say, NI and N2. In each 
separate branch players are unsure what their opponents are like as defined by their pay-off 
functions, or what they know about the other players. This is classified as a game with 
incomplete informations Figure 4 is the one that these two incomplete information games are 
transformed into a complete, but imperfect information game, according to Harsanyi (1967, 
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1968). The first position is called the initial node and is an open dot, all the rest are filled in. 6 
Thus, solution techniques for complete information can be applied to this transformed game. 
Static games are ones where we can think of players making their moves simultaneously. In 
contrast, a game can be dynamic because players are able to observe the actions of other players 
before deciding upon their optimal response. This situation may be called `strategic interaction'. 7 
The ratification games of the EU and individual member states are also dynamic games. 
Interactions between the government and domestic constituents are conditioned by the 
relationship of strategic interaction. Such a relationship can be represented by the extensive form 
diagram shown in Figure 4. Figure 4 can be applied to the ratification game at EU and domestic 
levels. The latter in particular with complete information, however, is going to be taken into 
account in this study, and assumes that all player's pay-off functions are common knowledge. 
In the ratification procedure at domestic level, governmental executives with information 
about the negotiation outcomes take the first move on `Campaign' or `No Campaign' that 
constituents would accept or reject ratification. If the government and their constituents were to 
make their moves simultaneously, their constituents would have only two strategies. These 
would be either to accept or reject the ratification. However, constituents initially observe a 
government's decision and makes its decision conditional upon what a government does. As a 
government has two possible actions, and so do constituents, the constituents have four (2 x 2) 
strategies. Figure 4 shows that constituents have eight (2 x2x 2) strategies, since a government's 
initial move is separated into two cases, i. e. NI and N2. 
For simplicity, it is necessary to assume that there are only two types of countries within the 
EU. The EU member states would represent Ni or N2 regarding the issue of `two-speed Europe' 
or `two-tier Europe. ' These terms denote that "not all member states are willing and able to 
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proceed towards integration at the same pace, and thatsome means should be found of allowing 
the more enthusiastic to make progress without being held back by the others" (Bainbridge and 
Teasdale, 1996, p. 454). In the same context, N1 represents the countries that find treaties 
beneficial, while N2 represents the member states that regard treaties as unbeneficial. On the 
other hand, CI and C2 are constituents of Ni, and the former is confronting the information 
campaign of Ni, while the latter is not. C2 and C4 denote constituents of N2, and the former 
makes a decision confronting the information campaign ofN2, while the latter decides without it. 
After evaluating treaties in terms of their benefits, member states would start information 
campaigns, if the benefits were greater than the total costs. When they expect the benefit 
generated by a campaign to exceed the costs of running a campaign, say, U(Campaign) ) U(No 
Campaign). This criterion of behaviour can be applied to both types of government, say, NI and 
N2, even though the former may expect the ratification, while the latter may not. This is, 
however, not to say that N2 would try to run campaigns against the treaty. With such 
governments, the constituents of individual member states would interact in the same set of 
information, thus implying that the constituents of one member state can make decisions before 
knowing those of the constituents of the other member states. This relationship is expressed by 
linking Cl, C2, C3 and C4 with the broken line. 
2.4 Defining characteristics of the EU's foreign economic 
policy games 
An understanding of the EU's institutional and regulatory framework helps when identifying the 
nature of its foreign economic policy games, which vary according to the issue in hand. This is 
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because the institutional and regulatory framework of the EU, constrains the choice of Member 
States concerning new issue areas, 8 development aid, trade and economic cooperation 
agreements and association agreements. As such, the basic impact of the EU institutions on 
foreign economic policy shapes Member States' position to be located between two-level game 
(the international- and the national levels) and three-level game (the international-, the EU- and 
the national levels). 
In particular, the insight into the contending principles within the EU policy-making 
procedures such as `direct effect', `supremacy', `doctrine of implied powers' and `subsidiarity' 
makes it possible to understand the regulatory framework that structures the actors' choices. 
Such explorations result in the identification of the natures of diverse games and lead to the 
sorting of feasible explanatory variables and the appropriate level of analysis for rational 
thinking. The `doctrine of implied competence', established by the ERTA case in 1970 (Case 
22/70), 9 contend that the external power of the Community is always co-extensive with its 
internal power. Thus, where Community institutions have the power to regulate a matter 
internally, they may also act externally. Furthermore, if the matter in question is the subject of 
formally established common rules, the Community's power to act externally becomes 
exclusive: individual member states may no longer act independently. This doctrine indicates 
that Member States engage in a three-level game in the international negotiations, in which 
qualified majority voting is adopted as the rule of policy-making. 
Meanwhile, subsidiarity is the principle that decisions should be taken at an appropriate 
level consistent with effective action. "In areas which do not fall within its exclusive 
competence, the Community shall take action, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, 
only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by 
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the Member States and can, therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be 
better achieved by the Community. "lo 
2.4.1 Inter-mestic policies: the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) 
(Two and Three level game) 
In 1995 when OECD countries tried to conclude a binding multilateral agreement on Foreign 
Direct Investment (FDI), the European Commission was willing to interpret it as belonging to 
the scope of Common Commercial Policy (CCP). In this issue the scope of the Community's 
exclusive competence is legitimised, and the Member States' joint decision-making is not 
allowed. That is, the subsidiarity principle is not applicable to this issue area. Such an 
orientation, however, collided with a controversy in the formal decision-making procedures with 
the Council and the European Parliament (EP). Also when the MAI negotiation was in progress, 
the EP made recommendations to the European Commission the same as the case of general 
trade agreements. The EP asserted that international rules of investment are necessary for firms, 
whilst states, in particular developing countries, deserve a right to pursue independent economic 
policies. As mentioned in previous section concerning general trade agreements of the EU. 
"Recognizes the need of companies which are active internationally for a 
harmonized regulatory framework for investment, and the right of each and every 
state, in particular if it is economically less developed, to pursue an independent 
economic policy, of which laws and other provisions governing foreign investment 
are an integral part.... "" 
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This knowledge is connected to the formal position of the EP emphasising that the issue of foreign investment 
rules should be based on the principle of subsidiarity. 
"Considers that, given the internationalisation of markets, it is incumbent upon 
Member States to address the diminution of their powers in respect of investment 
and other related policy issues, and to ensure that any growth of Union competence 
in this area is matched by increased accountability to the democratic institutions of 
the Union, with full regard to the principle of subsidiarity"12 
In the progress of such a debate, at that time, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) judged that 
this area is not subject to the scope of CCP (Opinions 1/94,2/92) recognising that it would be 
more properly implemented at the national level of individual Member States. This judgement 
was against the opinion of the Commission, but in accordance with those of the most Member 
States. Consequently extra-EU investment has been governed by bilateral investment treaties 
(BITS) 13 
There is a convergence in the institutional interpretation of the EU that MAI is the one that 
`doctrine of implied competence' is applied to, whilst it represents a hybrid characteristics of 
targeted cooperation (three-level game) and consultation on unilateral action (two-level game) 
(Young A., 2000, p. 107). In addition, the issue area of FDI in which `institutional adaptation' 
has evolved through interpretations rather than the amendment of treaty is not regulated by any 
formal cooperation procedure. 14 As such, the institutional framework of the EU as a structure in 
MAI game characterises `soft institutions' with which individual Member States interact as 
actors (Young A., 2000). 
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Individual Member States in the MAI game had an option in deciding whether to participate 
in the targeted objectives of the Community. Such autonomy enabled Member States to choose 
to adopt a common position of the Community to blockade the application of liberalisation to the 
cultural industry such as film and broadcasting. By contrast it was also possible to choose an 
option to exercise only consultations with the EU institutions on the other issues including the 
national exception of Most Favoured Nation (MFN) treatment and national treatment principle. 
Thus, it is possible to say that the MAI game meets a necessary condition for applying the 
principle of subsidiarity for the distinction between the Community competence and the Member 
States competence. As such, the MAI game is also subject to the classification as a hybrid game, 
in which concurrent competences between Community and individual member states are 
recognised. 
2.4.2 Foreign economic policy and economic diplomacy 
2.4.2.1 Development aid policy (Two and Three level game) 
According to the general policy principles under the development cooperation the EU has 
actively involved itself in the promotion of third world and developing countries. The forms are 
general preferences, food aid, emergency aid, the support for non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs) in the third world, and additionally assistance of special relations through economy, 
trade, industry, technology and financial cooperation agreements. The objectives are "to foster 
the sustainable economic and social development of the developing countries, and more 
particularly the most disadvantaged among them; to foster the smooth and gradual integration of 
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the developing countries into the world economy; to foster the campaign against poverty in the 
developing countries". 's 
Practically, development cooperation arrangements under the Lome Convention IV, 
cooperation programmes with third countries such as Technical Assistance to the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (TACIS), 16 and Pologne, Hongrie, Assistance ä la 
Restructuration Economique (PHARE), 17 Bosnia and Herzegovina Regulations, trade 
agreements with third countires, Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) operation of the EC, 
and humanitarian assistance policies can be referred. It is the Lome Convention that is the most 
important and comprehensive, and that represents the development aid policy of the EU. 
The development aid policy of the EU does not belong to the scope of Community exclusive 
competence. The two bases for this viewpoint are generally referred: first, a regulatory basis 
from Art. 130u of Title XVII clarifies it. 
"Community policy in the sphere of development cooperation, which shall be 
complementary to the policies pursued by the Member States, ....... 
2 
As such, for some perspectives the EU plays a leading force, whilst for the others the 
supplementation to, and the coordination with, national development policies are its objectives. 
Meanwhile, the second basis derives from the practical financial assistance. Development 
aid is financed by non-European Development Fund (non-EDF) aid that is funded by the EU 
budget and EDF aid that is funded by special distribution of the Member States. As such, 
financial aid for the development aid policy from the Community level is only 15 % of total 
endeavour. It is possible, therefore, to say that in fact the Member States are dominant in terms 
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of financial aid, whilst the Community is in charge of the perspective of trade in development aid 
policy. 
Here the confirmation of policy consistency and convergence between the EU and the 
Member States is in question. That is why the Council issued a series of guidelines for a solution 
in 1992 and 1993. These guidelines aimed to promote the optimal coordination in terms of policy 
content, policy operation, and policy position in international fora. According to them, the most 
important actors in development aid policy of the EU are the Council, the Commission 
commissioners in charge of cooperation and development, Directorate General (DG) VIII 
(Development), the EP Committee on Development and Cooperation, and a number of 
diplomatic missions of third world in Brussels who are accredited to the EU. 
On the other hand, procedures vary depending on a series of envisaged decisions. Above all, 
if the Council intends to issue simply a declaration or a resolution on the issues, then it does not 
have an obligation to consult with the EP. Rather, in this case the Council has only to do proceed 
cautiously only after receiving a proposal from the Commission and ad hoc working party of the 
Council. By contrast, if a trade agreement is envisaged, the Commission and the Council play 
key roles based on the Art. 133 and Qualified Majority Voting (QMV). In this case, the 
European Parliament (EP) does not have any formal role. Unlike these cases, if a cooperation 
agreement or an association agreement is suggested, the assent procedure of the EP, set out in 
Art. 228, would be used followed by the application of QMV (for the cooperation agreements) or 
unanimity voting (for the association agreements) and the veto of the EP (Nugent, 1994, pp. 407- 
408). 18 
Finally, development aid policy of the EU characterises another hybrid game. Underlying 
principles of this policy representing universality, indivisibility and interdependence include: the 
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reliance upon the international standard; the recognition of the need to work through multilateral 
organisations; the insistence upon the centrality of human rights in international relations; 
dialogues with partners, and; the preparedness to balance the reactive policies, designed to 
respond to human rights violation, and the pro-active policies, designed for the respect of human 
rights (including the sanctions as the last resort). Among them, today the tense concern on 
human rights, i. e. democratisation, the control of law, and good governance, has become 
significant. This account operates as an important criterion in characterising a game together 
with the `political conditions', concerning human rights and democracy, in trade and association 
agreements with non-EU countries. 
2.4.2.2 Trade and economic cooperation agreements and association 
agreements: `political conditions' (Two and Three level game) 
Trade agreements, one of several forms of the EU agreements with third parties, are operated by 
the Community exclusive competence in the context of common commercial policy (CCP), 
based on Art. 133 (ex. Art. 113). By contrast, trade and economic cooperation or association 
agreements are negotiated based on Art. 228 of the EC Treaty, and they aim at the establishment 
of preferential or special relations. Meanwhile, Art. 238 of the EC Treaty provides a legal basis 
for the association agreements that include the prospects of preferential access to the EC market, 
free trade area, economic and technical cooperation, financial assistance, political dialogues, and 
the associated countries to be members of the EU. 
Among them, cooperation procedures such as trade and economic cooperation agreements 
and association agreements share a similarity to trade agreements in the context of CCP, but 
make a difference in the sense that Council decisions in the former require unanimity voting 
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rather than QMV. As such, it is accompanied by the increase in the possibility of positively 
reflecting preferences of the Member States, and the reduction of the dominant position of the 
Commission. In addition, the EP exercises more power caused by formally requiring the assent 
procedure19 of the EP. 
Since the late of 1980s `political conditions' started to be attached to those agreements - 
mainly concerning human rights and democracy, and the EU has recognised these agreements as 
means of promoting `political liberalisation'. The debates on `political conditions' have been 
continued since Lome Convention II in 1979, and it was Lome Convention IV that contained 
them for the first time in practice. Lome Convention IV is a comprehensive trade-and-aid 
agreement between the member states of the EU and 71 developing countries in Africa, the 
Caribbean and the Pacific (the ACP states), and covers the period of 1990-2000. Its Preamble 
affirms the perspective of human rights, and contains the preference of special tools such as 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and European Convention. Article 5 and 366a of the 
revised Lome Convention refer that human rights, democratic principles and the rule of law are 
now an essential element of EU-ACP relations. Besides these elements become a regular feature 
of trade agreements and association agreements, too (Cremona, 1996). The direct driving force 
for a generalisation of human rights provision to be contained in the Community agreements was 
the European Council Resolution of 28 November 1991 concerning human rights, democracy 
and development. 
As for the competence of human rights policy, although judicial protection of human rights 
is rooted in the legal order of the Community, in terms of its implementation there is a gap. 
Despite the need for a comprehensive human rights policy, the EU reveals inappropriate 
institutional arrangements for the implementation of human rights policy in both internal and 
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external relations. Above all, in terms of internal policy, tasks concerning human rights are 
located in entities reinforced by ambiguous mandate, little expertise and less interest. 
On the other hand, in terms of external policy, the Commission encompasses the established 
Units with particular mandate such as Unit 2 of Directorate A of DG IA (Human Rights and 
Democratisation) and Unit 4 of DG VIII (the control of law, fundamental freedom, 
democratisation, the coordination on issues concerning institutional supports). As such, 5 
different Commission commissioners and their staffs play key roles generating complexity, 
fragmentation and the lack of cohesion and institutional leadership (Alston and Weiler, 1999, pp. 
11-12). In addition, in the perspective of constitutional competence, the Community 
characterises the lack of constitutional competence caused by not listing human rights in the set 
of objectives even since the Amsterdam Treaty. 
In accordance with such an institutional perspective, the debate on negative and positive 
integration of human rights policy has been in progress. The former requires an affirmative step 
to expedite the achievement of a special objective, whilst the latter is limited to the ban of 
violation of principles. Yet, today it starts to be recognised that negative integration is not 
enough to reach agreed objectives, and consequently the logical conclusion of the debate is 
positive integration. In this process, the ECJ plays a key role through its interpretation of the 
interdiction that regards the starting point of human rights in the same light as the principle of 
four free movements for the creation of a single market (Alston and Weiler, 1999, p. 10). In 
addition, the ECJ can undercut the legal basis for the financial assistance to the human rights 
agencies today. However, the ECJ cannot confirm these four free movements and the 
convergence of human rights policy alone, and it requires the positive will of the other EU 
institutions, in the sense that it is not an executive organ. 
60 
From the viewpoint of the Commission it is necessary to confer plenary jurisdiction to the 
Community to confirm the respect of human rights. Such a thought is supported by non- 
governmental organisations (NGOs) that evaluate the value of national sovereignty 
anachronistic. Meanwhile, the Council suggests that the common human rights policy of the 
Community impinges upon domestic activities of the Member States, and the issue of human 
rights is outside the legislative jurisdiction of the Community. In such a series of development 
process, as unlike the trade agreements in the context of CCP, sometimes the EP withheld its 
assent through the assent procedure because of the abuse of human rights and the lack of 
democracy in the signatory parties. 
Contrasted to contending viewpoints between these two institutions, it is self-evident that in 
the issue areas of exclusive competence such as the CCP, the Common Agricultural Policy 
(CAP) and the Single Market only the Community can be regarded as a custodian of human 
rights. By contrast, in the areas of national jurisdiction including criminal law, individual 
Member States are custodians of human rights (Alston and Weiler, 1999, p. 23). According to 
this interpretation, the EU has kept an intention to evolve subsidiarity as the EU has involved the 
national constitutional order of the Member States and European Convention system. 
However, the guideline in the protocol on subsidiarity that is attached to the Amsterdam 
Treaty emphasises that Community action is necessitated by diverse elements including the 
transnational domain of the issue and the existence of treaty obligations. As such, the human 
rights policy of the Community is not in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity. 
Nevertheless, in some measures it can be a necessity being characterised by a hybrid game. 
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adopted, and thus QMV and two readings between the Council and the EP are accompanied by 
this. However, in the second reading the EP can amend or reject the proposal by overturning with 
an overall majority (Nugent, 1994, p. 408). 
19 The assent procedure was a mechanism introduced by the Single European Act (SEA) to give 
the EP the right of veto over certain important decisions, of a non-routine legislative character, 
taken by the Council of Ministers. The procedure is applied to two areas: the conclusion of 
Association Agreements with third states (Article 238 of the Treaty of Rome) and the accession 
of new member states to the Community (Article 237 EEC). Only in a single reading and when 
the approval of the EP is given without amendment, the agreements are authorised and finally 
signed. 
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Part II. Methodological Review 
Chapter 3: 
A methodological arbitration between comparative politics 
and international relations 
3.1 Introduction 
The guiding question of this chapter concerns the possibility of mediating between International 
relations (IR) and Comparative Politics (CP) approaches to the EU as well as between inter- 
paradigm debates within IR (Hix, 1994,1996, Risse-Kappen, 1996, Jacobsen, 1996). The 
shortcut answer is a set of ontological, epistemological, and methodological discussions provide 
analysers of the EU with a possibility for such arbitration: the nature of the EU; investigation of 
the state as a main actor; level of analysis; and agent-structure relationships. 
From the perspective of agent, the exploration of the nature of the EU is directly connected 
to the main issue of statehood in the study of foreign economic policy. The key question here is 
whether or not the EU has the capacity to form and implement a common foreign economic 
policy. Such an investigation of the nature of the EU as an actor may be very important in a 
sense that it is the only empirical study associated with broader conceptualisation of the nature of 
the EU that can obtain a complete significance (Caporaso, 1996). 
On the other hand, the investigation of the nature of the EU engages in insights into the 
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issue of the state as an actor. Such a continuum derives from the changes in the nature and 
capacity of the state, which correspond to changes in the contemporary global political economy. 
There is, therefore, a call for a new recognition of the state as a traditional major actor. Such a 
recognition is based on the challenge to the state as a rational, unitary and sole actor in 
international relations. This call may touch the issue of level of analysis associated with the level 
of activities of newly defined actors in the realm of foreign economic policy. 
In the issue of level of analysis new epistemological challenges exist, also, in terms of the 
linkage of domestic- and international politics and state-society (-system) relationships. These 
challenges result in an ontological, epistemological, and methodological arbitration of sub-fields 
of political science. This arbitration can mediate the debate between sub-fields and even between 
individual paradigms, which approach the EU's foreign economic policy with different 
perceptions of the relationship between these concepts. 
3.2 The nature and actorness of the EU 
There is no fundamental consensus between CP and IR on the nature of the EU system derived 
from differences in the point of view and emphasis (Jordan, 1997). The issue of the nature of the 
EU provides a starting point for the constructing of a basic methodological cognitive framework 
for the study of the EU as well as the question of statehood, which is one of the main issues in 
the study of the EU's foreign economic policy. ' Does the EU have enough statehood to exercise 
the right to form and implement foreign economic policy? As for this question, this study argues 
that the debate on statehood of the EU is useless and even results in methodological inefficiency, 
which puts barriers to more fruitful analytical outcomes. 
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3.2.1 Moving down the ladder of abstraction 
Putting the EU on Sartori's `ladder of abstraction' helps us to build a concept, i. e. unit of 
analysis, at an appropriate level, which leads to research orientation for more theoretically 
reasonable comparison. It also provides components of contemporary global political economy 
with an acceptable abstraction of the nature of the EU. 
Terminology may be used abstractly or concretely depending on an individual researcher's 
place on `the ladder of abstraction' (Sartori, 1970), stopping the ascent or descent at the rung 
where one is satisfied that the kind of understanding one seeks has been achieved (Rosenau and 
Durfee, 1995, p. 3). Here, abstraction of a concept is represented by intension (or connotation) 
and extension (or denotation). The latter implies the number of cases to which the concept is 
applied while the former indicates a series of attributes by which cases are defined. 
There are two directions on the ladder of abstraction: one is to move up, accompanied by 
decrease of intension (reducing attributes), and in turn the increase of extension (expanding the 
number of cases). This results in the avoidance of conceptual stretching; concepts with fewer 
defining attributes commonly apply to more cases and are therefore higher on the ladder of 
generality. The other option is to move down, leading to expanded intension and reduced 
extension, which means that concepts with more defining attributes apply to fewer cases and 
hence are lower on the ladder of abstraction. With such a scope Figure 3.1 explores abstraction 
of the nature of the EU. Moving down the ladder of generality is often accomplished by 
differentiating the classical subtypes of things which we are trying to define. These subtypes are 
full instances of the root definition, and generate great particularity. 
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Figure 3.1 The conceptualisation of the EU on The ladder of 
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`Actor' is divided into two categories such as individual and societal (organisational) actors. 2 
The former indicates each individual, while the latter refers to the committee (cabinet or local 
associations), organisations (central government, representative agency, voluntary authorities, 
private business, local governmental posts, expert associations, trade unions, and organised press 
groups), household, and other micro groups (Harre, 1981, pp. 144,150-52). They operate in the 
realms of domestic and international politics and encompass a different grouping in the same 
way as state actors are opposed to non-state actors. Each shares a common capacity and means to 
form and implement actions or decisions for the reproduction or change of a certain social 
condition, and is an entity with causal accountability for the outcomes (Sibeon, 1999, Hindess, 
1988, p. 105). 3 When moving down the ladder, the EU can be seen as an international 
organisation or an international regime from the viewpoint of an international actor. In terms of 
the former, the EU is a material entity with material location (Brussels, Strasbourg and 
Luxembourg), offices, personnel, facilities and budget. Furthermore legal personality is given to 
the EU by the international community. 
Meanwhile, from the viewpoint of the latter the EU makes differences to international 
organisations in a sense that as far as member states are concerned it exercises the same action as 
a state making a binding law. Usually international organisations have been created by inter-state 
treaties and power to make a binding law would not be given to them. In addition, the EU has the 
character of an international regime in a sense that it is a specific structure, governing the 
geographical realms of some actors, well-defined activities, and resources (Breckingridge, 
1997). 4 Thus, to sum up, the EU can be recognised as an `international regime with organisation' 
in which diverse norms, principles, rules and decision procedures operate. 
Here the differentiation would increase in the sense that many kinds of actors, who are 
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recognised as sharing the home area in a Root Concept, are limited to more specific areas. Such a 
downward movement, however, may increase the actorness by defining more specifically an 
actor's attributes, so that it may lead the researcher to conceptual stretching. Consequently, it 
may interfere with the establishment of an appropriate analytical tool (Collier and Levitsky, 
1997, pp. 434-37). 5 
Sartori's strategy is to climb the ladder to avoid conceptual stretching, which implies 
moving up to concepts with fewer defining attributes and a correspondingly broader range of 
cases. Such an ascent, however, generates a drawback in the sense that it may in addressing more 
general things, cause a loss of conceptual differentiation. 
3.2.2 Moving up to the root concept: four elements of actorness 
As the concept of an actor in traditional international relations indicates the state, 6 so the 
properties of an actor are the same as a state's. However, as the rapidly changing contemporary 
global political economy challenges the nature of state and its functions in international relations, 
there is a call for the reconsideration of the attributes of an actor. Linked to this call, this study 
accepts Jupille and Caporaso's suggestion for four attributes of an actor that suits the 
contemporary global political economy, and will explore the actorness of the EU: recognition, 
authority, autonomy and cohesion. 
Recognition is understood as acceptance by and interactions with other entities (Jupille and 
Caporaso, 1998), and as a political matter that enables supporting or weakening of a targeted 
government (Krasner, 1999, p. 15). Recognition also has the character of a political condition 
that might result in a legal consequences (Evans and Newnham, 1998, p. 468). Recognition of 
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state or government is generally based on two doctrines: declaratory theory and constitutive 
theory. The former is when the UK recognised the People's Republic of China in terms of 
`effective control on territory'(the so-called Lauterpacht Doctrine). In this case, a factual 
requirement is emphasised. The latter is when the international community endows legal 
personality to a state. 7 Such recognition by others allows for a presence in global politics, and 
this presence is a sine qua non for global actorness (Jupille and Caporaso, 1998). 
Since the Westphalia Treaty in 1648 it has been conceived that the concept of sovereign 
territorial state implies that only states can make treaties, participate in international 
organisations and hold responsibilities and obligations to the other states. Then, as the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) approved the legal status of the United Nations (UN) in 1948, 
the EU also obtained this legal personality. This represents the recognition of the EU by the 
international community in terms of constitutive theory. 
Recognition of the EU by third parties is not given by a simple production of external 
effects such as trade creation and diversion that is accompanied by the completion of single 
market. According to declaratory theory, the criterion of recognition would fill out whenever 
third parties would interact with the EU rather than approach individual member states (Jupille 
and Caporaso, 1998, p. 216, Evans and Newnham, 1998, p. 468). At this point of time, it is 
necessary to have a closer look at the institutional structure of the EU in which the actomess of 
the EU is embedded and reflected. 
If one wanted to mention a representative institutional attribute that structures the actors' 
relationships within the EU, then it must be acquis without saying anything further. Acquis 
denotes "the whole range of principles, policies, laws, practices, obligations and objectives that 
have been agreed or that have developed within the European Union", including "most notably 
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the Treaties in their entirety, all legislation enacted to date, and the judgments of the Court of 
Justice" (Bainbridge and Teasdale, 1996, p. 4). Acquis structures these interactions within a 
multi-linked game, deciding whether the competence for a specific issue of the EU's foreign 
economic policy lies with the EU or with the member states. The General Agreement on Trade in 
Service (GATS) international agreement constitutes a successful three-level game according to 
the narrow opinion of the exclusive competence area of the EU in respect to the interpretation of 
its authority. In this case, recognition of the EU by third parties is produced. By contrast, the Air 
Services international agreement represents a competitive two-level game in the sense that 
member states conclude bilateral agreements with third countries, 8 such that the EU as an 
international actor is not recognised by third parties. 
Authority is used for actions or commands in terms of legal and institutional perspectives, 
and distinguished from power, which indicates capacity more than right (Kassim and Menon, 
1996, p. 3). The logic of international politics, for example, lacks a concept of authority, but is 
power-operated, indicating that this concept of authority is mostly national or domestic (Evans 
and Newnham, 1998, p. 39). The absence of international authority therefore leads us to the 
concept of international anarchy. Such authority limits agents' actions or constrains the scope of 
their competence to the range that is acceptable for principles. The account of structural 
(institutional) aspects, therefore, is nested in the investigation of authority. 
The matter of legal authority is connected to that of legal personality. The Treaty of 
European Union (TEU) came into effect in November 1993, but is not an internationally 
comprehensive agreement. The reason why is the incomplete formation of co-operation in 
politically sensitive areas such as foreign policy, security policy, immigration policy, and 
internal national security. As a result, it is impossible to expect the activities of the EU in these 
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areas, and this limitation of the EU is not consistent with its legal personality in terms of 
international law. The Treaty of Amsterdam, therefore, tried to modify those kinds of anomaly. 
It is `direct effect', `supremacy', `pre-emption' and `subsidiarity' that represent the 
fundamental principles of competence location within the EU. A set of these principles judge the 
appropriateness of competence location between member states and the EU level by sometimes 
locating exclusive competence to the EU level in some arenas, as opposed to concurrent cases in 
which the EU and member states act together. 
However, such an account of legal authority is necessary but sufficient for understanding 
the actorness. A weak state, for example, with incomplete legal authority would lack actorness in 
global political economy, while even before 1948 the EU had important functions even if it 
lacked legal personality as a significant actor in global political economy. Legal authority, 
however, would keep encompassing significance as long as it continued to form the expectations 
of the other actors, and to define the limitation of accepted actions (Bretherton and Vogler, 1999, 
p. 18). 
The literal meaning of autonomy is a self-government associated with ideas of sovereignty 
and independence (Evans and Newnham, 1998). Autonomy is recognised in two ways: 
institutional distinctiveness (whether having distinct institutional apparatus or not, i. e. whether 
these institutions are making a difference or not) and the independence of the other actors, 
especially state actors (discretionary goal formation, decision-making and implementation) 
(Jupille and Caporaso, 1998). Such a concept of autonomy is more flexible than that of 
sovereignty as the former focuses on the freedom of the EU in the relationships to societal forces 
within Europe and to external sources, while the latter is concerned with formal authorities and 
their transfer (Kassim and Menon, 1996, p. 3). 
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When the account of the EU is taken in terms of autonomy, there are two main points to be 
found. One is that autonomy is more of the matter of the relative than the absolute. This kind of 
account is mainly given by pluralists, but is supported by most scholars of today (Evans and 
Newnham, 1998, p. 40). 9 As for the EU, the concept of relative and absolute autonomy depends 
on the issue area. The miniature state-like structure located in Brussels does not exercise a 
significant role in the areas of foreign and security policy, welfare policy, social policy, 
citizenship, police and governing international security. Thus, it relatively has thin and limited 
autonomy compared to domestic institutions. 
By contrast, in some areas, including competition policy, the EU enjoys reasonable 
autonomy from national political institutions, i. e. nation-states, through its competence to make 
decisions and recognise authorities. In these areas the EU seeks to abandon or reduce supports 
for national champions at individual member state level, and makes it difficult to pursue policies 
of industrial patriotism by establishing and applying the Community rules (Thatcher, 1997). On 
this point, the EU that enjoys relative autonomy depending on issue areas could be seen as a 
post-modem state whose properties contradict the Westphalian state (Caporaso, 1996, p. 45). 
The other main point is that it is necessary to consider two sides of autonomy. Defining 
autonomy as a state's capacity to transform national policy preferences to authority actions 
cannot comprehend the challenges from external sources as it does the challenges from societal 
forces. Moravcsik (1991,1993a, 1993b, 1994) says that member states would not lose their 
autonomy as a result of the activities of the EU. Despite this argument it is clear that the EU 
institutions actually constrain national autonomy by pursuing supranationalism. The Commission 
and the European Court of Justice (ECJ) define a set of possible policy options by quasi-judical 
function and by jurisprudence, respectively, in some areas such as competition policy. 
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Meanwhile, in the coalition with the EU institutions (usually the Commission and the European 
Parliament) the EU can constrain national autonomy by mobilising constituents who favour 
transnational interests. 
On the one hand, to the extent that interest groups re-orientate their endeavour towards 
Brussels, and to the extent that governments forfeited their roles as gatekeepers of domestic 
interests and the EU the extent that the locus of state power is transferred to supranational level 
is also indicated. At the same time, all of those are explanatory indicators for how autonomous 
the EU is to national government and societal forces (Kassim and Menon, 1996, p. 8). On the 
other hand, autonomy of the EU from external sources confronts the challenges from potential 
alternatives such as human rights, minority authority, financial accountability and maintenance 
of international stability, which are competing at the EU level with norms such as soft law, 
negotiated enforcement, waiting for a policy window, punctuated equilibriums, package dealing, 
subsidiarity, informal decision-making and consensus at (almost) any cost. 
In fact, in the interdependent world of today, final authority for the decision-making of 
national governments cannot be free from the challenges of external sources. Thus, simultaneous 
account of those two sides is necessary. Furthermore, the conceptualisation of autonomy in terms 
of two perspectives, i. e. from internal and external sources, would fill the gap between these two 
areas that still remains despite the blurring of boundaries between international relations and the 
other sub-fields of political science (Kassim and Menon, 1996, p. 3). 
The minimal level of cohesion is another property of actorness. Cohesion is not a simple 
aggregation of internal preference or external presence, but the capacity of an entity to form and 
arbitrate policy preferences (Jupille and Caporaso, 1998). Moravcsik (1993b, 1995) argues that 
the policy outcomes of the EU are produced by an inter-state liberal process of preference- 
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convergence. Policy preferences of individual member states, however, are easily and already 
constrained by membership of the EU. Furthermore, the EU does not characterise a formal or 
nominal multilateralism by putting weight simply on the number of members. By contrast, the 
EU is a substantive and qualitative multilateral regime, with common principles such as 
indivisibility of collectivity, non-discrimination and diffused reciprocity, and emphasis on the 
relationships between members (Ruggie, 1992). In such a multilateral regime the principles of 
`generalised' actions (Ruggie, 1992), norms and rules operate. All of those components generate 
capacity (control) of the EU to form and arbitrate consistently policy preferences. 
Even though the establishment of a security community is left as a final target, cohesion of 
the EU would have significance to Waltz's international structure at least in two senses: member 
states are pooling their `interdependence sovereignty', i. e. `control and not authority... capacity 
of a state to regulate movements across its borders'(Krasner, 1999, p. 4) to the supranational EU 
institutions, and the former Eastern Europe countries are willing to connect their economic fates 
to the EU, i. e. the feature of economic community. The EU, however, even makes a distinction 
between the other forms of entities in global politics only with standard of external 
consequences, despite the absence of minimal level of cohesion (Jupille and Caporaso, 1998). 
In particular, taxonomic collectivity does not correspond to the attributes of actorness. 
Entities such as social movement, social class, men, the black, the white, and women have 
neither an identified means for taking decisions, nor a causal accountability for the outcomes. It 
is, therefore, impossible to say that they are actors (Hindess, 1988, p. 105). 
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3.2.3 Lowering standards: conceptual expansion of statehood 
The exploration of the nature of the EU on the top rung of the ladder of abstraction confronts the 
dominance of state. In international relations tradition, the nation-state has been recognised as 
the main actor, which produces foreign policy. However, unlike the area of the EEC, i. e. the first 
pillar of the EU, the EU does not feature a unitary actor in the area of foreign policy. In addition 
to this, the statehood of the EU in forming and implementing foreign economic policy has been 
questioned, largely because of the imbalance between its economic weight and its capacity to 
exercise power through purposeful and state-like policies (Smith M., 1994b). The basis for such 
a scepticism lies in the adherence to the traditional meaning of statehood, consisting of 
sovereignty, recognition by other states, citizenship, control of territory and transactions, and 
monopoly of legitimate violence. 
It has mainly been sovereignty that represents properties of state as a major actor in 
international relations (Howe, 1990, Beetham and Lord, 1998). Sovereignty consists of internal 
and external sovereignty: the former is defined as `a supreme decision-making and enforcement 
authority with regard to a particular territory and population' (Evans and Newnham, 1998, p. 
504), while the latter means `the absence of a supreme international authority and hence the 
independence of sovereign states' (Evans and Newnham, 1998, p. 504). These two accounts of 
sovereignty involve the concept of final and absolute authority as a specific form of political and 
legal authority (Hinsley, 1986, Held, 1989), and concern its transfer. 
What matters is that the concept of state attached to the property of sovereignty is not 
appropriate for explaining international relations of today. The basis of this idea lies in the fact 
that political and legal authority that the concept of sovereignty are mainly concerned with 
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national and domestic consensus, and this consequently means the absence of international 
authority. Generally this idea is referred to as the concept of an anarchical system which is 
guided and operated by not authority but power, meaning capacity. Furthermore, in the 
interdependent world of today in which a certain country's domestic policy cannot be 
independent of the other states' political and economic development, de jure authority and de 
facto power do not coincide any more (Keohane and Nye, 1974, Hanrieder, 1978, Hoffmann, 
1987). 
Thus, a concept of sovereignty which is mainly concerned with de jure authority does not 
suit the properties of the state in the contemporary global political economy. In the same context, 
the concept of sovereignty is too narrow to capture the extent to which the EU member states 
condition their own de facto powers (Kassim and Menon, 1996, p. 3). In this situation, if 
someone asked whether or not the EU has a capacity to form and implement foreign economic 
policy, as according to the traditional concept of state, then he or she would try to put new wine 
into an old bag. 
By contrast, by adopting a contrasting stance that expands statehood by emphasising 
autonomy, representation, and the quality of influence (i. e., lowering the standard), 1° the EU can 
be regarded as an entity with a capacity to establish and enforce foreign economic policy 
equivalent to that of the state, showing its 'external presence' in terms of trade policy, 
development co-operation, foreign policy, and interregional dialogue. Furthermore, the EU 
generates matters of interest arbitration, representativeness, and mediation, as well as qualities 
associated with national political systems such as alternative lines concerning the question of 
distribution (who-gets-what, when, and how) (Rosamond, 2000). 
Meanwhile, from the perspective of the state as a political structure, implying a 
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reproductive set of process or patterns across different agents, the concept of state comprehends 
not only formal rules that guide inter-state interactions, but also norms, understandings, and 
process of standard operation (Caporaso, 1996, p. 32). In the same context, soft law (Wellens and 
Borchardt, 1989, Caporaso, 1996), approval of national methods that achieve Community goals, 
interest groups, policy professionals, national bureaucrats, and informal networks between the 
Commission professionals would support the concept of the EU as a political structure. 
The system of the EU, however, has different characteristics from the existing political 
systems of states. Its political system does not contain a continuum from loose 
intergovernmentalism to a superstate (Marks, Scharpf et al., 1996, Marks, Hooghe and Blank, 
1996, Richardson, 1996), and consequently its external outcomes are not generated through an 
integrated policy-making process. In terms of methodology, differences between the existing 
political systems of member states and those of the EU have been found. The traditional political 
systems of the state require a criterion for comparison derived from its exclusive independence in 
a comparative analysis, while assuming that its sub-units are under the same influence. By 
contrast, in the EU system, although it shows differences depending on the issue area, generally 
such exclusive independence is deprived of its meaning and the dimension of the same influence 
is shown to be more complex. 
Thus, the EU is recognised as an actor-like entity (Allen and Smith, 1990, Hill, 1994, 
Sjostedt, 1997, Smith M., 1996, Whitman, 1997), confederation (Wallace W., 1983), sub-system 
of the international system (Hill, 1994) or an example of multi-level governance (Ebbinghaus, 
1998, Caporaso, 1996) instead of a traditional state. Each of these types is an incomplete form of 
actor because they have less of its defining attributes. Thus, they would be higher on the ladder 
of generality, and would therefore provide less differentiation. The recognition of the EU as a 
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provisional actor, however, strengthens differentiation and makes it possible to avoid conceptual 
stretching by specifying the missing attributes and consequently creating new analytic categories. 
On the other hand, it may be less vulnerable to conceptual stretching in the sense that researchers 
would be more modest in arguing the perfection of the EU as an actor (Collier and Levitsky, 
1997, pp. 438-41). " 
3.3 The unit of analysis: the state as a unitary actor and 
state-society relationships 
3.3.1 Challenge to state as a unitary and rational actor 
There is a conflict between IR and CP centring round the concept of state as an actor that is 
located in the top rung of the ladder of abstraction. In terms of the unit of analysis, IR 
(intergovernmentalism and neo-functionalism) is attached to the Weberian definition of the state 
as the hierarchical structure of authoritarian decision-making enjoying external and internal 
sovereignty (Risse-Kappen, 1996). According to this, the state is seen as a unitary actor 
representing sovereignty and territory or an interdependent and dependent sub-system. Such 
recognition does not provide us with the theory of the state (showing the formation and changes 
of the state, and its relationship with society and its autonomous role), although it is a state- 
centric approach. In addition to this, it overlooks differences in internal preferences and political 
institutions in a society. The problem is that these differences represent an important influence 
on international politics (Milner, 1998). Thus, many scholars in IR raise the issue of dismantling 
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the definition of the state by turning to political sociology (Krasner, 1983), historical sociology, 
the consideration of the change from medieval to modern and Durkheim's dynamic density 
(Ruggie, 1986), interdependence, institutionalism, globalisation , and multilateralism. 
By contrast, CP understands the state in terms of a moral order, an ethnic-cultural unit, a 
monopolist of just forces in a society, a proxy or agent of the ruling class, a multilateral polity, a 
neo-multilateral or cosmopolitan polity, the ruling elite, and bureaucratic or administrative 
organisation. Increasingly Comparative Politics conceptualises the state as an interlocking 
institution in which the political and societal groups interact with subsets of national 
governments, and the political decisions are the result of complex negotiation processes 
(Heritier, 1996). Such conceptualisations make us recognise the political system of the state as a 
discrete entity away from the Weberian definition of the state. Furthermore, it contributes to a 
deeper understanding of the nature of the decision-making procedures in the EU, distinguishing 
between the internal structure of a society, i. e. the nature of political institutions, and the society- 
state relationship, that is the policy network in which the national government is only one actor 
(Risse-Kappen, 1996). 
Basically, the mediation of the debate on foreign economic policy in the EU starts with the 
challenge to state-centric recognition. The fundamental dynamics of such a challenge derive 
from the cessation of the Cold War, the diffusion of democratisation (Milner, 1998, pp. 767-79) 
and the expansion of globalisation. The cessation of the Cold War agitated the stability of the 
state as the sole actor in the international system and raised the importance of other actors, 
including international institutions (Milner, 1998, pp. 767-79). In the Cold War era power 
relationships were clearly stable or fixed, making `problem solving theory' of demonstrable 
theoretical usefulness. This theory regards dominant social power relationships and the 
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institutions in which such a relationship is organised as a given framework of action. 
Furthermore, it makes it easy to perform minute and accurate investigations by attaching 
variables to the issue areas, reducing the statement of specific questions to a limited number of 
variables. By contrast, in an era such as the post-Cold War World when the power relationship is 
unstable, the theoretical utility lies in critical theory's ability to capture the opportunities and 
risks of change (Cox, 1986). Critical theory projects socio-political complexity not as separated 
parts, but as a whole, i. e. it tries to understand the processes of changes involved by both the 
parts and the whole. 
Meanwhile, the denial of unity in the state leads naturally to critiques of its rationality. The 
basis of the denial of rationality is derived from the diverse non-governmental actors seeking 
their own different interests from national interest, linking with national actors through conflicts 
of interests or the opportunities for negotiation and compromise. From the perspective of sub- 
systemic forces, the point that individual decision-makers may act irrationally based on their own 
erroneous cognition or beliefs which they acquire by their personal status or historical 
experiences, is also another major reason for such a denial. The challenge here is to capture when 
and how constraints and opportunities are conferred on individual member states and the actors 
of the EU's representative institutions by domestic interest, i. e. non-governmental actors' 
interests, and those in the EU and international level in the field of foreign economic policy of 
the EU. 
3.3.2 Challenge to the state as a sole actor 
Even though there are various actors in the study of foreign economic policy, the state or 
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government has been seen as the major actor and structure. Actors and structures other than the 
state and government have been regarded as prominent only to the extent of their impact on the 
areas of the states' concerns. Such a point of view has been adopted by statists whose 
observations mainly centre round trade and realists in IR. For them, the state alone has the 
properties of an appropriate unit of analysis: `the highest level of generality subject to, ' and `the 
ability of this collectivity to act as a coherent unit' (Frey, 1985, p. 142). 
Hix (1994) criticises IR approaches (the realist approaches such as intergovernmentalism, 
preference-convergence approach, and elite-bargaining theory), as to the extent that they see the 
state as a unitary actor with a single interest, they neglect the influence of non-governmental 
actors. In addition, he points out that there is much left to be desired in terms of the definition of 
national interest, which has neglected economic interest as opposed to attaching importance to 
the recognised interest of government. Many scholars in CP argue that IR exclusively focuses on 
inter-state interactions, or those among governmental elites. 
Such criticisms of IR, however, may be applicable to limited paradigms. Other approaches 
in IR, such as liberalism and structuralism, pay attention to actors other than the state, departing 
from the Weberian idea of the reason of the state and the assumption of the state as a unitary and 
rational actor. For example, international professional organisations and their technocrats are 
assumed as major actors in functional integration theories, while neo-functional integration 
theories regard trade unions, political parties, trade associations and transnational bureaucratic 
societies as significant actors. Multinational corporations and transnational and 
transgovernmental associations are understood as major actors by interdependence theorists. 
In addition, liberal paradigms in IR address the issues of how inter-state interactions and 
international norms transform the ways of defining national interest. Furthermore, they consider 
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how international factors interact with domestic factors to explain the changes in national 
interest. There is a need to point out the shortcomings of the rational choice approach in CP; it 
regards member states as unitary actors with hierarchical and single-peaked preferences, and it 
views political conflicts within the EU from a single dimension. As a result, they failed to 
incorporate effectively and formally internal competition among states and the institutional or 
ideological accounts into their model (Hix, 1994, p. 15). 
The challenge to the singularity of the state as an actor also turns up in the reinforcement of 
transnational relations and the central role of institutions. Transnationalism emphasising 
international variables and challenging the role of the state relaxes the assumption that the state 
is the sole actor in international politics and focuses instead on the importance of transnational 
actors and the interaction amongst societies. Consequently, the actors other than the state such as 
nongovernmental organisations (NGOs), international non-governmental organisations (INGOs), 
multinational corporations (MNCs), foreign investors, the Vatican, revolutionary organisations, 
trade unions, and scientific organisations enter into the analysis of international politics 
(Keohane and Nye, 1972). 
The challenge to the singularity of the state as an actor also turns up in the reinforcement of 
the central role of institutions. A few empirical studies based on the institutional approach to the 
study of foreign economic policy generate persuasive cases for the central prospects on the 
balance of power between the organisational structures, institutions and their constraining roles. 
Beyond Katzenstein's emphasis on institutional constraints in his domestic structure approach, 
research of Goldstein (1989,1993), Pastor (1980) and Destler (1980) on the USA's foreign 
economic policy established the central role of the structure of domestic institutions in the 
formation of policy, especially those of commercial policy (Mercado, 1995, p. 116). Moravcsik 
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(1993 a, 1995) also does not neglect the influence of institutional actors, although by contrast he 
rejects the research that focuses on institutions. As the external impact of the Cold War 
disappears and moves away from the maintenance of the order based on the existing balance of 
power, various institutions such as international organisations are beginning to play the role of a 
new mediator in the balance of power in a trade war, i. e. a new form of power game. Various 
agencies in such institutions impact on the international system through their strategic 
interactions while institutions form or reflect these agencies' interactions (Milner, 1998). 
3.4 The level of analysis 
3.4.1 Linkage between domestic and international politics 
The term of international relations imposes complexity and variety on the object of research, 
which includes all manner of interactions amongst the members of an individual society (Holsti, 
1995, p. 18). International relations theories makes not only interstate relations, but also other 
performers such as international groups, MNCs, and international terrorist groups its objects of 
research. In addition to this, domestic political factors in a state such as bureaucratic political 
associations, interest groups, the president, and leading political authorities are the focus of 
profound research (Viotti and Kauppi, 1993). Such concentrations on domestic political factors 
grant IR the possibility of connecting with other fields of political science (Milner, 1998). 
However, in terms of a tool that is employed in analysing the internal working of the state, it fails 
to draw upon the enormous resources of CP (the theory of comparative government) (Hurrell and 
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Menon, 1996). The existing research of domestic politics in JR either fails to closely examine 
strategic interactions internally or does not go beyond a simple assumption on a few methods of 
aggregating preferences through the national choice of policies. Consequently, it demonstrates a 
lack of intensive methods for predicting outcomes (Milner, 1998). 
Conversely, pluralism in CP contributes to the analysis of political processes within the 
Community by concentrating on the nature of decision-making processes within the EU (Hix, 
1994). However, the nature of the EU, consisting of diverse factors including intergovernmental 
and national factors, neutrality of member states shown in the policy-making processes, and the 
consistent importance of power to be considered, indicates that the CP approaches alone are not 
enough to interpret the politics of the EU. In addition to this, public policy approaches generally 
cannot be applied without reference to the international factors which condition and form 
policies (Hurrell and Menon, 1996). As such, there is a need to draw reciprocally upon the ideas 
of these two sub-fields of political science (Richardson, 1996, George, 1996, Young 0., 1994, 
Bulmer, 1994). 
Addressing the level of analysis question within IR theory, neo-realists and globalists 
emphasise the importance of the system as a level of analysis, although each has different 
images. By contrast, perspectives focusing on domestic and external factors are variously 
adopted by realists and liberalists in IR. Generally, realists emphasise the international system, 
and do not try to open `Pandora's box' (Hollis and Smith, 1990, p. 93) containing the internal 
characteristics of components (i. e. the individual state) of the international system, assuming 
instead that the state is a rational actor. In addition, realists are mainly interested in the status 
quo, i. e. the maintenance of the system, away from the structural changes of the system, 
regarding the international system as a constant. 
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Waltz's neo-realism takes the position that individual differences between states and 
domestic politics can be overlooked by underestimating the influences of domestic politics on 
national policy-making. According to his cognition, national domestic factors are never 
important compared to the external imperatives of the international system, and thus despite 
internal differences all the states are understood as reacting in the same ways to external stimuli. 
The exclusive consideration of domestic factors in foreign economic policy-making is 
accompanied by the risk of isolating foreign economic policy from international relations. 
External environments contain the `how question' (how foreign policies are decided and how 
possible choice is conditioned by the type of method chosen) by exercising reasonable influences 
on the contents of foreign policies and policy-making processes. Even external environments 
(the alliance structure of the world, the structure of power, control, dependence, and 
interdependence) constrain the national policy-makers' actions without regard to decision- 
makers' ideological orientation or personal ideas, let alone domestic public opinion or the 
economic and social demands which are components at an individual national level (the state and 
individual i. e. decision-maker) (Holsti, 1995, pp. 17-18). From the standpoint of such features, 
Hix (1996), who emphasises the relative propriety of CP approaches as a tool of analysis, also 
admits that the importance of international pressures including global economy and political 
interdependence are excluded both at a national and the EU level by CP approaches. 
By contrast, such features of external environments make it possible to recognise the scope 
of changes in a political system as a dependent variable which change depending on system 
environments by the existing macro theories such as system theory or structural and functional 
theories (LaPalombara, 1970). This is a work excluding the meaning of politics in the research of 
political phenomenon (Sartori, 1970). Thus, many scholars including G. Almond, a 
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comparativist, place an emphasis on the interactive model of CP and IR, i. e. cross-disciplinary 
work. On the other hand Haggard and Simmons (1987) argue that structural theory such as the 
analysis of power is not enough to explain the dynamics of the international regimes, and that a 
theory that is able to link the processes of domestic politics into the international level is needed. 
Out of such a series of phenomena and a necessity, as another necessary starting point for 
the analysis of foreign economic policy of the EU, the importance of a simultaneous inquiry into 
domestic politics, domestic EU politics and international politics incrementally comes to the 
front. The reasons are that it is unrealistic to expect an approach coming out of a sub-field to 
provide an appropriate explanation of policy outputs, and that it is not obvious what constitutes 
internal politics and the essence of international relations, as the era of globalisation arrives in 
which the linkage between domestic affairs and international affairs is increasing with the 
expansion of interdependence, power of the state, and the increase of inter-state institutions and 
their density (Hurrell and Menon, 1996). In such a context, the existing CP orientation towards 
domestic factors increasingly penetrates IR areas in terms of the focus of analysis (Jacobsen, 
1996), and inversely in IR the introduction of the studies of domestic politics is actively 
processed. 
3.4.2 Challenge to state-society relationships 
The traditional IR paradigms such as realism and neo-realism recognise that the state, seen as a 
national-territorial totality, acts independently of the society as `the range of institutions, 
individuals and practices lying beyond the direct control and financing of this central entity [the 
state]'(Halliday, 1994, p. 81), and represents values that are separated from those of the society. 
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In addition, the definition of state in international relations is repleted with legal and value 
assumptions as well as analytical convenience (Halliday, 1994). 
By contrast, the other paradigms challenge the dominance of state in a sense that with the 
increase of interdependence and transnationalism, the global system and structure start 
dominating state and non-state actors (Halliday, 1994, pp. 74-93). Those paradigms try to 
simultaneously understand how the state locates itself in the area of domestic politics, the 
international system, the structure of class, and the international capitalist economy (Cox and 
Sjolander, 1994, Smith, Boath and Zalewski, 1996, Booth and Smith, 1995). In addition, they 
seek the origins of foreign policy in the societal and economic structure of state. Pluralists in IR 
have the tendency to place an emphasis on state-society or individuals (Viotti and Kauppi, 1993, 
p. 44). In such a framework, the time-honoured intellectual tradition of IR that sees foreign 
policy as a pure expression of national interests is challenged by the distinction of state and civil 
society. 
Liberal theories such as intergovernmentalism, neo-functionalism and institutional 
approaches (functionalism and federalism) have the advantage of being able to open the national 
`black box'. They are, however, lacking a consideration of societal actions by assuming that 
actors' own interests are a dynamic of European integration, failing to distinguish the society- 
state relationships. On the other hand, the domestic structures of a society, i. e. the nature of 
political institutions, can not be described by them. Namely, they cannot answer the question of 
whether or not the actors' interests relationships and preferences are formed by the institutions of 
the EU or its integration itself, deriving from their adherent recognition to the utility function 
defined in an economic aspect (Risse-Kappen, 1996). 
In the comparative politics tradition, state-society relationships are addressed on the basis 
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of state-centric viewpoint. In CP, the state has been conceptualised as a `black box' (Easton, 
1965) into which inputs (influences, pressures and attitudes) flow and out of which authoritative 
decisions flow. Since the middle of the 1980s, however, this traditional viewpoint has confronted 
a challenge that concerns societal inputs to political decisions. Being consistent with this 
challenge, CP has paid greater attention to non-governmental institutions such as abnormal 
governmental organisations, political parties and interest groups, and attitudes and recognitions 
of elites and the public. Such a shift in viewpoint led newly to emphasise the role of the state in 
the state-society relationships as well as public policy-making (Verba, 1985). However, 
comparative politics approaches define the importance of institutions in terms of the strength and 
autonomy of state to society, which would lead us to the error of ignoring the perspective of 
state-society interactions. Even this kind of account would push society out of consideration 
(Remmer, 1997, p. 57). 
In fact, in European Studies, nation-state-centric perspectives have prevailed apart from the 
perspective of global dynamics (Rosamond 1995), though Mitrany's integration theory seeks a 
world polity. In the sense that the EU consists of nation-states, it is obvious that the nation-state 
is a major actor in European affairs. It is not possible, therefore, to exclude the nation-state when 
pursuing European Studies. That is, however, not to say that the nation-state is the optimal unit 
of analysis for European affairs. Rather, social forces and the development processes of different 
forms of the state and the fundamental procedures (interactions) that operate in the structure of 
world political economy should be included in the framework of European Studies. Only by this, 
the question of `ceteris paribus' (formal with other conditions remaining the same) leading the 
assumption of the static situation of the whole could be resolved (Cox, 1986). 
In particular, the area such as foreign economic policy that is linked directly to the interests 
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of civil society deserves to be addressed within the framework based on the linkage of state and 
society. As the case where U. S. Ethyl Corporation brought the Canadian government to court 
shows, `a situation where, by virtue of the implementation of a law or regulation by a 
government, the assets of a private party lose value' (UN, 1998, p. 61), i. e. the rubric of 
`regulatory taking', represents explicitly how foreign economic policy is connected with civil 
society. 12 
For establishing a framework based on state-society linkage, first, it is necessary to secede 
from the definition of state as a national-territorial totality. Instead of such a definition, the 
notions of state as `a set of administrative, policing and military organizations headed, and more 
or less well coordinated, by an executive authority (Skocpol, 1979, p. 29 cited in Halliday, 1994, 
p. 79) or a specific set of coercive and administrative institutions should be stressed. Such 
provocative notions are in theory autonomous, but make it possible to take institutions into 
account, which are influenced by the state and a match for the regulatory and reproductive 
functions of the state. In addition, it embraces state-society interactions as a necessary condition, 
including the perspective of the state as ultimately constrained by society, not as a mechanism to 
dominate, regulate, and reproduce society (Halliday, 1994, pp. 74-93). 13 
Second, this account of state-society linkage confronts the question of how to examine 
state-civil society relationships centring round the pursuit of special interests or universal 
interests and the arbitration of them. Civil society is distinguished from such economic areas that 
pursue economic interests exclusively associated with specific members. Civil society plays a 
role to realise the common good that the community pursue, and thus is defined as diverse non- 
governmental organisations with development, disarmament, women's equality, democracy, 
environmental protection, and human rights as its objectives. Those objectives are reflected in a 
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state's foreign economic policy, and are not limited to the national level in terms of the realm of 
activities. Civil society exists everywhere in the world in diverse shapes and forms at different 
levels of organisations, capacity and strength. Meanwhile, civil society participates in the process 
of transnational structuralisation (Cerny, 1997) together with the other political, economic and 
societal actors through transnational linkage. 
3.5 Strategic interactions in nested games: agent and structure 
The issue of the level of analysis connects closely with that of agency-structure, which is a 
fundamental issue for political science and its efforts to conceptualise the relationship between 
state actors and the international system. Above all, if the structure of a system is defined 
exclusively in terms of a component unit, as is the assumption in realism and neo-realism, such a 
structure is not capable of generating actors or state actions (Wendt, 1987). In addition, an 
individual reductionism is also a biased viewpoint, in which the structure of the system is defined 
as a factor of a unit such as a distribution of capabilities. 
The actors and the structure of a system, therefore, must be regarded as entities 
(substances) that are reciprocally constituted, i. e. reciprocate (exchange) reciprocal influences, 
apart from these two extreme epistemologies or ontologies. Such an intention, attaching 
simultaneous importance to unit and structure, appears analogous to neo-realism in terms of 
basic assumptions. Fundamentally, it demonstrates explicit differences, recognising the one's 
dominance between agency and structure as a unit of analysis. Realism in IR regards the system 
as a given and does not go beyond this unit of analysis. By contrast, neo-realism contends that 
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only by including consideration of structural influences to the analysis at a unit level is it 
possible to properly understand international politics. Such a position is sympathetic with world- 
system theory. These theories, however, are weaker at properly explaining the nature and 
dynamics of the major objects of analysis, and are often unable to interpret state action itself 
because either structure or agency is given a priori dominance over the other (Wendt, 1987). 
The outcomes of this structural change confirm the tenuous distinction between domestic 
and international politics, and leads to an examination of interactions amongst actors in a multi- 
level game and their impact on the international system (Milner, 1998). These features result in a 
multi-level game logic (Snyder and Diesing, 1977, Putnam, 1988, Fearon, 1998, Milner and 
Rosendorff, 1996,1997, Grossman and Helpman, 1995, Paarlberg, 1997, Schoppa, 1993, 
Patterson, 1997, Moyer, 1993, Tsebelis, 1990, Collinson, 1999, Coleman and Tangermann, 1998, 
Milner, 1998) where strategic interaction is operating, i. e. each unitary states' "optimal strategies 
depend on what other states are doing, and they can only achieve their goals to the extent that 
other states do not interfere with them"(Milner, 1998, p. 771). 
Basing analysis on the logic of strategic interactions means the orientation of anti- 
reductionism in the confrontation of holism-reductionism centred round the level of analysis. In 
other words, unlike reductionism that regards attitudes of the whole as a simple sum of 
individual entities, it recognises the attitudes of the whole as including specific relations as well 
as the whole's inherent characteristics derived from its interactions with different environments. 
Thus, the whole of the EU's foreign economic policy-making is regarded as being beyond a 
simple aggregation of the domestic features of individual member states' foreign economic 
policies (levels II and III, domains of the EU and domestic politics, respectively, which are not 
exposed to level I, i. e. the domain of international relations). In other words, it is regarded as 
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possessing individual member states' policy preferences, formed by interactions with world 
political economy environments or structures that control the range of individual states' 
determinative capability on their actions (level I and its exposed level III) as well as 
opportunities and constraints on inherent attitudes of the Community's policy-making (level I 
and its exposed level II). 
This indicates the need to confer an equal ontological status to agency and structure, 
without attempting to reduce the structure of the international system to a unit of the state, i. e. 
states' attitudes, or vice versa (individualism and holism), as well as separate agent and structure 
for analytical purposes (positivism and rationalism). In other words, an understanding of the 
dynamics of the international political system as an outcome of social interactions within a 
framework of the interactions between domestic, EU and international system levels is required, 
i. e. the changeability of variables. IPE theory based on a positivist understanding which prefers 
the distinction of agency and structure does not give us the tools needed to capture the 
complexity of the global economy (Higgott, 1993). 
The EU is a polity beyond an international organisation, an interstate forum, an instance of 
emergent supranationalism, an interstate co-operative body (Hix, 1994,1999), or a regime 
(Rosamond, 2000). Within the EU, member states are still dominant players, and dominant 
intergovernmentalism exists while the role of the key player in interactions with external forces 
is conferred to the representatives of the EU, not member states themselves. In addition to this, 
the processes of negotiation within the EU are actor-centric, and the actors are not personified 
states, but civil servants, the Commission officials, MEPs, national ministers, and Prime 
Ministers (Christiansen and Jorgensen, 1999). According to these natures, almost all EU policies 
characterised by direct interactions with the international system, intergovernmentalism among 
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member states, and multi-level features are formed by the processes of interactions between the 
EU authorities and the international system. 
In the framework of such multi-governance the position of the state is determined by the 
actors' preferences on policies, and by the institutions for their power sharing on the continuum 
between the domestic politics and the international system (Milner, 1998). This linkage between 
domestic environments and the international system within the context of a multiple-layered 
governance leads to the trend of focusing on IR influences in domestic interests and institutions, 
and consequently to how IR relates to other fields of political science (Milner, 1998). Such an 
emphasis on the context of interactions within strategic environments is shared by game theory. 
Game theory, however, shows great differences between the strategic interactions approach 
which rejects the idea of thinking of government (consisting of central decision-makers, 
bureaucrats, and other domestic groups) as an agent and using a single utility function in 
presenting all representatives in a society, in the sense that it assumes that the state is a unitary 
actor (Milner, 1998). In addition, game theory cannot explore how societal interactions construct 
actors who are recognised as a given, since it concentrates on what decisions a given actors 
make, the so-called technical perspective (Wendt, 1987, pp. 368-369). 
In a similar context to the linkage between domestic- and international politics, the EU's 
FEP is subject to both processes of externalisation and internalisation (Smith M., 1994a, p. 464). 
The process of externalisation occurs when the internal bargaining between member states and 
within inter-EU institutions is projected onto an international context. By contrast, the process of 
internalisation occurs when external developments and actors become part of the EU's 
bargaining process, which might then be used by either member states or the EU's institutions in 
the determination of EU policies. These two processes can be seen as an extension of the 
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understanding of the linkages between domestic politics and interstate diplomacy, which is 
referred to as a two-level game (Paarlberg, 1997, Schoppa, 1993, Putnam, 1988). It will be 
further modified into a three-level game (Patterson, 1997, Moyer, 1993) consisting of 
international organisations (GATT or WTO), the EU institutions and the member states' 
governments. 
By contrast, from the perspective of actors, domestic actors who participate in a three-level 
game consisting of domestic politics, the EU and the international system would compete over 
individual interests, i. e. their own portions, together with national and the Community policy 
preferences or interests. This feature is a `nested game' (Tsebelis, 1988,1990) and may provide, 
in particular, the actor-centric process of negotiation within the EU, i. e. metaphor of two-level 
and three-level games, with an interesting and supplementary angle. 
Figure 3.2 describes EU governance concerning the features of two-level and three-level 
games in policy-making. The distinction between levels I, II and III clarifies some of the 
dynamics and interrelationships, and thus attempts to explain exactly when and how the EU 
interacts within international economic diplomacy. Level I signifies the strategic interstate 
bargaining between negotiations (Milner, 1998) leading to a tentative agreement in the GATT or 
WTO game. Level II is the EU's policy-making process whereby the Level I agreement must be 
ratified. On the other hand, Level III is the national Level in which competing domestic socio- 
economic interests constitute the bargaining positions and power configuration at Level II 
(Putnam, 1988). 
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Figure 3.2 Multi-level game in the EG's foreign economic 
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In these level-games, outsiders are not key players in the inter-EU FEP game, and the EU's 
member states do not play directly and bilaterally in the GATT or WTO game without going 
through the ratification games in the national and EU levels. Thus, each game is autonomous. 
Equilibrium in a game, however, creates the need to re-evaluate the payoff from the other game. 
At this point, each game is linked (Coleman and Tangermann, 1998). Such a linkage of games 
generates a double constraint. In the negotiations with non-EU countries there is a need to choose 
policy tools offering the possibility of achieving ratification in Levels II (EU politics) and III 
(domestic politics). By contrast, the EU needs to consider possible solution-sets of policy tools to 
be approved in international fora. 14 
In Level I, the perspective of international relations is emphasised more than that of foreign 
policy. When the EU is understood as a sub-system of the international system (Hill, 1990,1993, 
1996), the EU's external policy is not simply a European foreign policy; it generates multi- 
dimensional international relations, which interact on the three parallel sets of politics, military 
affairs, and economics. Via an empirical analysis of such interaction, the answer to the question 
of the role of the EU in the world political economy can be pursued at Level I. Thus the EU's 
role not only in multi-lateral trade agreements, but also in new bilateral agreements, inter- 
regional association, co-operation, and partnership agreements with third countries or emerging 
regional economic groups is worthy of notice (Collinson, 1999). In such a multi-level game, the 
general classification of foreign economic policy approaches such as system-centred, society- 
centred, and state-centred approaches (Ikenberry et al., 1988a) converges to a synthesis. 
The analysis of foreign economic policy from the perspective of the strength and autonomy 
of the state against a society does not consider how competition among societal interest groups 
impacts upon the convergence of diverging preferences (Gourevitch, 1986, Milner, 1988,1998, 
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Frieden, 1991, Rogowski, 1989). However, focusing on the groups of domestic actors who 
contain hegemonic power in producing the collective outcomes highlights the lack of 
consideration given to how to aggregate the other actors' diverse preferences into the policies by 
making it pay attention only to these groups' preferences. Finally, foreign economic policy of a 
polity is beyond a `function of domestic politics' reflecting the preferences of the dominant 
group or class in society, or resulting from the struggle for influence that takes place among 
various interest groups or political parties (Ikenberry et al., 1988a). 
As such, foreign economic policy is a collective systemic outcome produced as the result of 
implicit aggregation of diverse domestic preferences through state-society interactions within a 
political system. Simultaneously, it is a function of internationally obvious strategic interactions 
between state, society and system beyond the `function of attitude or capacities of the state' 
involving other states (Milner, 1998). The function of such a strategic interaction is also 
operating in close state-society-system interactions concerning the formation and implementation 
of foreign economic policy of the EU in the processes of internalisation and externalisation. 
Within these processes, the EU institutions plays the role of a filter or mediator to form or reflect 
the interactions between the preferences of individual member states produced by the 
convergence of governmental and societal preferences, i. e. state-society interactions, and those 
of the international system, i. e. the structural power. Meanwhile, individual actors, i. e. decision- 
makers, operate as nested agents to pursue their own objectives within these processes. 
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3.6 Conclusion 
In conclusion, the debates on approaches to the EU between IR and CP can be arbitrated through 
some meta-theoretical points as the following: first, in terms of a unit of analysis it is vital to 
define the nature of the EU on the middle-range of the ladder of abstraction. It has found out that 
the EU characterises recognition, authority, autonomy and cohesion that constitute the root 
concept of actorness. Meanwhile, there is another finding that the concept of state based on 
sovereignty as its main property does not suit to the conceptualisation of actors, including the 
EU, in contemporary interdependent global political economy. Such unsuitability derives from 
the sense that the concept of sovereignty highlights formal authorities and their transfer rather 
than control or capacity, which are more often and mainly addressed in international relations. 
There is a need, therefore, to limit standards of statehood to the qualities of a political system 
such as the arbitration of interests, representation, mediation and autonomy, i. e. the conceptual 
expansion. As such, it is more appropriate to recognise the EU as a state-like entity, i. e. an actor 
in the international system, which has the capacity to implement the common policies such as 
foreign economic policy. 
Second, the denial of the unity and rationality of the state, as well as its soleness as an 
actor, is required as a starting point, and also as a basis to capture a proper understanding of the 
political economic dynamics that occur in EU's foreign economic policy-making. As such, not 
being dependent on a conception of states as unitary actors, IR can share conceptions or theories 
in CP, and provide strong and parsimonious tools to, and greater empirical accuracy for 
understanding strategic interaction within different institutional environments than the other 
approaches (Milner, 1998). 
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Third, as for level of analysis, there is a need to focus on state-society interactions that 
operate in the process of interlocking domestic politics, the EU politics and international politics. 
It is, therefore, necessary to open `Pandora's box' (Hollis and Smith, 1990, p. 93, Haggard, 1991, 
p. 408) that represents internal characteristics of individual components, and adopt the viewpoint 
of comprehending the basic interactions that operate in the process of the development of 
societal forces and national structure, and the structure of world political economy. 
Finally, it is necessary to develop a framework based on agent-structure interactions. The 
issue of agent-structure covers not only IR but also political science, even social science, as 
relevant fields. An appropriate answer to this question can be found in the orientation towards to 
agent-structure duality meaning that agent is constrained by structure and on the other hand 
changes structural environment, away from the dichotomy of agent and structure based on the 
logic of parsimony of theory or structure-determinism. Actors in this account are not 
personalised state but political actors (officials, Commission officials, MEPs, national ministers, 
and Prime Ministers), economic actors (firms, IMF, IBRD, and foreign investors) and societal 
actors (non-governmental actors such as NGOs, international non-governmental organisations 
(INGOs), transnational non-governmental organisations (TNGOs), civil society and transnational 
actors). 
What does matter here is how we construct a framework to address these perspectives. 
Under the necessity of such a method, what this body of academic work is trying to suggest as a 
new framework is the aggregation of diverse preferences via interactions among various agencies 
with different preferences, and those interactions within a structure (domestic, European and 
international) within a two or three (or even more) level-game. This work involves the inquiry 
into the content of policies as its output and policy-making processes as its process. Thus, it is 
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possible to acquire an understanding of a method to explain the policy results of such 
interactions or the development of hypotheses to examine how to relate the changes of 
preferences or institutions to those in the choice of policies (Milner, 1998). 
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A Methodological Arbitration Between Foreign Policy 
Analysis And The International Political Economy Approach 
4.1 Introduction 
The guiding question of this chapter is whether the need for the cross-disciplinary research of 
foreign policy (FP) and FEP approaches is vital in order to capture the dynamics in the 
formulation and enforcement of the EU's FEP? Corresponding to this question, on the one hand, 
this chapter explores methodological propositions in a middle-range arena based on a dialectic 
synthesis of major sub-fields of political science such as international politics (IP) and 
international political economy (IPE). On the other hand, in accordance with such an exploration 
of methodological propositions, this chapter finally suggests a more rigorous method, which 
allows the systemic and modest conceptualisation of FEP as a dependent variable. 
Ultimately, this chapter aims to advocate the need for the expended conceptualising or re- 
theorising of foreign policy incorporating economics with politics by accepting the overlapping 
phenomena in the sub-fields of international relations study. The need for such an approach 
derives from several explanatory factors: the blurring of boundaries among academic fields 
caused by diverse structural changes in the contemporary global economic system; and, the 
collapse of boundaries that combibes national economies into a global economy. Other important 
factors calling for this synthesis include the multiplicity of levels as well as the complexity of 
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structures, processes and organisations, which describe the EU's empirical areas. ' Finally, such 
changes call for a reconsideration of theoretical questions of explanation, leading us to recast the 
components of FP and basic issues about the nature of IR and power (Tooze, 1990,1994). 
As for a concrete approach to the above-mentioned goals, this chapter examines the issue of 
`what questions should be asked' as the first task to achieve a dialectic synthesis of sub-fields. 
This part concerns `Order' and `Justice and Distribution', the questions of `Why and What', and 
`Who-gets-What'. After that, as the second task, the issue of the level of analysis will be 
explored, centring around the linkage between domestic politics and international politics, state- 
society relationships, and agent-structure interactions that determine how the above questions are 
answered. Ultimately the insights derived from these questions reveal a group of explanatory 
variables with fundamental theoretical implications for a concrete methodology that rises during 
the blurring of the boundaries between FP and IPE. 
4.2 Task I for dialogue: distinction in terms of different 
outputs, keywords and research questions 
4.2.1 Blurred Categories of Foreign Policy and Foreign Economic Policy 
Traditionally, Foreign Policy is understood as `the system of activities evolved by communities 
for changing the behaviour of other states and for adjusting their own activities to the 
international environment' (Modelski, 1962, p. 6); or `all the attitudes and activities through 
which organized national societies seek to cope with and benefit from their international 
environments' (Rosenau, 1970, p. 366); or `a stable set of attitudes towards the international 
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environment, an implicit or explicit plan about a country's relationship with the outside world 
(Wallace, 1971, p. 11). According to these opinions, FP analysis concerns the relative potency of 
particular variables and role variables, the way in which an operating code is affected by advice 
in decision-making processes and multiple sources of advocacy, and diverse channels by which 
domestic opinions are fed into bureaucratic politics (Rosenau, 1988, p. 23). Corresponding to 
those, and according to the genealogy of the discourses of international relations, FP is classified 
as a sub-field of IP. By contrast, FEP is taken as a sub-field of IPE by embracing technical terms 
such as aid, currency, financing, foreign aid, foreign economic policy-making and decision- 
making, international political economy, political economy and trade in the development of an 
empirical analysis (Rosenau, 1988, p. 17). With such features, there have been two ways to 
approach the analysis of FEP in political science: one is to employ the category of FP analysis in 
international relations (Papadakis and Starr, 1987), and the other is to analyse FEP away from 
the mainstream of FP analysis (Pastor, 1980). 
However, as one of the significant features in contemporary global political economy, it is 
likely to recognise that the boundary of FP has blurred associations with that of FEP in shaping 
streams of external policy. There is a put-back-the-clock general recognition: FEP can be held 
distinct from FP in terms of operational arenas such as trade, finance, investment, resources, and 
technology opposed to that of FP, i. e. military security (Hocking and Smith, 1997, p. 7). The 
idea, however, that theoretical devices of foreign policy do not contain FEP, is mistaken. It is 
also mistaken to think that the theorising of FEP does not encompass the issue of military 
security (Tooze, 1994). Such an argument derives from the fact that in terms of idea the 
traditional concept of power and security has changed and FEP operates today as FP caused by 
the expansion of the issue linkage concerning the definition of national interests. 
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First, changing ideas of power and security result in overlapping operational arenas of FP 
and FEP. This feature of FEP as FP corresponds to changes in the contemporary global political 
economy such as the increase in the significance of economic issues and to the extent of the issue 
linkage. Since the demise of the Cold War the global political economy has confronted dramatic 
shifts that exert meaningful impacts on the distinction of FP and FEP. Above all, the end of the 
Cold War has increased the relative importance of economic issues compared to that issue of 
military security. Such an increase of relative significance results in the blurring of the `low and 
high politics' dichotomy as a means of describing the reality of policy environments. On the 
other hand, it inspires the conceptual extension and the multiplicity of structures through the 
change in the idea of the concept of security, from military security to economic security, 
investment security, environmental security, and identity security etc. Consequently, the general 
tendency in the sub-fields of political science inclines to politicisation. Such changes make the 
contemporary foreign policy area distinguish the `old' agenda of military security from the `new' 
agenda of economic bases (Hocking and Smith, 1997, p. 8). 
Meanwhile, the second basis of the blurring of boundaries derives from the partial similarity 
of the goals to be achieved by FP and FEP. This similarity is caused by the (re)definition of 
national interests and the diffused linkage of the relevant issues. The goals of FP are to exercise 
influences in the external environment, to maintain or shift others' behaviours, and, as a result, to 
form the future state of affairs and future set of conditions that are targeted (Snyder, Bruck and 
Sapin, 1962, p. 82). They refer to values such as the carrying of resolutions in the UN General 
Assembly, territorial incorporation or unification, maintaining of friendly relations, concession in 
international negotiations, increase in prestige, peace, and constraints on others' belligerent 
policies. These goals of FP have been regarded as the same as the concept of national interest as 
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a means of political actions and way of thinking of goals in the sense that they represent values 
and interests that operate as internal factors in the process of FP formation. 
As such, generally (military) security and order have been set as the main goals of FP. 
Nevertheless, looking at the issues by which a national system penetrates another national system 
or takes part in each other's political processes, their dynamics enable us to recognise that the 
affairs of IPE have been dealt with by FP. As a result, the partial arbitration of those two sub- 
fields turns up, and it is possible to confirm that by the existence of three perspectives in FEP. 
Those three aspects of FEP characterise different forms based on the diverse purposes or 
intentions of decision-makers in targeting the final goal, as described in Figure 1.1 in chapter 1. 
4.2.2 Key Words: Order, Justice and Distribution 
Since 1945, external impacts caused by the failure of the hegemonic international economic 
system and the globalisation of economic activities FEP analysis has developed away from the 
main stream of FP analysis (Tooze, 1994). This has occurred through the recognition of the 
politicisation of the international economy. Indeed, terminologies such as aid, currency, 
financing, foreign aid, foreign economic policy-making, international political economy, 
political economy and trade have never been included in the empirical studies of FP (Rosenau, 
1988, p. 17). Thus, FEP has been classified as a sub-field of IPE, whilst FP has been regarded as 
a component of IP, derived from the fact that the outputs generated by what have been regarded 
as major actions in individual areas make a significant difference in their nature. In addition, 
such a difference in outputs also links to their contrary focuses on the macro-level, including 
firms and interest groups, and the micro-level, including individual actors (Rosenau, 1988). 
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According to such a distinction, FEP analysis, as a sub-unit of IPE, shares the merits and 
shortcomings of IPE, thus reflecting the traditional assumptions and values of IPE as they are 
(Tooze, 1994, p. 63). Moreover, theories of FEP analysis derived from IPE form have found their 
theoretical resources distinct from those provided by those of the traditional FP analysis (Tooze, 
1994, p. 70). 
The main starting point of social science is `how-to-explain-it'. Nevertheless, `What- 
question-to-ask' is second to none in its importance. The discussion of which question to ask 
should precede the creation of explanatory tools establishing a new framework for the analysis of 
the EU's Foreign Economic Policy. Furthermore, there is another reason in that as far as they are 
concerned with different theoretical resources, FP and FEP analysis generate differences in 
individual efficiency representing a difference in pursuing the main issues. 
Despite a little redundancy, international politics or international relations studies can be 
divided into five schools in terms of research question, methodology, and research objectives 
(scope of theorising): traditional analysis, study of strategies, the grand theorists, middle-range 
theory, and international political economy (IPE) (Holsti, 1995). Traditional analysis focuses on 
the technical analysis of international politics and international organisations, whilst the study of 
strategies focuses on the development of schemes to achieve practical policies. Meanwhile, 
grand theorists seek consistency based on the understanding of evidence via a range of concepts 
(power politics, equilibrium, policy-making, system, and communication model). Middle-range 
theory applies problem-oriented analysis by empirically examining selected aspects of 
international politics and foreign policy, and by pursuing an exact description or explanation of 
concrete phenomena. 2 
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By contrast, IPE aims to identify and resolve problems in the real world, which exist in the 
gap between politics, economics, international relations, and international economics. In such a 
real world approach centred on the allocation and distribution of resources, IPE analyses the 
power gap between the state and the market, which decides issues of `justice and distribution', 
such as how scarce resources are used (allocation in terms of the point of view of economists), 
where the power of collective action is used (allocation in terms of the point of view of political 
scientists), who gets what (distribution from economists), who gets to use it (distribution from 
political scientists), and the consideration of structural power and economic power, which 
provide the contexts of actions (Tooze, 1990, Strange, 1988,1995, Balaam and Veseth, 1996). 
IPE is generally regarded as a sub-field of International Relations (IR) (Goldstein, 1999, 
Holsti, 1995), largely because the three major theories of IPE - mercantilism, liberalism, and 
structuralism - are the variants of those of IR. Such recognition leads to the application of a 
conceptual framework that studies issues of international security centred on the major concepts 
of power and negotiation to IPE. Within this framework, the state is seen as the major actor, 
deciding actions according to its interest (Goldstein, 1999). 3 International Political Economy, 
however, demonstrates a difference in terms of `what-question-to-ask', contrasting with other 
schools of 1R. 
The consistent questions in JR or IP concern the issues of the basic units constituting the 
international system and the global system, and how such units are linked to each other. These 
questions have fundamentally been based on the state-centric viewpoint, which leads analysts to 
`4 order' as a theme. The other four schools share a common concern about understanding the 
issues of war and peace, i. e. `order', whilst IPE is concerned with the issues of `justice and 
distribution', including the economic welfare and equity of citizens, the welfare of economic 
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benefit, the loss or opportunity of the people, the wealth of the nation at an international level, 
and the analysis of international inequality and its remedy (Holsti, 1995, Strange, 1995). 5 
4.2.2.1 Three domains of Justice: National, Economic and Individual Justices 
The issue of `justice' is one of the core normative concepts of IPE7 alongside that of 
`distribution' concerning `what ought to be'. However, such concepts have been neglected by 
contemporary IR because of radical positivist distinctions of facts and values, the scepticism of 
epistemological positions of value description, and the dominance of realism. Since the 1970s, 
however, as practical questions posed by normative answers developed in world politics, 8 IPE 
again attracted political scientists (Rawls, 1999, Frost, 1994, Glaser, 1995). 9 Above all, it is 
important to note that such normative political thought generates an issue contradictory to that of 
`order', which has been a key word in traditional political science (Hocking and Smith, 1990, 
Bull, 1977,1995). This point can be summed up in terms of national, economic and individual 
justices as briefly outlined below. 
National Justice: In the 1960s and 1970s a number of issues created by conflicts between 
(the established) order meaning assumed permanence of the existing specific state-system and 
voiced concern about the achievement of justice in world community. In terms of national 
justice, such conflicts between order and justice resulted in the desire for statehood itself and the 
demand for national status within the system of states (Hocking and Smith, 1990). In addition, 
they generated a call for a new international order to reflect the correction of fundamental 
imbalances and inequities in the established order created by Western hegemonic powers and 
international institutions (Keohane, 1980,1984,1989). On the other hand, such a demand for 
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national justice, i. e. the demand for an international status extending into trans-national linkages 
starting from a national internal level as the mixed actor system does develop caused by internal 
fragmentation of the state. In addition, it continues to challenge the Western state-system and its 
particular distribution of power as well as the state-system itself. 
Economic Justice: The development of the state-system with features of inequality and 
diversity, and the maintenance of unequal inter-state economic relations stimulated the demand 
for economic justice. Superpowers wishing to establish the rules of world economic game tried 
to arrange a close linkage between economic power and international status. This arrangement 
was mainly conducted by the extortion of economic advantages and their dominance to the states 
with relatively less economic weight in the world economy. More practically, it was performed 
by the shift from hegemonic power to international institutions (or regimes) (Keohane, 1984, 
1989), or the successful development of negotiation strategies through issue-linkages (Putnam, 
1988). Thus, in the 1970s and 1980s, the demand for economic justice increased dramatically, as 
demonstrated by the New International Economic Order (NIEO) suggested by the third world, 
and other calls for the redistribution of resources. Furthermore, conceptual expansion and 
structural multiplicity such as economic security in the area of security study happened 
(Baldwin, 1997, Sperling and Kirchner, 1998). The question of economic justice is not second to 
national justice in its importance as an international agenda deriving from the blurring of 
boundaries between high politics and low politics. 
Individual Justice: Traditional explanations based on the existing dominance of the state 
assume that the collective actions of the state aggregate the demands of individuals and 
legitimise the supremacy of national interest over individual or group interest. Thus, the 
intervention of individuals or subgroups has only an indirect effect, and the point of time when 
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the principle of justice takes over national interest becomes ambiguous. As a result, conflicts 
between national interest and individual or group justice in terms of their relative importance are 
exacerbated (Hocking and Smith, 1990). As the perspective of inter-mestic policy in FEP 
indicates, the implementation of FEP by the government may produce injustice in terms of 
individual interests, since the economic issues connect directly to the daily lives of citizens. 
4.2.2.2 Distributional Justice 
Distributional justice means locating scarce resources to societal members in a desirable and just 
way. From a broader perspective, it involves the distribution of all benefits and burdens that are 
socially valuable, such as power, social status, information, freedom and suffrage, to social 
members. By contrast, in a narrow definition, it refers to the distribution of benefits and burdens 
limited to economic values such as material goods and services. Such distributional justice 
comprehends the four elements of rights, fairness, equality, and the qualification for being 
granted. 
According to these criteria, in the state of just distribution no one's just rights should be 
infringed, and consistent attitudes without propensity should be firmly maintained. Furthermore, 
based on common moral values that are shared by all members, the qualification for being 
granted according to `capacity', 'to the extent of endeavour or contribution' or `material need' 
should be accepted. Those four characteristics of distributional justice are interpreted in political 
processes of `who-gets-what' and `when and how' (Tooze, 1997) at the international level 
concerning the issues of international political economy such as production, investment, finance 
and trade. 
112 
There are some debates on economic effectiveness such as efficiency, transaction costs, and 
the economy of size in the formulation and implementation of the EU's FEP. This is because 
such a discourse of effectiveness is not in accordance with a series of contradictory political and 
social issues including `democratic deficit', `the pooling of sovereignty', and `regional 
inequality' (Smith Ni, 1994). Such discordance derives from the conflicts between the idea of 
effectiveness and the matter of choosing the way for the effective and just distribution of all sorts 
of benefits in the basic structure (Rawls, 1999). 
In the economic activities within the EU, meanwhile, the justice of distribution of resources 
for the production and goods as its outputs is called for. In addition, as for the political actions, 
justice in the formulation of policy preferences is provoked corresponding to the distribution of 
power and authority based on equal freedom and equal opportunity. The viewpoint of 
intergovemmentalism, as advocated by Moravcsik (1993a, 1993b, 1995,1998), argues that the 
different policy preferences of the existing member states are expressed in the common policies 
of the EU via the process of convergence. Unlike these, however, the other sides emphasise that 
a value-free and autonomous process of preference-convergence may be exposed to the operation 
of the other exogenous variables, or endogenous variables may occur in such a preference- 
convergence process. Such an exposition may result in a priori constraints on the member states. 
4.3 Task 2 for dialogue: the level of analysis and 
agent-structure 
In terms of levels of analysis such as national or system levels, FEP analysis has confronted the 
same problem that the traditional analysis of FP has to overcome. The framework of arbitrating 
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FP analysis and IPE approaches suggests a basis of agent-structure interactions and state-society 
linkage as further structure-structure interactions, state-market relationships and the linkage 
between domestic and international levels. The reason why all of these are emphasised is that 
differences between FP analysis and IPE approaches caused by different focus between macro- 
and micro-levels can be replaced by the mutually supplementary relationships via such a series 
of linkages. As long as more close insights are involved, above all, the aspect of agent-structure 
interactions is addressed with, and then that of structure-structure linkages is going to be 
explored. 
4.3.1 Interactions between Agent and Structure in FP and FEP 
It is possible to understand Foreign Policy in a narrow way so that the outputs are interpreted in 
terms of factors at the unit level such as a bureaucratic process, personality of leadership, 
governmental organisations, and organised ideology of the state. In reality, however, Foreign 
Policy study has been conducted from the perspectives of domestic politics, international 
relations, comparative foreign policy, case study, and middle-range theory (Smith S., 1989, 
Light, 1994). From the viewpoint of domestic politics, Foreign Policy is understood as being 
decided by processes in the decision-making structure of formal national instruments excluding 
circumstantial impacts on decision-making and structural effects by the state actions. 
By contrast, Foreign Policy study in IR pursues a broader generality to explain the systemic 
reasons for state actions, climbing further up Sartori's ladder of abstraction. 1° In particular, 
realism and neo-realism focused on the pursuit of power and national interest to explore the 
theoretical structure in a systemic context (Ziring, Plano and Olton, 1995). This approach, 
therefore, fails to address different empirical contents within contemporary Foreign Policy 
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(Smith, S., 1989). With this criticism in mind bridging studies have been conducted to explore 
generality and speciality through relatively narrow conceptualisation. 
In fact, the analysts of FP have confronted the explanatory implications of agent-structure 
issue less than scholars in IR (Carlsnaes, 1992, p. 245). This finding derives from the features of 
FP analysis such as the stress on economic logics and functional modes, collectivism based on 
the pursuit of systemic interests, and monolithic concern on the roles and recognition of 
individuals. The rational choice theories including game theory in FP study are classified in the 
category of actor-centred approaches, would not like to explain the agents' choices and 
preferences. As a result, they cannot take account of the way in which individuals produce a new 
condition under the given circumstances (Przeworski, 1985, p. 401, cited in Carlsnaes, 1992, p. 
251). 
Furthermore, they put an emphasis on the functional modes rather than agent-structure 
interactions, as the actors are defined in terms of collectivism that is based on the pursuit of the 
systemic interests. The approaches of FP, on the other hand, assume explanatory actors rather 
than rational actors, and pay attention to both the roles of individuals and the content of their 
perceptions (for example, Allison's bureaucratic model). They (examples include Harold and 
Sprout, Jervis, George, Holsti, Hermann, Lebow, Larson, and Vertzberger) also focus on actors' 
cognitive and psychological structures. The shortcomings, however, turn up, as for the former, as 
it tries to reify FP behaviours from the structural and institutional perspectives, and structural 
factors are not incorporated to the explanatory variables. 
By contrast, Sprout and Sprout (1957), Snyder, Bruck and Sapin (1962), Brecher et al. 
(1969) and Papadakis and Starr (1987) suggest an environmental model in which the emphasis is 
put on the relationships of environment and FP that is moderated by the process of decision- 
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making. Furthermore, it proves the absence of deterministic relationships between FP processes, 
environment, and outputs. In this model FP is recognised as process, output, and behaviour, 
whilst what is the important thing is not the collection of variables themselves, but the 
environmental matrix. In such a matrix, constraints by a set of factors can be offset by the 
opportunities provided by a set of other factors. Most importantly the influence of the 
environment on the formulation of FP has a dual nature: on the one hand, it provides the 
international actors with constraints and opportunities, and on the other hand, agents' actions are 
predicated depending on how actors to recognise the environment. As such, it highlights the 
decision-making process that plays the important role of mediating the environmental set of FP, 
outputs, effects and outcomes. Finally, it is to say that the decision-maker's recognition of and 
reaction to environmental factors impacts on the content of FP. To sum up, the environmental 
model of FP analysis is an approach focusing on the linkage between the policy-making and 
decision-making processes of FP in which agent-structure interactions operate (Papadakis and 
Starr, 1987, pp. 413-419). 
International Political Economy is also the discipline into which the issue of agent-structure 
does not penetrate broadly. " The issue of agent-structure in IPE revolves around three limited 
areas, which are the relations of state and market, public and private, and production, investment, 
and exchange (Laffan et al., 1999, p. 54). IPE is not fundamentally interested in the actors who 
act at the micro-level, for example the representatives of firms, bankers, producers, traders, 
workers and investors. Their recognitions, motivations, roles and actions are not subject to 
attention. As such, it is lack of the concerns on the environment in which they exercise 
discretion. By contrast, IPE finds `what kind of goods are produced', `how much they are 
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distributed', `under what constraints it does happen', and `profitability or survival in world 
capitalism' interesting (Rosenau, 1988). 
The main theme of IPE, that is fundamentally interested in the macro institutions and 
processes, is the power gap or asymmetry between state and market (Strange, 1988). The state in 
IPE is sometimes understood as a gatekeeper between national political economy and 
international political economy, or as a controller over economic activities within borders by 
realists. In addition, the state and government may cooperate with private economic actors 
including enterprises or transgovernmental organisations, for example international 
organisations. As such, dynamic interactions occur through the formation of associations or 
convergence between public economic activities and those of private actors (Laffan et al., 1999). 
Such goals and control of the state have been in conflict with markets in which interactions of 
economic power operate and it hold their own dynamics. 
By contrast, sometimes overall global economic welfare and goals of private organisations 
by sector confronts a conflict. In addition, the balance also fluctuates in the production process of 
goods and services, the way in which investment is determined and located, and the way in 
which goods, services, and knowledge are exchanged. In particular, the inconsistency between 
consistent pressure for production location in the context of the state or region and that for the 
internationalisation of investment and exchange by government is a core issue of IPE (Laffan et 
a!., 1999). In fact, the above-mentioned areas are entangled enough not to separate. As such, it is, 
in practice, not easy to isolate agent from structure in IPE. Rather, the trial to isolate them may 
bear no fruit in a piece of academic research. 
117 
4.3.2 Structure-Structure (domestic and international levels) 
It is the linkage of domestic- and international politics, state-society linkage, and state-market 
linkage that is required in terms of the meta-theoretical perspective for the integration of FP 
analysis and IPE approaches. First, FP and IPE confront a task to free themselves from the 
dichotomy of domestic- and international politics. Generally speaking, FP analysis also confers a 
meaning to the micro level, by including characteristics of the actors who locate in the lower 
level than the abstraction of the state as subjects: bureaucratic processes, attributes, capacity or 
recognition of individual leaders, negotiations, governmental organisations, and organised 
ideology of the state (Buzan et al., 1993, p. 48, Rosenau, 1988, pp. 21-23). As such, the outputs 
of FP are called by the individuals' names such as the Marshall Plan or Nixon Doctrine 
(Rosenau, 1988, pp. 21-23). By contrast, IPE assumes the individuals' actions in the analysis of 
the same self-interests to benefits-costs, and pays attention to the synthetic outcomes of system- 
dominant patterns over individuals' actions. In accordance with this, IPE is only concerned with 
the macro-induced transformations that impose common impacts on relevant individuals. As 
such, banks, firms and departments rather than individuals like representatives are subject to the 
account of IPE, and the geographic distinction such as Toyko-round or Bretton-Woods System is 
the nucleus of IPE. With such a distinction, IPE adheres to the macro orientation by subsuming a 
number of actors under the macro processes, structures and the rubric of the state (Rosenau, 
1988, pp. 21-23). 
Most studies in world politics and international politics are in fact FP analysis. Nevertheless, 
there is a difference in using the main level of analysis. In IP, the international system is chosen 
as its main level of analysis, while the nation-state stands as the level of analysis for foreign 
policy theory. These two levels of analysis may be regarded to have difficulties to mix up 
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together. However, it is the meaningless existence of the boundaries between levels of analysis 
exhibited when a certain country's FP is considered in terms of the inter-state interactions, away 
from the concepts of actions, i. e. the stage of analysis of actions to external environment or 
domestic conditions in which those actions form. This is because as soon as FP is taken into 
account in terms of inter-state interactions it may extend to the realm of international politics 
(Holsti, 1995, pp. 18-19). In the same context, comparative foreign policy as a sub-field of FP 
analysis explores how internal and external factors interact in the process of FP formation, and 
focuses on the convergence of the national system and the international system. As such, FP and 
IPE share a similarity of focus on the system level. IPE also focuses on the convergence of those 
two systems, and is interested in the dynamics of the production cycle and trade practices that are 
a source of and reaction to global financial patterns (Rosenau, 1988, p. 17). However, despite the 
similarity in terms of the level of analysis, FP and IPE lack interactions (Rosenau, 1988, p. 17). 
Second, it is necessary to incorporate the account of state-society relations into the 
framework of FEP analysis. The rationale for this suggestion lies in the cognitive incongruity of 
the state as an actor, and the inconsistency of both agent and structure. Above all, what is 
important in addressing the issue of agent-structure is also to take account of social changes 
except particular changes, since both agent and structure are inconsistent. The agent-structure 
interactions are temporary because they exist in the dynamic process of being conditioned by 
time. On this point, the agent-structure interactions are not subject to causation (Carlsnaes, 1992, 
p. 250). As a result, social changes are worth being taken into account for explaining agent- 
structure interactions. Social changes are inherent to dynamic phenomena and are not 
independent variables, not being decided by factors, but get tangled in temporary processes 
(Cerny, 1989, p. 4 cited in Carlsnaes, 1992, p. 246). In addition, they are characterised by being 
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dependent on the flow of time. Such a series of distinct characteristics plays the role of 
environmental variables by defining (time-space) contexts in which agent and structure interact. 
Meanwhile, the significance of the insight to the state-society relations meshes into the need 
for the recognition of the state as a structure or institution. It is inappropriate to recognise the 
issue of agent-structure as the relations of the state and the system. The reason why is that the 
recognition of the state, not as a social structure or institution, but as an actor in itself may iterate 
the same mistake as the blackboxing in which the account of the domestic politics that is omitted 
by politics in reality. The issue of action and structure has been discussed in the form of micro- 
macro linkage in the U. S. A. In this case, it implicates slightly general distinction that may be 
empirical and analytical between social phenomena per se in both a large and small scale 
(Carlsnaes, 1992, p. 246). In Europe, attention has been paid to the relationships between an 
actor or agent and social structure on behalf of the issue of agent-structure. Here an actor 
indicates individuals or collective groups, while social structure comprehends bureaucracy, 
institutions or the state. 
As mentioned previously, there is another reason for the need for the account of state-society 
relations concerning FEP approaches. Unlike the decision-making of external political policy, 
FEP may bring out potential social conflicts caused by the different impacts on social groups. 
FEP, therefore, has no choice but to be different from FP. In the same context, the study of FP 
behaviours of today must explain when individual variables (social groups, the personality of 
leaders, and systemic constraints) become important, and how they interlock to generate 
particular outputs, away from the existing system-centric thinking (Skidmore and Hudson, 1993, 
p. 21). Thus, the debate of comparative foreign policy appears to deal with the effects of 
comprehensive state-society relations beyond the simple relations of policy-making groups. 
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Finally, it is necessary to take account of the market that mediates economic actors and 
decision-makers, and structural powers in generating the phenomena of political economy 
including policies. Given the fundamental four structures in the global political economy, namely 
security, production, finance, and knowledge (Strange, 1988), the market restricts particular 
actions and promotes other actions, not as an economic actor but as a structural factor (Waltz, 
1979). Not only in the financial structure in which credit is created, but also in the production 
structure in which the nature of raw, manufacture and service, and the location and processes of 
production are determined, the market operates as a structural power. In addition, also in the 
knowledge structure in which the forms of knowledge, its accumulation and restoration, and 
modes of communication are determined, the market carries out the deterministic role. On the 
other hand, in the security structure in which the state dominates, influences of the market on 
security outcomes have increased, as the market access to arms is constrained at least partially or 
is open through de-regulation. In such a group of categories, if the market sets up, then it would 
provide everyone in the market with constraints, risks, and opportunities (Strange, 1995). 
However, the market would take a dominant position in the method in which political 
economy functions, only when it is allowed to do so by the one who owes authority and 
generates power (Strange, 1988). Also in the above-mentioned four structures, the market and 
the state determine the processes, not determined in a unilateral way by one of them. Even some 
states can shape the way in which the market operates. In the case of the EU, such a power gap 
between the state and the market generates the gap between outputs in two different areas such as 
the interdependence of the market and that of policies (Strange, 1994a). This implies the direct 
explanation of an estrangement between European economic integration and political integration. 
Scaperlanda (1967) undertook an empirical study of this concluding that the dynamic flow of 
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foreign direct investment in Europe does not have correlations with the speed up of European 
integration. This conclusion indicates the gap between the market and policy interdependence. 
By contrast, Wallis (1968) proved that in turn the speed up of European integration correlates 
with the capital flow. These contradictory studies suggest the methodological need for take 
insights into the market, market operator, and non-state organisations beyond its truth or not 
(Strange, 1995, p. 173). Finally, the power gap between the state and the market in IPE implies 
that it is necessary to incorporate the state and the market into the framework as two 
contradictory structures in which the interactions of micro-level actors are mediated. 
4.4 Dialectical Synthetic View 
4.4.1 Theoretical Framework 
This study suggests a framework for FEP analysis by incorporating FP analysis to IPE 
approaches based on the agent-structure interactions (even structure-structure) from the results of 
the above-mentioned discourses as figure 4.2 depicts. Above all, FEP formation is defined as 
consisting of decision-making and policy-making processes, outputs and behaviours. Policy- 
making indicates the patterns of complex interactions between pertinent officials and 
governmental organisations that generate outputs and decide the practical line of behaviours 
(Bacchus, 1974, pp. 17-18). Those patterns conceive environmental variables that operate in the 
domestic and international structures, and in turn environmental variables provide them with 
constraints and opportunities. In addition, the market also operates as a structural factor by 
122 
exerting influences on the orientation and goals of governmental policy-making. Of course, the 
market is sometimes constrained by governmental authority. 
Figure 4.2 The Dialectical Synthetic Framework of Foreign Economic 
Policy Formation 
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In the meantime, the policy-making process interacts with the decision-making process. 
Decision-making is to choose one option among diverse alternatives, in which individuals, 
structures and interactions interlock by carrying out their own distinct roles. Decision-making is 
distinguished from policy-making with the `time-limit' in the sense that a policy is in progress 
and it consists of a series of decisions and behaviours. Such a decision-making process does not 
represent a simple interaction in which actors are separate and reciprocatal actions, constraints 
and opportunities. It depicts a complex interaction between political, economic and social actors 
in which they reciprocate actions, constraints and opportunities in an already tangled statement. 
On the other hand, a complex interaction between them is embodied in the choice of strategy 
= {1, ..., n} with effect = {1, ..., n} via the recognition of environmental variables that are 
mediated by knowledge. In this process, environmental variables provide agents' actions 
(choices) with constraints or opportunities. In addition, the market also exerts an influence as a 
structural factor here. The market constrains the units' particular actions, i. e. economic actors, 
and supports taking another action. The market is unintended and spontaneously generated, and 
is not enough of an institution or agent to be perceived concretely. The market that is created by 
voluntary interactions of economic units chooses the actions of economic actors depending on 
the results of those actions. That is, it provides actors with constraints or opportunities sentencing 
high profits and bankruptcy (Waltz, 1979). The actor who gets offered opportunities by a series 
of factors becomes a new dominant actor in that context. However, it simply means that he can 
lead the context in which he is by utilising his dominant position, not meaning that he can take a 
unilateral action. 
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The condition that is contextualised by decision-making interacts again with the institutions 
and structures in FEP decision-making that is established through the interactions with 
environmental variables. As such, via interactions between two processes, the interactions of 
agents and structures ultimately generate FEP as its output, and consequently FEP is realised in 
an implementation of an output. In the final stage, FEP as such an output and behaviour, exerts 
two effects that are divided into status quo and direct effect / strategic learning. The former leads 
to maintenance of the existing context, while the latter leads to a shift to a new context. 
Finally, a group of possible explanatory variables from such a framework are extracted as 
follows: the `market' in terms of structure, the `domestic / international structures and politics', 
`individuals' in terms of agent, and `knowledge' in terms of a mediator. The aspect of the market 
offers a general explanation revealing the background of particular policy's emergence, and 
clarifies a number of possible objective policy options. Meanwhile, it has a potential to explain 
the timing of a particular policy's emergence. However, generally speaking, there is a tendency 
that its explanatory power for timing is relatively less significant than that provided by other 
perspectives. This is because general policy formation has a tendency to be under the control of 
political and decision-maker's factors. However, the perspective of the market is significant in 
the sense that the operation of those factors is not purely independent of market economy forces. 
The viewpoint of the domestic structure provides policy formation by general explanation 
and the understanding of the timing, and further generates the explanation of policy content by 
clarifying the linkage to particular classes or interest groups. In addition, it offers objective 
policy options and appropriate explanation of domestic political phenomena (related to staying in 
power or a change of regime). The sub-category of the viewpoint of the domestic structure is 
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divided into the relations between the domestic position of decision-makers and policy outputs, 
between the domestic political structure (including the bureaucratic structure) and policy outputs. 
In addition, the relations between state-society relations and policy outputs, between social 
construction and policy outputs, and general attitudes or orientation of external policy are subject 
to such classification. Among them, as for state-society relations, the following variables can be 
used as indicators: the extent of the autonomy the state against society (Rosenau), policy 
network, institutional and organisational arrangements (Risse-Kappen), autonomy of the state in 
terms of distinction of the strong, the weak, and the mediation, the extent of the centralisation of 
national institutions, the distinct capacity of the political system to control society or to 
overcome domestic resistance (Krasner), the extent of the autonomy of the state through society- 
dominant / state-dominant characteristics, changes in the domestic coalition, i. e. the realignment 
of political forces, political action groups, the coalition of firms and the state, and the strength of 
the state (Katzenstein). On the other hand, the characteristics of the bureaucratic structure, the 
relationships between administrative departments, the consistency of bureaucratic goals 
(Rosenau), and the nature of political institutions (state) (Risse-Kappen) are referred to. The 
indicators of social construction refer to the power centralisation and preferences of social forces 
(Rosenau); social actor's impacts on policy; public attitudes on foreign affairs; the extent of 
social fragmentation (among Left and Right ideologies, religions, and classes); public opinion 
(Risse-Kappen); balance of power between industrial, financial, and commercial elites; and 
interest groups (Katzenstein). 
The viewpoint of the international structure provides the general explanation, and the 
understanding of the timing and policy content. While the market changes very fast, the 
perspectives of the domestic and international structure are relatively slow. The insights of the 
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latter, therefore, comprehend more long-term information concerning the analysis of policy 
content. The sub-category of the aspect of the international structure refers to the multilateral 
economic system, the international flexibility market, and the international primary goods market 
(Rosenau) in terms of the international system. Meanwhile, in terms of international relations, 
bilateralism, unilateralism, multilateralism (regional), and transnationalism or supranationalism 
are referred to. In particular, transnationalism includes the insights to transnational corporations 
(TNCs) and civil society (including non-governmental organisations (NGOs)). 
The perspective of individuals, unlike the above-mentioned series of structural aspects, 
refers to the belief-system of decision-makers, ideological orientation, cognitive structure 
(Rosenau), idea (Goldstein and Keohane, 1993), knowledge, political survivability of politicians 
(Weingast and Marshall, 1988, Downs, 1957), and the recognition of goals (Rosamond, 2000). In 
addition, the matter of inter-decision-makers relationships (for example, trust), realistic attitudes 
and liberal attitudes, and decision-maker's discretion as hawkish and dovish orientations, 
difference in personality, and dominant ideas and challenges to them. In particular, it is possible 
to find knowledge playing a political role in the sense that an empirical test can be taken as the 
utilisation and learning model for that becomes refined, and that the process in which a cognitive 
matrix is realised is the process in which the logic of power unfolds. 
Simultaneously, the viewpoint of knowledge can be used as a resource by entrepreneurial 
actors, since it is shaped in the form of narratives, and suggests the structure in which actions are 
embedded. On this point, it suggests a lens to understand the agent-structure relations within the 
processes of decision and policy-making. Such an analysis of knowledge proceeds in sequential 
stages as follows: firstly, it is to distinguish the forms of knowledge in terms of the functions of 
realising sociality; secondly, it is to cope with and connect knowledge forms and a cognitive 
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system with particular groups; thirdly, it is to connect a cognitive system with the overall social 
forms; and finally, it is to analyse the correspondence or correlation between the framework of 
macro social structure, the cognitive system and the knowledge forms (Gurvitch, 1971, p. 42). 
The consequence proves positive or negative relationships between the knowledge system and 
social structure in a particular society, whilst the latter indicates that the knowledge system of 
individual decision-makers is independent of social structure. 
There is, meanwhile, an aspect that locates a series of structural and agential perspectives in 
the middle-range of the above-mentioned. It is the very historical context that history as the 
shadow of the past, covers the present is incorporated to social science that pursues the 
explanation of real society (Braudel, 1980, p. 38, p. 50). It also suggests the explanation of inter- 
play between meaningful actions and structural contexts (Skocpol, 1984) that is subject to 
historical push and shove (Mills, 1970, p. 12). Thus, history is regarded as a sound basis for IPE 
study (Strange, 1995), whilst it is used as a method to challenge the cognitive basis of traditional 
IPE by historical sociologists and those who adopt the Gramscian approach. More practically, 
the account of historical contexts adds insights to the multiple domains of `social time' to the 
relations of agent-structure (Braudel, 1980, Cox, 1995, Germain, 1996). The multiple domains of 
`social time' indicate the concreteness of historical contexts that appears through different 
impacts on the forms of agency (Amoore et al., 2000). As such, it shows the complexity of 
structural and relational factors that construct policy outcomes (Strange, 1995), and suggests 
supplementary explanations to actors' difference in policy orientations under the same structural 
contexts. The viewpoint of historical contexts, therefore, is not a particular analytical mode, but a 
supplementary ingredient to the other perspectives (Amoore et al., 2000). 
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4.4.2 A mediator between agents and structures: knowledge 
Knowledge operates as a cognitive variable in the structure and progress of FEP-making, 
together with variables of the international system, international relations, societal construction, 
national structure, and the individual at the multiple levels of analysis (Rosenau, 1966). 
However, there are other cognitive variables such as the belief system, ideal orientation, and 
cognitive structure. Generally, they are classified as major variables in a middle-range theory of 
foreign policy study by S. Smith (1989). Cox (1986), however, recognises them as a major 
component of `the frame of actions' (or historical structure) which is used to understand the 
control structure of international political economy, based on the interactions of material 
capabilities, ideas, and institutions. Such a framework of actions shapes the structure of world 
order. Neo-realists in particular envisage the structure of world order as a dynamic of material 
capacities among three categories of forces without giving attention to cognitive and institutional 
perspectives such as ideas and norms. This is lumped together under the term balance of power 
(Cox, 1986). Unlike their understandings, knowledge is worth being paid attention to because of 
the following reasons: 
First, attention is paid to the political roles of knowledge. The nature of knowledge 
comprehends that of politics. The existing paradigms of political science, centring around 
conflict (problem)-solving, are filtered by the study of `the power of idea' of today in the realms 
that they cannot guarantee the explanatory power of their own tools. Applied practically the 
extension of limited politics and the broadened concept of power to structural power, relational 
power, and power that impact on other's idea (Strange, 1995, p. 173), the concepts of `learning 
effect' or `globalisation of knowledge' provide more fruitful explanation of political affairs. In 
addition, knowledge becomes a means for power analysis concerning the analysis of leadership 
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by analysing the belief-system of leaders, ideas, and ideologies. This finding does not derive 
from focusing on learning, persuasion, and cognitive dynamics makes concepts of power, 
leadership, and hierarchy meaningless. Rather, cognitive matrix is the process in which the logic 
of power unfolds in its realisation. In addition, it becomes possible to test empirically the roles of 
knowledge, as the utilisation and learning models of knowledge emerge. 
Second, in particular, the changes in the contemporary global economic environment such as 
the widening and deepening of global economy into national economies, confer new functions 
upon knowledge. This conferment of prestige is derived from the changing global environment; 
large and technically developed firms shape new international economic policy networks 
associated with core governmental authorities. Within this structure, knowledge includes 
technology functions as a key factor for selecting the most suitable agency for the contemporary 
global environment, and articulates the structural power which is trying to penetrate the state and 
alert its internal power structure via the process of `national internationalisation' (Cox, 1986) or 
`intemalisation' (Smith M., 1994a). 
Third, knowledge enables the orientation ofa country's FEP to be changeable via conceptual 
redefinition. Knowledge stirs a series of conceptual variation. There is the creation of a cross 
point in which the concept of national interests, one of the main key words in the analysis of FP, 
engages with the construction of knowledge, consisting of normative idea (or principled 
knowledge) and causal idea (or causal knowledge), via the materialisation of normative and 
technical aspects. For example, the characteristics of the concept of national interests, 
representing normative and technical aspects, generally generate a basic accord among decision- 
makers in terms of the general goals of the state to be achieved in the world. By contrast, the 
aspects of the role, character, and mission of a country do not drive the decision-makers' entire 
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differences in the practical outline of implementation. It is this very point that knowledge casts a 
significance for the analytical value suggesting the space in which it can operate as an 
explanatory tool. 
Fourth, the knowledge system of a policy is produced or reproduced by the interactions of 
agent and structure within the policy processes. The agent-structure relationship does not mean 
anything until it is recognised by an agent, since it is dialectic. It is not until agent monitors and 
reflects structure on its actions that structure exercises power to an agent. That is, structure is 
enacted and interpreted by the agents (Giddens, 1984, Wendt, 1987, p. 359). It is the knowledge 
system that is in charge of such an interpretation process. The knowledge system operates within 
the `reproduction process by decision-makers' that is a necessary process for the cognitive 
components of public policy to be institutional ised. 12 
Fifth, the knowledge system is not metaphysical, but a concrete output of the political 
(policy) process in which purposeful actors offer and diffuse interpretation, narratives, and 
paradigms. In such a political process, entrepreneurial actors utilise knowledge as a resource. On 
the other hand, they can also contribute in the development of a cognitive structure via actions, 
for example, of amending interpretation, or finding out an unprecedented meaning or output of 
the public policy. By contrast, knowledge shaped in the form of narratives can constrain an 
actor's choice by providing the structure in which actions are embedded. Finally, the exploration 
of knowledge in the policy processes suggests an appropriate lens for understanding agent- 
structure relations. 
Finally, knowledge encompasses historicity. The historicity of knowledge means the process 
in which the form of knowledge is reproduced (Amoore et al., 2000). This process produces the 
way of understanding society by actors, and social practices that offer reflections or constraints. 
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Meanwhile, such outputs represent significance as an explanatory variable in the sense that they 
can be evaluated as an accepted rationality even when they are beyond the scope of traditional 
rationality. For example, the historical experience of Europeans who went through consecutive 
wars becomes a practical motive for European integration based on at least peace to be expected. 
As such, integration is principled as a common value of Europeans, while causal knowledge 
(idea) differs in terms of a means and method for achieving such a goal. In addition, it was not 
until the 1970s that the U. S. A. started realising the issue of human rights in the area of FP, 
contrasting with Europe's earlier launch that goes way back to the post-World War II era. This 
story proves the relative weight of historical contexts derived from the fact that anything else 
perspectives cannot suggest any explanation of it. As such, knowledge understood in the 
historical context can properly explain the timing of the launch of a particular policy. 
4.5 Conclusion 
In conclusion, the theoretical implications for the established concrete framework can be 
summarised as follows: first, the importance of national domestic structures should receive 
attention, focusing on at least four social structures which constitute the state: domestic- 
economic, domestic-political, international-economic, and international-political factors (Wendt, 
1987). Simultaneously, such a framework needs to include the concept produced and reproduced 
by agents. In the case of the EU, the fundamental structural changes generate dynamic evolution 
in the concept of sovereignty (Carlsnaes, 1992, p. 262). 
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Second, the analysis of state actions requires a resolution of agency-structure relations. In 
other words, correlative or causal effects amongst different structures should be evaluated, 
departing from the standard structural monism. There has been a recognition that Contemporary 
FP needs to recognise not only national interests concerning the other social and international 
actors, but also structural constraints on actions since FP arises from the state that locates in 
political economy-shaped actions of the state. As such, it supports the need for considering the 
linkage between domestic and international structures. 
Third, the theorising of the international system or structure is needed. This work requires 
two prerequisites: to complete a model by which it is possible to avoid the general principles that 
produce and reproduce structures, and to establish another model by which the emergence and 
reproduction of the structures can be explained (Wendt, 1987). As to the former, it is vital to 
define the structure in contexts based on the orientation towards the agent-structure interactions 
(Cerny, 1989, Carlsnaes, 1992). This is because agent and structure interact in space and time 
and consequently form a temporary context. That is, the interactions of agent and structure can 
generate another context or status quo according to their results. The framework, therefore, based 
on the interactions of agent and structure explores dialectically the way in which the consistent 
constraints and opportunities posed by contextualised structures activate, as well as another 
important way that actors influence in such a way. As to the latter, meanwhile, such unstable 
factors as time flow across the differences in the contexts of agent-structure, for example, 
traditions or practices, shapes the state that shapes the international system. That is why it is 
necessary to consider historical contexts. 
Fourth, the structure offers constraints to the weak compared to providing the strong with 
opportunities via posing strategic selectivity (Hay, 1995). This aspect must be dealt with in IPE 
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in terms of the issues of justice and distribution. In this address, the main themes are probably 
the concerns of the government or the agent who gets the control power beyond the inter- 
governmental relationships ('who or what governs outcome'), or gains and losses caused by their 
outcomes ('who or what gains and who or what loses from such outcomes') (Strange, 1994a, pp. 
19-20). 
Finally, above all, it is necessary to try to find a mediator between agency and structure to 
overcome the dichotomy in their relationships. Putting a mediator into a framework makes it 
possible to increase the possibility of solving the ceteris paribus question, for which the existing 
problem-solving theories are still criticised. Knowledge may act as such a mediator (Strange, 
1988,1995, Radaelli, 1999), while liberalists suggest institutions as an agency-structure 
mediator. This thesis suggests knowledge as such a mediator. Knowledge in the middle-range of 
agent and structure is reflected on agents' actions as constraints or opportunities via the 
explanation of structures. In addition, knowledge produces or reproduces structures by 
transforming actors' interpretative system. As such, the interactions of agent-structure are 
mediated or arbitrated by a knowledge system, and finally, result in a particular policy output. It 
is such an insight of knowledge to make it possible that the time when actors operate not as 
negative reactioners, but as positive reactioners to structural powers, is distinguished from the 




1 Derived from such a range of changes, the changing nature and capacity of the state as a 
structure and an agent has become the most important issue (Tooze, 1994). 
2 Middle-range theory also puts its ultimate objective on prediction, not explanation. 
3 For them, IPE is a field of addressing trade, monetary relations, multinational corporations, the 
economic integration of Europe, the international politics of the global environment, the 
economic gap between North and South, and the issues of development (Goldstein, 1999). 
4 Even though pluralism has a conservative propensity to the value of `order' as realism does, it 
puts more weight on democratic ideas about freedom and justice for individual, group, and 
society (Viotti and Kauppi, 1993). 
S By contrast, IR inclines to a single focus on an actor or interaction model, and misses a bit 
better whole focus caused by the dominance competition of individual paradigms. Some scholars 
think that IPE, on this point, is greater set than IR (Strange, 1994b, Rupert, 1995). 
6 These terms derive from Hocking and Smith (1990). 
7 As for core normative concepts, there are the others such as liberty, equality, human rights, 
political obligation, sovereignty, group rights, self-determination, property rights, restitution, 
redistribution (Frost, 1994). 
8 For example, what duty does the EU have to economic refugees from the East? (Frost, 1994) 
9 Rawlsian viewpoint of justice regulates concretely the basic structure of society through the 
accumulation of decisions about the circumstantial system. 
10 Singer (1969) suggests that systemic theory loses its explanatory power when it is far from a 
broad generalisation. 
11 Wendt did also agree with me on this point. 
12 Here as long as decision-makers follow the shared explanatory paradigms, adhere to the 
common opinions about political, social, and economic reality, and are those who recognise the 




The interactive structural contexts in the formation of an 
inter-mestic policy: domestic, international and market 
contexts in the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) 
game in 1998 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter aims to verify the hypothesis by applying conclusions that are extracted through the 
methodological debates mentioned in previous chapters to empirical facts. Practically, it aims to 
prove whether or not a series of facts (outputs) derived from dynamic interactions between 
agents and structures in the MAI negotiations matches the rules of a game and reasonable 
outputs under the assumption of a rational actor; to confirm the interactions between domestic 
variables and international variables by verifying the hypotheses 5.1,5.2,5.3,5.4,5.5,5.6 and 
5.7 in chapter 2; and to confirm the structural consistency between the French domestic 
ratification game of 1998 and the French traditional foreign direct investment (FDI) policy. Here, 
an experimental sub-hypothesis is suggested as follows: 
Sub-hypothesis 7: The structural inconsistency between the French domestic ratification game 
on the MAI of 1998 and the French traditional FDI policy indicates the potentiality of 
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structural shifts. As such, these structural shifts provide relatively better opportunities for the 
agents' actions. 
Alongside this series of possible accounts over policy outputs, it leads us to the capturing of 
decisive factors in the French governmental decision-making on the MAI in 1998. As such, it is 
possible to verify interactions between the structural contexts of status quo and the emerging 
structural contexts through the comparison of their consistency. For the verification of 
hypotheses, above all, it is necessary to take account of the objective structure that offers 
opportunities and constraints on the strategies, i. e. an agent's choices. Structure-centred accounts 
comprehend the aspects of capital mobility, globalisation, and power politics in the changing 
international politics and contexts, domestic politics and contexts, and market contexts. In such 
structural contexts, it is possible to understand the state linked to three perspectives: as a rational 
(and unitary) actor pursuing the national interest, as a reactor to different preferences in a non- 
cooperative game between economic agents (i. e. a ratification game), or as a negotiator in an 
international negotiation game. As such, structural accounts connote these three perspectives of 
the state. 
As for the practical method, quantitative and qualitative analysis are adopted in a 
complementary way. For the former statistics are introduced, while for the latter documentary 
analysis is used. In particular, for the third aim of this chapter, from the viewpoint of 
comparative politics, heterogeneity of the German, French and British FDI policies are subject to 
a cross-cases analysis. This cross-cases analysis is undertaken to acquire the expansion of space 
applicability for generalisation, i. e. cross-sectional expansion, as one of space control types in a 
comparative analysis. The Most Similar Systems Design is adopted based on the method of 
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difference or concomitant variation in which inter-systemic differences is the only one that is 
assumed to be an independent variable (Przeworski & Teune, 1970, p. 33). On the other hand, 
diachronic analysis, so-called time-series analysis, is adopted to strengthen the time applicability 
of generalisation. The adoption of this method aims to confirm whether the structure of domestic 
ratification games over the MAI of 1998 is different from that of the traditional FDI policy of 
individual Member States. In this process, the data up to one year before 1998, when the MAI 
negotiation happened, has been partially adopted to avoid the simultaneous bias between 
dependent variables, independent variables, and control variables. Besides, logarithms of feasible 
variables are taken to reduce hetero-scedasticity of the data. 
5.2 Possible variables and solutions from a rational model of the 
domestic ratification game 
This section aims to analyse the different structure of the ratification games of the French and 
British governments confronting the MAI which was a full-scale negotiation in the OECD over a 
comprehensive and binding investment agreement including the high level of liberalisation, 
investor protection, and a dispute settlement mechanism is in the late 1990s. 
5.2.1 Possible explanatory variables 
Linked to the variables that operate in the domestic ratification game, benefits and costs can be 
summarised as follows: 
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  bj : the constituent's benefit from accepting a beneficial treaty. This is not contingent upon 
undertaking an information campaign that results in the same outcome, which is equivalent to U2 
(accept/campaign) = U2 (accept/no campaign) = b1. The former denotes the benefit of the 
acceptance with an information campaign, while the latter is for the case of acceptance without 
campaigns. 
  b2: the constituent's benefit from rejecting a non-beneficial treaty. 
  rl: a popularity bonus. Member states would receive this as a result of successful ratification 
followed by an information campaign. It is obvious that domestic constituents whose acceptance 
results in ratification would like to positively evaluate the government's attitudes in a sense that 
the government provides detailed information about the treaty. In reverse, it implies that there 
would be no rl without campaigns, even if ratification were successful. That is, a successful 
ratification without campaigns would not affect the popularity of governments. 
  r1: the voting costs. 
  fl: a penalty for unsuccessful ratification. If a member state did not get a successful 
ratification, it would be punished by this penalty. 
  i: a cost to engage in an information campaign. This implies that an unsuccessful ratification 
with an information campaign would cost fr + i. 
  cl: a cost by the decisive constituent's withdrawal of its long-term support. The constituent 
would withdraw its long-term support when it realised that the treaty was not advantageous. 
Such a cost would happen only to N2, since its constituent approves of the treaty, while N2 
evaluates the treaty as unbeneficial. In this case, a sudden withdrawal of long-term support by 
constituents would cost much to N2. Furthermore, if the constituent were a decisive one, then the 
cost would be greater. By contrast, as for Ni, both Ni and its constituent evaluate the treaty as 
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beneficial. Thus, the change to the constituent's long-term support would not influence NI and 
can be ignored. 
  c2: a cost caused by mistakenly approving the treaty that a government does not want to be 
ratified. Such a mistake would impose this cost on the constituent. This cost would not be 
imposed on the constituent of N1, but on that of N2, since N2 evaluates the treaty as not 
beneficial and its constituents would accept it. 
  c, 3: politically negative effects followed by the ratification of a treaty such as the damage of 
national sovereignty and the negative impact on the efficiency of national economic policy. 
The function of the payoffs in the ratification game would be (IIN, H ), which nN is for the 
decision of a government whether to undertake an information campaign or not, while rjc is for 
the utility of its constituents. UN is decided by a greater popularity bonus (+), the cost of an 
information campaign (-), a penalty for unsuccessful ratification (-) and the cost of the decisive 
constituent's withdrawal of their long-term support (-), say, rl- cl - fl -i- ci. Meanwhile, rjc 
consists of the constituent's benefit from accepting a beneficial treaty (+), the cost caused by 
mistakenly approving the treaty (-) and the voting costs (-), i. e. bl + b1- c2- r2. 
In doing so, more practically for Ni, (rl -i- c3, bl - r2) would be its payoff function for 
acceptance with an information campaign, since cl, c2, f! and b2 do not take place in this case, 
say, the value of zero, c1 = c1= fl = b2 = 0. The payoff function for the rejection with an 
information campaign would be (- (fl + i), - r2) caused by the values of b1= b2 = 0, r1= 0, and cl 
= c1= 3=0. On the other hand, with no information campaign the acceptance of the treaty is 
generated by the payoff function (-ci, b1- r2). Such a function derives from the value of r1= c1= 
c2 =fi =i= b2 = 0, since all these variables would not take place. In the same condition, the 
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rejection of the treaty provides the payoff function of (- fl, - r1) on the basis of the values of rj _ 
cl =i= bl = b2 = c2 = c, 3 =0 caused by their inexistence. 
By contrast, with an information campaign, N2 would have its payoff functions such as (rl- 
CI -i- C3, - c2- r2) for the acceptance, (- (fr + i), b2 - r2) for the rejection of the treaty. In the 
former, since cl and c2 do take place, while bl, b2 and fl do not happen, while the latter derives 
from the values of r1= cl = b1= c2 = c3 = 0. Meanwhile, no campaign would generate (-c3, - c2 - 
r2) for the acceptance and (- fi, b2- r2) for the rejection of the treaty. The former derives from the 
values of r1=cl =fl=i=b1=b2=0, while the latter is the result ofr1=cl=c2=cj=i=b1=0. 
On the other hand, Ni and N2 would start an information campaign under the condition that 
the expected pay-off generated by a constituent's acceptance of the campaign exceeds that of a 
constituent's acceptance with no campaign. That is, it is possible to assume that a popularity 
bonus which a member state would receive as a result of successful ratification followed by an 
information campaign is always greater than the sum of the costs of an information campaign 
and the decisive constituent's withdrawal of its long-term support, say, 0< r1- i or 0< rl- c! - i. 
At this time, N1 and N2 have the value of 1 for `an information campaign'. Finally, NI and N2's 
decision over whether or not to proceed with an information campaign has two elements of 0 and 
1, say, Il E {0,1} for Ni and 12 E (0,1) for N2. Meanwhile, the expected pay-off is smaller 
from a constituent's rejection with a campaign than that from a constituent's rejection of a `No 
Campaign' provides Ni and N2 with an incentive to send a message to the constituent via 
campaigns. All these functions are represented in Appendix 5.1. 
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5.2.2 Sub-game Perfect Nash Equilibrium and Backward Induction 
In many dynamic games there are multiple Nash Equilibria. Often, however, these equilibria 
involve incredible threats or promises that are made by players but are not in their interests to 
carry out. In a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, each player acts rationally given their belief about 
what the other player might do. Meanwhile, to understand players' maximised profits, it is easy 
to think of a player making various threats or promises, and the other player acting accordingly. 
However, a threat or promise is only credible if it is in that player's interest to carry it out at the 
appropriate time. Assuming that players are rational implies that incredible statements will have 
no effect on the other players' behaviour. The concept of sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium 
rules out these situations by saying that a reasonable solution to a game cannot involve players 
believing and acting upon incredible threats or promises. On the basis of this logic, each player 
must act in his or her own self-interest in every period of the game. 
A sub-game is defined as "a smaller part of the whole game starting from any one node and 
continuing to the end of the entire game, with the qualification that no information set is 
subdivided" (Romp, 1997, p. 32). A sub-game is, therefore, a game in its own right that may be 
played in the future, and is a relevant part of the overall game. From the extensive form of the 
ratification game, given in Fig. 4, we can observe that there are four sub-games starting from 
each of the constituents' decision nodes. For the predicted solution to be a sub-game perfect 
Nash equilibrium it must contain a Nash equilibrium in each of these sub-games. The procedure 
of finding out sub-game perfect Nash equilibria makes it possible to identify which government 
would maintain the characteristics of a strong state against its constituents. 
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Figure 5.1 Sub-game Perfect Nash Equilibrium in a dynamic ratification 
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However, considering each of the Nash equilibria identified for the entire game to see which, if 
any, is also a sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium is time-consuming. Instead, there is often a 
quicker way of finding the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium for a dynamic game, which is 
called `backward induction'. Assuming that under the condition of perfect and complete 
information, no player is indifferent between two persons' possible actions at any point in the 
game. This principle involves ruling out the actions where players would not play because other 
actions return higher pay-offs. Meanwhile, in applying this principle to dynamic games we start 
with the last period first and work backwards through successive nodes until we reach the 
beginning of the game (Romp, 1997, p. 33). 
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Applying backward induction to Ni, at the first node government NI has started a 
campaign, and thus constituents will either earn b, if they accept, or - r2 if they reject it. In this 
situation constituents will accept ratification, since U (Accept/Campaign) = bl )U 
(Reject/Campaign) _- Ti. Consequently, to accept is a dominant strategy. This is presented by 
crossing out the corresponding pay-off vector (- f! - i, - r2). At the second node government Ni 
did not start a campaign, and thus constituents will earn either bl - r2 if they accept ratification, 
or - r2 if they reject it. In this situation constituents will accept ratification, if U (Accept/No 
Campaign) = bl - Ti) U (Reject/No Campaign) =- Ti. 
In doing so, we can rule out the possibility of the case where constituents reject ratification 
and government Ni does not start a campaign. This is shown by crossing out the corresponding 
pay-off vector (-fl, - r2 ). We can now move back to the preceding nodes, which in this game are 
the initial nodes. Here government NI decides whether or not to start Information Campaigns. 
However, if a government assumes that constituents are rational, then they know the game will 
never reach the previously excluded strategies and pay-offs. 
Therefore, government Ni can reason that it will either receive r1 -i- c3 if it starts a 
campaign, or -c3 if it does not start a campaign. Given this reasoning, and according to an 
assumption rl -i)0, we can rule out the possibility that constituents will accept ratification. 
The reason why is that rl -i- c3 is always greater than -c3, i. e. rl -i- c3 >- c3, since r1- i is 
positive. As a result, we can cross out the corresponding pay-off vector (- c3, bl - r2). This leaves 
only one pay-off vector remaining, corresponding to government NI starting campaigns and 
constituents accepting ratification. This is the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium. Lastly we can 
reach a equilibrium as follows: 
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Possible solution]: If the government can present a beneficial treaty, it will 
engage in an information campaign and the constituent will accept the treaty. 
Meanwhile, as for the case of N2, we have two nodes, starting with the last period of the game 
first. - (r2 + c2) is always smaller than - r2, since r2 and c2 are positive numbers, and b2 - r2 is 
greater than - (r2 + c2), since b2 is greater than zero. According to the logic of - (r2 + c2) (- r2 
(b2 - r2 a rejection of ratification is always the dominant strategy for a constituent regardless of 
the preceding action by the government. As a result, at the first and second nodes the constituent 
will reject ratification, crossing out the corresponding pay-offs (rl - cl -i- c3, - r2 - C2) and (- 
cj, - r2 - c2). 
Moving back to the preceding nodes, here government N2 would not start an information 
campaign, i. e. a dominant strategy, since - fi) -. ir -i in theory. In doing so, we can rule out the 
possibility that government N2 will start a campaign, and so cross out the corresponding pay-off 
vector (- f! - i, b2 - r2). As a result, this leaves only one pay-off vector remaining, which 
corresponds to government N2 not starting a campaign and the constituent rejecting ratification. 
This result leads us to another equilibrium as follows: 
Possible solution2: If the government cannot present a beneficial treaty, it will 
refrain from an information campaign and the constituent will reject the 
treaty. 
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5.2.3 Empirical illustrations 
5.2.3.1 A ratification game in France 
As public opposition rocketed in the beginning of 1998, member states' governments started to 
become more sceptical towards the MAI. In France, public opposition against the MAI increased 
in Autumn 1997 and increased further in Winter 1998. The press attacked the agreement and 
there was a series of demonstrations. Consequently, the French government called for a 
deferment of the negotiation excused by domestic consultations. Finally, the negotiation was 
delayed until October 1998 when the French government announced its withdrawal from the 
agreement based on the conclusion produced by domestic consultations. 
' This declaration was 
committed without any formal consultation with the EU. 
As such, the ratification game of the French government represents the case of N2 in Figure 
5.1, that is, a government finds an agreement not beneficial. According to the optimal solution 
produced by backward induction, it is possible to say that the French government did not commit 
any campaign to inform the MAI negotiation to domestic constituents on the positive side. Such 
`No Campaign' results in no popularity bonus. 
By contrast, also when the anti-campaign against the EU policy by a member state goes 
together with the failure of the domestic ratification, a popularity bonus is generated. This kind 
of popularity bonus may be greater than that in the case of `No Campaign'. The French 
government led the Council of Ministers to controversy by mounting the high profile campaign 
of resistance against the settlement terms that were proposed by the EU Commission in the 
agricultural sector under the Uruguay Round. In the process of the MAI negotiation, the French 
government did not hesitate in making an individual voice through claiming national exceptions 
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including its cultural industry and reacting positively to the calling of civil society against a 
collective voice of the EU that found MAI beneficial. 
As such, the pay-off of French government was in fact not (fl, b2 - r2 ), but (fl + r2, b2 
- r2 ). Here r2' is a popularity bonus that is given to French government by domestic 
constituents when the French government does commit an anti-campaign and a domestic 
ratification game fails to be agreed. r2' ) r2 if domestic constituents are dominated by Euro- 
scepticism. As such, along as the equilibrium of the rational model, the French domestic 
ratification game moves to the node of `Reject', in C4, where the costs of committing anti- 
campaign is going to be included to the pay-off of the strategic choice. 
Formally the French government gave four reasons for the decision to withdraw from the 
MAI negotiation: exemptions for cultural reasons, refusal of extra-territorial application of US 
law, accounting for European integration, and derogations linked to social and environmental 
norms. 2 In addition, French officials emphasised the importance of opinions from civil societies. 3 
The equilibrium from the rational model consists of the pay-off of constituents (b2 - r2 ). r2 is 
voting costs, while b2 is the constituent's benefit from rejecting a non-beneficial treaty. In 
particular, from the perspective of the latter, the rejection of treaty in the FDI sector provides 
domestic firms that lack international competitiveness by an opportunity to develop `the 
economies of scale' so that they can be in relatively more effective and competitive condition as 
they are exposed to international competition. 
There is another positive point. Domestic producers win the overwhelming per cent of 
market share resulting in benefits so that it is likely to reinvest these benefits to firms (Reich, 
1989, pp. 576-577). Besides, it is possible to avoid imbalance in the industrial structure in favour 
of capital-intensive and high-technology-intensive industry that would generate a negative effect 
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to labour-intensive industry. This avoidance protects the workers in labour-intensive industry, 
i. e. their jobs and incomes. 
Such perspectives compare to the constituent's benefit from accepting a beneficial treaty, i. e. 
bl. In the account of bl linked to the FDI sector, practically, as for firms the transfer of 
technology and management skills, while as for households job creation and as a result the 
increase in household income can be referred to. However, in fact it is possible that job creation 
and the increase in household income are offset by job export and consequent decrease in 
household income caused by the movement of production centres accompanied by outward 
investment. Thus it is necessary for the cost-and-benefit calculus to get precise data about the 
relevant sector. 
In the meantime, looking at a sub-game for the pay-off of the French government's choice 
with `Reject' of MAI by the constituents, the case of `Campaign' has a pay-off of - (fl + i), 
while the case of `No Campaign' has J7. Furthermore, fl is not economic costs, but political 
costs that are given to a Member State with unsuccessful domestic ratification. In fact, such costs 
make a significant difference in terms of economics, whilst in terms of politics it can be ignored. 
As such, it is saying that Campaign/Reject node and No Campaign/Reject node do not make 
any politically significant difference. This point of view offers another account in considering fl, 
i. e. the punishment by the EU of the unsuccessful domestic ratification, in the pay-off of the 
French government. 
In fact, the French government was not occupied by the account of fl derived from the 
regulatory structure of the EU. It was partially because of `soft institutions' of the EU (Young, 
2000) that lack of significantly binding political regulations, that the French government could 
declare its withdrawal from MAI negotiation without the formal consultation with the EU 
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negotiation partners. Confronted with such an attitude of the French government it is possible for 
the other Member States of the EU only to impose the political costs such as condemnation or 
non-co-operation on other sectors (Young A., 2000). 
5.2.3.2 A ratification game in the UK 
Until the middle of 1998, the British government had been in favour of MAI, as shown the 
feature of Ni in figure 5.1. This understanding derives from the fact that at the time the British 
government supported the proposed general aims of MAI, and was working to achieve the 
successful outcome of the negotiation on time for the OECD Ministerial meeting in 28th to 29th 
April 1998. In MAI negotiation, the British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, presented a positive 
attitude to multilateral investment rules, in the following way: 
"The multilateral agreement on investment is supported not just by the United 
States, but by Britain. Indeed, we have been active in promoting it, for a very good 
reason. Contrary to some of the things that are being said, it does not prevent decent 
regulations, either on labour standards or on the environment. What it does prevent 
is means of discriminating against foreign companies, and it is actually very 
important for British business and British exports that we prevent countries using 
regulation as a backdoor means of discriminating against foreign investment. s)4 
As such, the British government is aiming for a comprehensive, multilateral and legally binding 
agreement providing the high standard of investment protection and liberalisation of the 
investment regime. In accordance with these objectives, the British government explained that 
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the MAI does not prevent the government from enforcing policies as confirmed in a letter from 
Lord Clinton Davies, the trade minister, to MPs setting out the governmental position. 
"[The MAI] does not prevent government from implementing policies that favour 
small firms or particular industries or regions. Furthermore if a government wishes 
to offer subsidies to firms to employ local people, or the long-term unemployed, the 
MAI will not stand in its way. It is important to realise that, more generally, MAI 
obligations will not affect a country's right to maintain its own internal regulations, 
nor will the Agreement prevent governments holding companies accountable for 
their actions. "s 
The positive attitude of the British government to MAI is also confirmed by Clare Short's, 
Secretary of State for International Development, speech in July 1997. 
"Negotiations are now under way on the Multilateral Agreement on Investment 
(MAI). Our overall objectives are clear - to achieve high standards of investor 
protection which reflect our commitment to sustainable development, 
environmental protection and core labour standards. s6 
A domestic ratification game in the UK representing Ni moves on to the node of 
Campaign/Accept on Cl alongside equilibrium of rational model. The pay-off is (rl -i- c3, bl 
- r2) and the constituents enjoy the net benefit from accepting a beneficial treaty less voting 
costs. Meanwhile, the British government enjoys the net popularity bonus from successful 
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ratification followed by an information campaign less a cost to engage in an information 
campaign and politically negative effects followed by the ratification of a treaty. Such a 
governmental pay-off is calculated under a decision-maker's belief of rl -i -c3 ) 0. 
In the case of c3, sensitive issues that are core in national political and social activities such 
as the damage of national sovereignty and negative impact on the efficiency of national 
economic policy involve in this pay-of rl means much to decision-makers as politicians in the 
sense that it imposes a direct price on power maintenance of political parties and politicians, i. e. 
political survivability. Linked to such a calculus it is likely to happen that a decision-maker as a 
politician finds a dominant strategy when ri )i+ c3 or probably at least r1= i+ c3. Strategies 
in the condition of rl (i+ c3 make a decision-maker pay a price such as resignation, the change 
of regime, a power change, of an unsuccessful candidacy. 
These features of the British ratification game changed in late 1998. Anti-MAI-ism in the 
ranks of the Parliamentary Labour Party conformed to the slow advancement of negotiation in 
the House of Commons, and the MAI impacts on British international development aid policy 
was in question. The minister for Employment provoked the examination of environmental 
impacts of FDI to OECD, and pushed stronger wording for labour and environmental standards 
(Smythe, 2000, p. 86). 
5.3 (Three) Feasible structural contexts to explain the outputs 
It is necessary to distinguish systematically diverse international influences that impact on 
foreign economic policies of individual states. Above all, the international structure refers to the 
internationalisation of industrial capital and financial capital from a Marxian viewpoint, and the 
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change in technology, the increase in capital flow, and the sensitivity of national economy to 
other international developments (for example, hegemony, and constraints on foreign economic 
policy imposed by the increasing extent of international division of labour) from the perspective 
of liberals (Katzenstein, 1978). 
Global political economy imposes diverse constraints on individual national economic 
agents. Thus an international politics approach such as IPE offers not the diverse strategies of 
individual states, but the diverse limitations imposed by the structure. In this section through the 
accounts of capital mobility, globalisation and power politics representing those structural 
perspectives, the influence of the international structure is examined by verifying the hypothesis 
5.3 in chapter 2. A dependent variable for the relational analysis with such a series of 
independent variables is the difference in foreign investment policy of individual states, 
especially France, the UK and Germany. As such, a group of hypotheses are going to be verified 
by this section. 
5.3.1 A government as an international negotiator in the international context 
The case of MAI questions concerning the extent to which structural changes such as capital 
mobility and globalised production reshape and limit national economic sovereignty (Smythe, 
2000, p. 87). Such structural impacts on national economic sovereignty cause fundamental 
changes in decision-makers' preferences and strategies and the scope of their choices. For 
example, these structural changes induce changes in the implications of exchange rate policy 
through setting domestic decision-makers' strategies. Furthermore, structural changes make 
domestic decision-makers give up a number of regulatory measures by which foreign investors 
might be constrained. 
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Based on the logic above, this section aims to verify the hypothesis 5.4 in chapter 2. As for 
operational definitions to verify this hypothesis, above all `the increase of capital mobility' is 
represented by `overall balance' or, according to a dialectical logic, `FDI flow'. `Overall 
balance' consists of balance of current account and capital account, and overall balance curve, 
i. e. BP (Balance of Payments) curve reflects to the extent of capital flow. Meanwhile, 
`inward/outward FDI shifting balance' represents `the convergence of agents' policy 
preferences'. 
Operational definition 5.1: 
1.1 `The more horizontal `overall balance' is, the more the capital mobility increases'. 
1.2 'The increase in FDI flow accompanies the increase in capital mobility'. 
1.3 `Inward/outward FDI shifting balance reflects a change in a agent (a decision- 
maker)'s policy preference'. 
5.3.1.1 Globalisation 
Globalisation has brought out changes in interest in, ideas concerning, and the influence of the 
state and non-state actors as the international investment regimes develop. Such changes mainly 
incline toward rules that are designed to constrain national economic sovereignty over 
multinational capital. Globalisation impacts on states by redefining their definitions of 
investment interest through this bias. Such a redefinition materialises through inward/outward 
investment shifting balance and the decrease in the negotiating power of the state against firms. 
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Globalisation suggests significant implications from both the structural and agential 
viewpoint. Above all, from the structural viewpoint of neo-liberalism, it means the complexity of 
structure caused by growing interdependence. Such a structural complexity is comprised of 
closer connections between the domestic and international economy, as well as the extension or 
multiplicity of action level caused by a transnationalisation of interest. By contrast, from the 
agential perspectives, it suggests an increase in the number of actors in decision-making and 
policy-making processes. Such an increase of actors happens not only at the national level, but 
also at the transnational level. If there is a significance in terms of an actor, it would refer to the 
increase in non-state actors. 
A significant structural change brought out by globalisation is the transnationlisation of 
interest. Although this change also derives from the fact that issues are related to transnational or 
supranational norms, it can happen only via changes in agents' knowledge or recognition of the 
scope of objectives. So to speak, an agent-structure interaction is a precondition for structural 
changes. It is possible that in such an interaction the extent of its dynamics varies by time and 
space. Globalisation accelerates the dynamics of an agent-structure interaction by making the 
gap of the time and space narrow. As for its main method to make time and space narrow, 
technological development can be referred to above all. Globalisation is promoted by the 
development of global networks such as the internet in accordance with new technology. 
The development of global network makes it possible to rapidly spread information and 
makes it easier to get access to information so that the dynamics of an agent-structure interaction 
are extremely accelerated. The existing old-fashioned technology limits agents to simply reactive 
actions such that actors are monitoring the structure via their own knowledge and choose 
constrained strategies. By contrast, the current significantly developed technology provides 
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agents with information in more rapid and precise ways so that actors are able to take more 
proactive actions in regard to the structure via the formation of more proactive knowledge. As 
such, a hypothesis is established as the following. 
Hypothesis 5.8: Globalisation in the development of the international investment regime 
brings out changes in agents' knowledge of interest 
As for operational definitions to verify this hypothesis, above all `trade in goods', `growth in real 
trade less growth in real gross domestic product (GDP)', `gross private capital flows' and `gross 
foreign direct investment' are adopted as indicators of `globalisation'. The growing importance 
of trade in the world's economy is one indication of increasing economic globalisation. Trade in 
services also can be referred to as an important element of globalisation. In addition, 
identification of economies with dynamic trade regimes can be achieved by measuring the 
difference between the growth of real trade in goods and services and the growth of GDP. 
Meanwhile, investment flow is a spearhead of globalisation, since investment flow is a 
major component of capital mobility that represents globalisation. Capital mobility is a function 
of income and interest rates that are functions of current balance and capital balance. Meanwhile, 
`inward investment shifting balance' is adopted to indicate when rational agents redefine the 
notion of investment interest, since such a shifting in investment balance derives from changes in 
policy preference and the pay-off calculus. 
Operational definition 5.2: 
2.1 "trade in goods', `growth in real trade less growth in real GDP', `gross private capital 
flows' and `gross foreign direct investment' indicate the growing globalisation'. 
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2.2 "Inward investment shifting balance' suggests changes in agents' definition 
of investment interest and preferences. ' 
5.3.1.2 Power Politics (International relations) 
The foreign investment policies of Germany and the UK have generally been conducted in a 
liberal way, whilst French foreign investment policy has been based on strictly controlled 
protectionism. Such strict protectionism in French foreign investment policy is rooted partially in 
the mainstream of French foreign policy. In the same context, this section examines the 
relationships between international economic order and international politics or security order 
centring around the positions of the French and British governments on international investment 
rulemaking. A targeted hypothesis is the following. 
Hypothesis 5.9: It is impossible to isolate economic interest of a nation state from its security 
interest. In the same context, international security (or political) order is a necessary condition 
for FDI flow and the activities of multinational corporations. 
Applying this understanding to the case of the EU, it is plausible to say that European security 
order induces an increase in FDI flow. To verify this, it is necessary to take account of European 
security order divided into the Cold War and Post-Cold War periods. The reason for this is that 
the different features in the structure of the order generate diverse accounts for policy outputs. 
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5.3.1.2.1 French foreign policy and the US hegemony in the era of the Cold 
War 
Above all, in the era of the Cold War the European security order was heavily dependent on US 
hegemony. In terms of Susan Strange's four components of structural power, the Pax Americana 
system contained `knowledge' to produce nuclear weapons as an absolute power. As such, in 
terms of `security' it was only the US that had nuclear weapons in the 1940s, and the US offered 
a nuclear umbrella to Western Europe and Japan via North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 
and the US-Japan security agreement. In addition, from the viewpoint of `production', the US 
won over 50 per cent of world production volume, and in terms of `credit' over around 50 per 
cent of world currency reserve was occupied by the US Dollar (Gilpin, 1975). The component of 
`security' created the hegemony of a certain country, i. e. the US, and again induced growth in 
production and finance. 
During the Cold War, the Western European countries' greatest objective was the 
strengthening of European power within the framework of Atlantic integration (NATO). 
Compared to such a highly qualified objective, contending individual preferences between 
Germany, France and the UK are nothing but incidental (Gilpin, 1975). At the time, the US, with 
support from Germany and the UK, aimed at establishing a European political order as a 
bridging objective, and furthering greater Atlantic economic and political community as the final 
objective against the threat of the Soviet Union. By contrast, the French government, with 
supports of the other groups, preferred a more closed and autonomous Europe. 
In the 21st century France has wanted political, economic and military independence and 
ultimately the status of the ruler in world politics. To realise this goal the French government 
needs to acquire the status of a super power through obtaining an autonomous nuclear deterrent, 
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checking on German power expansion, and maintaining influences in Africa. The practical 
strategy for these aims is to check Germany through close ties with Eastern Europe, countries of 
Latin origin and the UK, and to make Europe grow up as a giant force to be capable of 
competing with the US and Japan, as France plays the role of a core in such a Europe. These 
strategic objectives are generally reflected in the pursuit of European integration policy. In this 
process, France maintains competitive relationships within co-operation with Germany, whilst it 
pursues autonomous foreign policy within the co-ordination with the US. 
This mainstream of French foreign policy recalls De Gaulle's foreign policy in the era of the 
Cold War. The fundamental objectives that underlied De Gaulle's foreign policy were military 
security, economic prosperity, and the restoration of national prestige or the pursuit of national 
grandeur. De Gaulle tried to achieve the recovery of French grandeur through making France 
surface as the third super power, independent of the US and the Soviet Union. In practical terms, 
he tried to possess an individual nuclear deterrent; to secede from NATO; to accelerate European 
integration through reconciliation with Germany aiming at checking German force as well as 
forming a unitary European force against the US and the Soviet Union; to maintain single 
political, military and economic influence in Africa aiming at ensuring a political voice as a new 
superpower in the Third world, and a wider global political role. 
5.3.1.2.2 French foreign policy, international regimes, economic sovereignty 
and the US capacity in the Post-Cold War era 
In the Post-Cold War era, France saw German reunification and Ostpolitik as the naked pursuit 
of `economic giant'. Consequently, the French government hurried the progress of the 
Maastricht Treaty (concluded on 96' December 1991) in. This was targeted at accelerating 
158 
European integration to prevent Germany from deviating from Western Europe. On the other 
hand, France took another track to prepare for the possibility of Germany taking a negative 
attitude by pursuing an individual hard line to penetrate central Europe: to strengthen its ties with 
the US and the UK and to re-approach NATO (Christopher, 1993, Lellouche, 1993); to reinforce 
co-operative relations with countries of Latin origin such as Spain, Portugal, and Italy (Mortimer, 
1992, Vernet, 1992); to reactivate its ties with the Soviet Union; and to promote economic and 
security cooperative relations with the central European countries aiming at checking Germany's 
ties with those countries. 
However, the fundamental lines of De Gaulle's foreign policy were never ever abandoned. 
In the contemporary period, Chirac's France has devoted its best efforts to the recovery of the 
domestic economy, whilst it orientated towards a single military hard line through the 
resumption of nuclear tests accompanied by loi prigrammation militaire (i. e. a long-term plan to 
reinforce military power). Such an orientation is evaluated as a resurrection of Gaullism, so- 
called neo-Gaullism. These aspects of changing foreign policy are basically supported by De 
Gaulle's nationalist foreign policy. Meanwhile, the fact that in the era of the Post-Cold-War the 
French government recognised the limitations of diplomatic alternative strategies that are 
established by itself, that confronts the possibility of German Sonderweg supports those contents. 
These fundamental policy objectives continued to be reflected in the unilateral declaration of the 
French government to withdraw itself from MAI negotiation in 1998 and Chirac's strong appeal 
to the public in terms of military independence of Europe from NATO in the Nice Summit in 
December 2000. 
Meanwhile, changes have also happened in the international economic order. It is the retreat 
of hegemony and significant roles of a series of international institutions that are the most 
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significant changes in the international economic order. Such international institutions involve 
new forms of power, whilst a series of norms such as co-operation, co-ordination, participation 
and consultation are emphasised. However, structural features in the era of the Cold War have 
been maintained in the form of regimes. In particular, there are a few significant political 
implications in the issue of the liberalisation of investment through multilateral rules. 
First, the perspective of a special state's consistent hegemony in the form of agenda setting 
power encompasses a significant political implication. Neo-liberals think that economic 
interdependence changes national interest, whilst it creates regimes as a method to save costs. In 
the same context, Keohane (1984) suggests that a stable hegemony is going to be replaced with 
regimes after the retreat of hegemony. By contrast, realists understand that the resurgence of 
regimes mirrors the power relationships in the international system. Still, hegemonic power 
relations are alive in institutions. As for the budgetary architecture, one of the necessary 
components of institutions, the more contributions a state makes, the higher voice it has in rule 
making. Such a variation does not reflect widespread antipathy against `hegemony'. 
When the notion of power is defined as a capacity to transform social, political and 
economic material environments for achieving objectives based on the mobilisation of resources, 
the creation of system rules, and the control on infrastructure and institutions (Held, 1996, p. 
255), then international relations led by institutions create a new form of the notion of power. 
International rules on foreign investment were launched by simply attaching the issue of 
investment to the Uruguay Round agenda, a trade negotiation, and have developed as a series of 
international investment regimes. 
As such, investment protection is currently provided by a web of international agreements 
and understandings at various levels: 1) Multilateral agreements, including elements of various 
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agreements negotiated under the auspices of the World Trade Organisation (WTO), such as 
GATS, TRIMs and the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Right (TRIPS). 2) 
Plurilateral arrangements, such as the EU, the NAFTA and MERCOSUR (the Common Market 
encompassing Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay), and the agreements reached between 
them. 3) Bilateral agreements, of which 1513 have now been concluded. 7 
It was the US that took the initiative in such activities. In fact, it was also the US that 
initiated the MAI negotiation. The US possesses a sufficiently strong power of agenda setting to 
provoke the inclusion of the issue of investment in the agenda of trade negotiations. Such power 
makes it possible to internationalise even the sensitive issues that connote the potential 
imbalance of interest, and ultimately creates a normalised or principled knowledge. 
Secondly, monetary hegemony, as a traditional structure in international relations, is 
embedded in new institutions that put an emphasis on cooperation and liberalisation. Aliber's 
(1970,1973) perspective of `capital market' concerning foreign investment indicates 
asymmetrical power games of inter-economic agents, of inter-foreign investors from different 
countries, and between foreign investors and domestic firms. General theories concerning the 
motives of investment countries in terms of investment supply (mentioned later in the section of 
market perspective) are not perfect in the sense that they omit the perspective of capital market 
relations. Such an asymmetry derives from asymmetrical advantage of foreign investors caused 
by the difference in stability of the exchange value of currency. 
Foreign investors from a foreign country that has a currency with a high exchange value, for 
example, the US Dollar, have greater capacity to pay for real assets. As a result, they have 
advantages compared to local firms. In addition, it is likely that investment firms from a foreign 
country of unstable exchange value of a currency prefer equity holdings that are marked by a key 
161 
currency (Triffin, 1954, Dunn, 1963). Domestic firms of a key currency country are able to loan 
in better conditions and lower interest rates compared to foreign firms from non-key currency 
countries. As such, firms of a key currency country always have advantages both in the domestic 
and international levels (Gilpin, 1975). That is to say that despite liberalisation of investment, it 
is possible that the existing structural nature of world economic order is still maintained because 
of the monetary hegemony of a key currency country (mainly the US). It is France that 
recognises this perspective. In the same context as the abovementioned account, De Gaulle 
emphasised the significant role of the US dollar as a reserve fund, and French officials appealed 
for reverting back to the gold standard (Gilpin, 1975). 
As long as the status of the US dollar as a key currency continues, the original intention of 
liberalisation of investment fades by making it plausible to prefer political price to lose to 
economic efficiency to acquire. In particular, it is likely that the `political price' structures the 
rationality of policy making for the French government, where the pursuit of national prestige 
and grandeur connotes significance. In 1998 when the French government decided to withdraw 
from MAI negotiation, French decision-makers took account of the `political price' in terms of 
the erosion of national sovereignty by foreign firms and the cultural issue covering cultural 
industry caused by the increase in inward investment flow. 
The liberalisation of investment infringes on national sovereignty and results in the 
dominance of economic society, i. e. economic community. Such a feature is the same as the 
social structure observed by Gramsci where economic society dominates civil society and 
government. By contrast, in the sense that this economic society has nationality, in particular 
mainly the US and Japan, it makes a great difference. Such a feature of an economic society 
means a reproduction of the US hegemony, since quantitatively foreign investment from the US 
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takes the greatest share in world investment volume. In the sense that the draft of the MAI 
included strong measures for allowing foreign investors to sue governments, significant attention 
was paid to the erosion of national sovereignty by economic society. In 1998 Jospin said: 
"[T]he MAI, in its current from, threatened the sovereignty of states, which are 
asked to commit themselves in an irreversible manner. " 
5.3.1.3 Quantitative analysis 
Turning to hypothesis 5.8, let us examine the relationships between `European security order' 
and FDI flow (between Europe and the US). As for operational definitions to verify this 
hypothesis, it is possible to use `the speed of European integration'. This is because European 
integration started with economic integration, completed a Single Common Market through the 
Single European Act (SEA), and now is approaching a political and military community since 
the Maastricht Treaty. In fact, an autonomous military committee was organised by the Nice 
Summit in December 2000.8 In addition, the fact that the US and France have pursued European 
integration as a means of achieving European security since the Cold War indicates the 
possibility of adopting `the speed of European integration' as an indicator. 
Operational definition 5.3: 
'The increase in the speed of European integration is a positive sign for European security'. 
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5.3.2 A government as a preference-taker in a non-cooperative game between 
domestic actors 
Domestic structure consists of political, economic and social systems. In this section, from the 
perspectives of these three systems, hypotheses 5.6 and 5.7 in chapter 2 are examined. 
5.3.2.1 Domestic political system and policy outputs 
A domestic political system consists of bureaucratic structure and political party structure. For 
the former, the stronger national institutions and the national control on a policy network are, the 
more difficult public approaches to the policy-making process. France characterises the 
centralised political system where the executive has the strongest power. Since De Gaulle all 
presidents have reinforced this system so that it is to say that France has constructed the strongest 
national institutions. The French parliament, unlike that of the US, does not encompass a strong 
position in the legislative procedure under the principle of `rationalised parliamentarianism' 
(Gabriel and Brettschneider, 1994). In the procedure of foreign policy-making, the president has 
`domaine reservee', and such a centralisation of decision-making is the most significant in the 
section of foreign policy compared to other issue areas (Krasner, 1983). 
In Germany the control of the executive on foreign defence policy is stronger than that of the 
US, whilst the parliament plays a limited role. The German parliament has more limited 
economic sovereignty to take legal measures compared to those of the UK and France (Gabriel 
and Brettschneider, 1994). However, Germany is unique in that the weakness of parliament does 
not result in the strengthening of the executive, but rather in a strong political party system that 
controls both the executive and the legislature. 
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The UK grants a communication function rather than legitimacy with more significant 
meaning. In the continental tradition, the parliament plays only a role of a cooperative legislative 
body, and the legislature confers the limitations on contents. By contrast, the UK parliament is 
free of any legal limitation under the principle of sovereignty of parliament, and enjoys 
sovereign and uncontrolled autonomy. In the UK, unlike the other liberal democratic systems, a 
few legally founded committees (more than France) are permitted and overall meetings are often 
held. From the executive to networks by sector the ratification of the adopted bill is more 
strongly guaranteed by the structure of committees than in the other systems (Gabriel and 
Brettschneider, 1994). 
In this section, the characteristics of bureaucratic structure are divided into `open' and 
`closed' ones, and are evaluated by `the independence of central bank' to examine the 
relationships between domestic bureaucratic structure and the outputs of foreign economic 
policy. A hypothesis is as the following. 
Hypothesis 5.10: Open domestic system is elastic to the changes in international environment. 
To verify this hypothesis an operational definition for `open domestic system' is required. The 
characteristic of national system of a country is indicated by `independency of central bank' that 
represents the relationships between governmental institutions as well as `the corporation-state 
relationships' that is dealt with in a later section. It is also possible to adopt `shifting balance in 
the international investment flow' for `the elasticity of national policy to the changes in 
international environment'. 
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Operational definition 5.4: 
4.1 'The more open a domestic system is, the more independency the central bank has'. 
4.2 "The extent of changes in investment flow balance' indicates the elasticity of the 
national policy to changes in international environment'. 
On the other hand, for the latter, i. e. the structure of political party, it is possible to distinguish 
types by the criteria of the Left-Right propensity. Appendix 5.2 depicts the inclination between 
the Left and the Right of national political parties in individual member states of the EU. 
Empirical data reflects diverse perspectives that derive from political viewpoints, the goal 
setting, rhetoric, the positions of party members or executives, and supporters of individual 
political parties. As Appendix 5.2 shows, Spain and Greece reveal the strong variation between 
the Left and the Right. Greek Sinaspismos and Spanish I. U., the extreme Left, are in striking 
contrast to New Democraty (Greece) and PP (Spain), the extreme Right. 
In France P. Communiste, the extreme Left, contrasts with RPR, the extreme Right, so that it 
is to say that the constituents of political parties lack a political middle-of-the-road. As such, it is 
possible to say that the French political party system never characterises a lesser bipolarisation 
than those of Greece and Spain. In France decision-makers in the Left-Right conflicts pursue the 
objective of economic growth with a set of formidable policy instruments that impinge on 
individual firms or special sectors. In addition, national officials possess a dominant advantage in 
the relationships with business community, and the policy network is integrated tightly 
(Katzenstein, 1978). As such, policy networks are completely dominated by the state, and such a 
dominance of the state has been promoted by an elite group who supports the independence of 
166 
France in world politics and `force de dissuasion' as well as `defence consensus' among all 
political parties (Risse-Kappen, 1996, p. 49). 
However, Germany does not show a strong variation between the Left and the Right, such 
that it is relatively easier for political consensus between the Left and the Right and between the 
opposition and the government to be established. Germany resembles corporatism with a smaller 
and less bipolarised system of political parties than France. German policy networks and political 
structures emphasise consensus building and the institutionalisation of a coalition that support a 
specific policy. Thus, the public puts relatively less direct input in the policy-making process 
(Risse-Kappen, 1996). 
However, the impacts of the public on the policy outputs are rather more consistent in the 
sense that the political party system not only penetrates national institutions, but also forms the 
most important link between society and the political system. In fact, in Germany the main two 
political parties, SPD and CDU, operate as catchall organisations to integrate divergent social 
demands. Under such a structure, in the reflection of domestic structure on German foreign 
policy, frequent volatility and unpredictability of policy does not exist (Risse-Kappen, 1996). As 
such, hypothesis 5.10 adopts operational definitions as the following. 
Operational definition 5.5: 
'The Left-Right cleavage among political parties reflects the difference in domestic political 
structure'. 
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5.3.2.2 Economic system and policy outputs 
It is likely that in the domestic ratification game, decision-makers confront a significant 
difference in domestic constituents' preferences. Domestic agents have different preferences on 
foreign investment, and the governmental structure inclines toward a specific group of them 
enough to make a striking difference. On this point, hypothesis 5.10 is established, and generally 
the interest groups approach is adopted to explore the relationships between domestic interest 
groups and FEP. However, the approach that this section adopts is intended to explain the 
interaction relations between domestic structure and interest groups, and differs from the existing 
interest groups approach. 
As for domestic interest groups concerned with the issue of investment, it is possible to 
restrict these to capitalists (firms) and workers (trade unions). It is reasonable to adopt these 
groups in the sense that the conflicts between capitalists (firms) and workers (trade unions) are 
the most significant ones in regard to foreign investment. Generally speaking, capitalists 
welcome the liberalisation of investment sharing the same position with the Business and 
Industry Advisory Committee (BIAC) on the MAI in 1998. This is because when the economy of 
scale is utilised ineffectively due to the small size of the domestic market, domestic firms can get 
greater profit through gaining access to foreign markets. 
In addition, firms can save on the costs of production input factors through the method of 
local production. In accordance with these market logics, the establishment of an international 
investment rule, i. e. the MAI, generates the acquisition of transparency and predictability by 
removing the ambiguity derived from the existence of different national investment rules. In 
addition, it stipulates the supply of investment from TNCs by eliminating the investment risks in 
individual states. 
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By contrast, workers (trade unions) generally aim to increase employment through a specific 
policy, to utilise labour-intensive comparative advantage and thereby, eventually acquire more 
income. Under a system of economic liberalisation the law of comparative advantage operates 
effectively, and the liberalisation of investment is accompanied by job creation. As such, workers 
possess positive pay-offs in games. Furthermore, workers are not just producers, but consumers. 
The liberalisation of investment provides them with greater benefits as it generates a lower price 
of goods, and price and service competitions among firms due to the lower costs of production 
input factors. 
However, with the establishment of an international investment rule under the MAI, this is 
not the case. This is because from the beginning of negotiations for the MAI, measures to bind 
effectively the abuse of domestic labour standard in which a certain government offers lower 
labour standards to attract foreign investment were omitted. Thus in 1998 workers agreed with 
the liberalisation of investment, but disagreed with on the MAI, which did not protect labour 
standards. 
Individual agents express these different preferences through (political or economic) actions 
towards a government. As for the forms of these, capitalists can switch their investments from 
the domestic market to a foreign market, or choose non-investment. This `capital flight' can be 
used as a means of capitalists' negotiating power in the sense that it imposes costs, i. e. price, on a 
government, such as the following: the export of domestic jobs, unemployment and the decrease 
in household income, loss of opportunities to promote industrialisation, decline of productivity, 
loss of opportunities to create human capital and loss of opportunities to increase governmental 
income through the sales tax on goods and services and an income tax on capitalists and workers. 
Besides this, lobbying and protests are available methods of influencing government. 
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On the other hand, workers express their preferences through general strikes, non-general 
strikes, sabotage, secondary boycotts, lobbying, protests and voting. These actions generate the 
temporary paralysis of domestic economic activities and the loss of household income, and, 
furthermore, induce social instability, and disturb the stock market. Ultimately it results in 
damaging the popularity of the government that is a significant political price. 
Contending preferences between capitalists (firms) and workers (trade unions) creates a non- 
cooperative game, and in this game a government forms three different types of neutral, capital- 
friendly or labour-friendly games. Above all, a neutral government, generally speaking, would 
like to choose a policy in favour of an actor who undertakes more political actions. Appendix 5.3 
A depicts this neutral game. Under a neutral government, players, i. e. capitalists and workers, 
take strategic choices according to the expected pay-offs or possible solutions. So to speak 
Capitalists acquire a pay-off of P1 through political and economic actions to the policy of a 
neutral government, whilst a pay-off of P2 is given to workers. Two players receive a pay-off of 
zero through no actions respectively. Among these possible solutions, Backward Induction picks 
(P1, P2) up as an optimal solution in which both capitalists and workers take actions to the 
government. 
In the meantime, under the capital-friendly governmental structure (the upper sub-game in 
Appendix 5.3 B), r, representing costs and benefits given to workers and capitalists by different 
political systems, is reflected on pay-offs. In this process, the capital-friendly governmental 
structure provides capitalists by positive r, whilst negative r is given to workers. By contrast, the 
opposite phenomenon happens to the case of labour-friendly structure (the bottom sub-game in 
Appendix 5.3 B). As such, as Appendix 5.3 B depicts, two sub-games are available to take 
account of In these games, the optimal solutions are (P1 + r, P2 - r) for a capital-friendly 
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structure, and (P1- r, P2 + r) for a labour-friendly structure respectively, when P1 - r) 0 and 
P2 - r) 0. These optimal solutions differ that in the case of a neutral government only in terms 
of the pay-off, whilst the optimal node of players' strategic choices is completely the same. By 
contrast, when P1 -r(0 and P2 -r(0, then the optimal solutions are (P1 + r, 0) and (0, P2 + 
r) respectively. Thus the players' action routes are changed. 
Finally, only if domestic (governmental) structure impacts significantly on players' pay-offs, 
does it plays a role of structural power to agents' strategic choices. By contrast, in the case when 
domestic structural impacts are not significant, simply the agents' pay-offs are changed, whilst 
the nodes of agents' strategic choices are still unchangeable. Let us apply this rational model to 
Germany, France and the UK. To verify the abovementioned hypothesis a few operational 
definitions need to be adopted. Capital-friendly and labour-friendly domestic structures are 
recognised by `unionisation of individual states', `specific gravity of tax on corporations in 
governmental income' and `the Left-Right propensity of governmental structure'. As such, the 
adopted operational definitions are as the following. 
Operational definition 5.6: 
6.1 'The higher the extent of unionisation is, the lower specific gravity of tax on 
corporations is and the higher Left propensity a governmental structure has, the 
more labour-friendly its structures'. 
6.2 `The lower the extent of unionisation is, the higher specific gravity of tax on 
corporations is and the lower Left propensity a governmental structure has, the more 
capital-friendly its structures'. 
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5.3.2.3 Social system and policy outputs: state-society relationships 
State-society relationships are divided into two types: society-dominated and state-dominated 
ones. In fact, these types are always mixed so that a sharp distinction of them is not available. In 
addition, the feature of state-society relationships is changeable over time so that the distinction 
of types is on the assumption of the limitation by time. 
Rosenau's pre-theory (1969) analysed the relationships between the type of a state and 
determinative factors of foreign policy. According to the result of analysis, as for a big state 
characterised as a developed and open political system, social variables, systemic variables and 
individual variables of decision-makers, in that order, have explanatory powers. By contrast, as 
for a big state characterised as a developed and closed political system, individual variables of 
decision-makers, systemic variables and social variables in order have explanatory powers for 
foreign policy. As such, a hypothesis is established as the following. 
Hypothesis 5.11: In a super and developed state with an open political system, society enjoys 
greater autonomy against the state In such a system, social variables have greater explanatory 
powerforforeign economic policy than systemic and individual variables. By contrast, in a big 
and developed state with a closed political system, social variables lack significant explanatory 
power compared to the other variables. 
France, Germany and the UK differ from each other in terms of their ruling coalition and their 
policy networks that link public actors with private actors. This difference reflects the different 
domestic structures in which policy is defined and enforced, and impacts directly on strategic 
choice in the formation of foreign economic policy. The UK relies on limited policy measures 
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that influence the overall economy rather than specific sectors or firms. State-firm coalitions are 
relatively not in favour of national officials, and policy networks that link the public sectors with 
the private sectors are relatively fragmented. 
On this point, Germany is similar to the UK (Katzenstein, 1978), but differs in a few 
viewpoints. In Germany, society has relatively more autonomy, and is highly participatory in the 
coalition with its government. Firms, trade unions and the Church are the most important and 
centralised social organisations that do not hesitate to attempt to influence foreign policy. These 
social actors overcome internal fragmentation so that they have the power to create a strong 
mediating mechanism (Risse-Kappen, 1996, p. 490). 
On the other hand, Germany prefers consensus building and is founded on the institutional 
arrangements and corporatism in which Interessenausgleich (i. e. divergent social interests) and 
mutual beneficial reconciliation are emphasised. Economic policies of the federal government 
are conducted through the consultation with broad interest groups including Bundesverband der 
Deutschen Industrie (BDI) and Deutscher Industrie- und Handelstag (DIHT), and the witnesses 
from relevant interest groups are invited to the Bundestag. Social values (culture) that emphasise 
consensus building are established in Germany as principled or social knowledge, and construct 
structural features. As such, it is impossible that a two-level game is established, since in policy 
networks it is likely that the accordance between elites' preference and that of the public 
happens. This accordance enables decision-makers to take a strategic choice by themselves 
without a domestic ratification game. 
France has comprehensive policy measures including financial control to change the 
behaviour of private actors. Financial control derives from the strong control of the government 
over capital market, and the high dependence of French firms on loans from the capital market. 
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In particular, the latter originates in the low equity capital rate of French firms (Krasner, 1983). 
Meanwhile, French economic policy is based on a strong `dirigiste' approach that is conducted 
by dominant branches of the executive, supported by a technical civil service, and buttressed by 
informal networks of Ministers, officials, industrialists and bankers (Hayes, 1993). 
Furthermore, traditionally, in French governments the administrative elites have enjoyed 
public control over private agents by choosing interest groups who share a common viewpoint 
with the government, and granting privilege to them. The inter-bureaucrats boundary is less 
distinct than that in the UK, and officials share the knowledge that there is general interest that 
outranks special interest, and it is only the state that can decide what is general interest and 
protect it. France with these features is classified as a strong state according to Krasner's (1983) 
governmental typology. Looking at the formation of foreign economic policy, it represents a 
closed political system in which the decision-making process lacks social input (Risse-Kappen, 
1996). Thus, the public and elites suggest different preferences so that a two-level game 
structures French domestic ratification and international negotiations. 
Turning to the verification of the abovementioned hypothesis 6.11 based on the assumptions 
of Rosenau's Pre-theory (1969), the classification of Germany, France and the UK has priority. 
Above all, as for `a super state', `the contribution of individual Member States to the EU budget' 
is available to be adopted. For `the developed state', GDP is adopted, whilst `open or closed 
system' is represented by `the independency of a central bank'. Two indicators such as `the 
extent of interest in politics' and `satisfaction with domestic democracy' are adopted for 
representing `the power of social variables in explaining state-society relationships'. This 
adoption derives from the knowledge that a state whose people share the participative political 
culture and the satisfaction with domestic democracy characterises a soft state to its society. 
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The reason for this is that satisfaction with domestic democracy explains the type of the 
government, for example, authoritarian or liberal. These types of government indicate the 
features of the route by which social agents' preferences are reflected in the foreign economic 
policy of the government. Under a participative political culture and liberal government, it is 
likely that public opinion or the viewpoints of interest groups will penetrate into governmental 
decision-making and policy-making processes. As such, social agents' preferences are positively 
reflected on foreign economic policy. 
Operational definition 5.7: 
7.1 'A super power contributes a large amount to the EU budget'. 
7.2 `GDP of a developed country is higher that that of developing countries'. 
7.3 'In an open system, the independence of a central bank is higher than that in a 
closed system'. 
7.4 `The more people are interested in politics, and the higher satisfaction with 
domestic democracy that the people have, the higher autonomy their society enjoys 
against the government'. 
5.3.3 The perspective of market as a structure 
5.3.3.1 Dynamic demand and supply 
Linked to the market logic, this section aims to verify the hypothesis 5.5 in chapter 2. There are 
two kinds of FDI. First, the creation of productive assets by foreigners who build something 
from scratch - Greenfield investment; and second, the purchase of existing assets by foreigners - 
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acquisitions, mergers, takeovers, etc. FDI encompasses investments made with the express 
purpose of taking ownership and control of domestic companies abroad. Direct investment does 
not only include the initial acquisition of equity capital, but also subsequent capital transactions 
between the foreign investor and domestic and affiliated enterprises. Market variables 
concerning FDI are as follows. 
5.3.3.1.1 Demand variables 
5.3.3.1.1.1 Positive variables (+) 
  w: benefit in terms of production and the increase in social welfare including technology and 
management skills. Host countries benefit from technology and management skills as well as 
capital transfer. That is to say that they benefit from the transfer of know-how, management and 
control skills, and marketing-related skills. 
  sl: high industrialisation in terms of production. From the dynamic perspective, FDI can 
contribute to the industrialisation of a specific sector by supplying necessary capital. That is, the 
effect of relocation of capital as a resource. 
  j: job creation. This is the effect that is accompanied by the influx of capital. 
  el: guarantee for the effect of domestic policy (in case of financial policy). FDI accelerates the 
capital flow. Under the floating exchange rate system, the extent of capital flow generates 
contradictory effects for monetary and financial policy. As for the former, it is only when 
international capital flow does not exist that monetary policy benefits in terms of effectiveness. 
By contrast, for the latter, the greater the capital flow is, the more effectively financial policy 
operates. Meanwhile, Such effects of (financial) policy convert to the increase in income from 
Yl to Y2, as Appendix 5.4 depicts. 
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  i1: the effect of income creation caused by the increase in production and employment. 
  t: governmental revenue derived from taxation on TNCs. 
  d: resource development. Host countries can have a chance to develop resources, in the sense 
that investing countries supply desired capital and technology, and find markets for goods and 
services. 
5.3.3.1.1.2 Negative variables (-) 
  c: the decrease in competitiveness. FDI dominates host countries' local markets, and results in 
the increase in dependency of host country on investment country. In addition, FDI curtails 
Research and Development (R & D) ability of a host country so that it results in the decrease in 
competitiveness of the host country's firms. 
  e2: impediment of effective economic policy. Foreign firms establish an international network 
centring around a holding company in an investment country. As such, when the economic 
policy of a host country operates against these firms, they can avoid this problem with support 
from a holding company. This results in the impediment of economic policy of the host country. 
  i2: a drop of domestic investment. Transnational Corporations (TNCs) do not reinvest high 
profit in a host country, but remit it to their home country or convert investment to other areas. 
As a result, the domestic investment of the host country is going to drop. 
  p: the deterioration of balance-of-payments. FDI continues to exert pressure upon balance-of- 
payments of a host country, since the patent royalty that the host country has to pay is high, 
whilst the benefit for the investment country of FDI is greater than that of host country. As a 
result, an outflow of foreign currency occurs. 
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  r: the drop of R&D capacity. R&D activities are centralised upon the holding company of a 
foreign firm, whilst R&D activities in the host country aim only to confirm how effectively the 
outputs from R&D activities can be operated in the specific environment of a host country. As 
such, R&D activities that are desirable for the host country are neglected, and the objective is 
only to transfer technology that is developed through a centralised mechanism. It results in the 
drop of R&D capacity of the host country. 
  s2: asymmetrical industrial structure. In the development stage of an economy, the host 
country needs labour-intensive technology, whilst investment country supplies capital-intensive 
and high-tech technology. As such, it is likely that the technology transferred to the host country 
by FDI cannot diffuse to every sector. As a result, the industrial structure of the host country 
becomes asymmetrical. 
5.3.3.1.2 Supply variables 
  a: advantageous variable 
FDI has also increased for a number of the firms' strategic reasons and these can be summarised 
as follows: to diversify regionally and politically; to protect profit margins by acquiring market 
share; to cope more readily with the shortening of the product life-cycle; to obtain economies of 
scale to compete internationally; to take it as a countermeasure to trade friction; to maintain close 
business relationships during a period of de-investment by some companies; to mitigate against 
legal controls on mergers and acquisitions and foreign investment; to provide access to desired 
technology; to broaden product lines; to expand markets; to restrict competition, and; to improve 
a branch network (Cooke, 1992, p. 51). 
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  d: disadvantageous variables 
FDI also has demerits as follows: (1) the overestimation of the value of the target company; even 
though the company researched and confirmed the condition of the target company, the value of 
the target company can be lower, contrary to expectation, (2) cultural clash between acquirer and 
acquired company; the relationship between employees who have a different nationality may 
become worse caused by the difference between organisational cultures. As a result the decline 
of organisational efficiency or the outflow of competent human resources may occur, (3) 
financial aggravation; because FDI outflow requires massive capital, the financial condition of a 
company may worsen, and (4) anti-trust laws; an important consideration in any contemplated 
acquisition is the potential constraint imposed by antitrust laws (Buckley, 1995, Gilpin, 1975, 
Mansfield, 1994, Rogers, 1993, Dunning, 1998). 
According to the abovementioned variables, economic agents decide to supply or not to 
supply foreign investment. Their behaviours are established in the theoretical forms of oligopoly 
theory, product-life-cycle theory and organic theory. Above all, oligopoly theory explains that 
domestic enterprises, possessing technological advantage, better financial resources, professional 
management and new products or a new production line, invest in foreign markets to exercise 
their control power on the market, aiming to restrict inter and external competitions. Such FDI is 
aggressive (Joyce and Gabriel Kolko, 1972). The product-life-cycle theory suggests that in the 
stage of maturity of product-life, competitive advantage derived from technological advantage is 
reduced, and moves on to low technology, low wage and labour-intensive economy in the 
consequential stage of standardisation. In the latter, domestic firms come to confront competition 
from foreign firms. Enterprises therefore implement foreign investment before the stage of 
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standardisation to prevent this from happening. Such FDI is defensive. Meanwhile, the organic 
theory of investment suggests that firms choose foreign investment not to pursue the 
maximisation of profit, but to prohibit the loss of market share, i. e. to protect earning capacity. 
This kind of investment aimed at `loss avoidance' is a defensive and long-term strategy. 
5.3.3.1.3 Dynamic game of supply and demand 
The function of the payoffs in the supply-demand game with complete information is (x, y), 
which x is for the decision of an investing country whether to supply the investment (capital) or 
not, while y is for the utility of a host country. x is decided by supply variables, i. e. advantages - 
disadvantages. Meanwhile, y consists of the costs-benefits variables of host country, i. e. w +sl + 
j+ el + il +t+d+c+ e2 + i2 +p +r+ s2. In addition, the pay-off of a supplier is greater than 
zero, since only if it is, foreign investment is in supply. In the same context, the pay-off of the 
demander is greater than zero, too. 
Based on economic logic, applying backward induction to the game of supply-demand, the 
French government must make a decision regarding its investment demand irrespective of the 
decisions of any investing country, for example, the US or Japan. Contrasting strikingly with this 
logic, the French government has actually kept a foreign investment policy characterised by 
limited access and discriminatory intervention. 
Furthermore, as Figure 5.2 shows, economic indicators for Germany and the UK produce 
negative results, whilst those of France produce positive results. In terms of French net direct 
investment, unemployment, trade balance at current price, net current and capital account and net 
current account, these have all been in strong balance, fair improvement, fair black or great black. 
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Figure 5.2 Types of the EU member states on external investment policy and 
their economic performance 
Country T I U BI B2 B3 
EU 15 less and fair fair black in black in black in 
improvemen 
balance t (since recession recession recession 
France Limited access strong 




discriminatory 1997) over 
intervention balance EU 15 
Germany Unlimited less balance fair great black fair red fair red 
access and improvemen 
t (since 
discriminatory 1997) under 
intervention EU 15 
United Unlimited fair balance Great great red fair red fair red 
Kingdom access and improvemen 
nondiscriminat 
t under EU or, 
intervention 15 
Notes : (1) T= type of the EU member states on external investment policy; I= direct investment 
net, Mio ECU; U= unemployment rate (%); B1= trade balance at current prices, 1000 million 
ECU (trade in goods); B2 = current and capital account net, Mio ECU; B3 = current account net, 
Mio ECU, (2) strong balance = even though that it was less than equilibrium since 1998; less 
balance =a little bit underneath equilibrium, and the rapid increase of outward flow since 1999; 
fair balance = almost near to equilibrium, despite the reduction since 1998 and the rapid increase 
of inward flow in the end of 1999; less and fair balance = underneath Germany's performance and 
since 1998 a big fluctuation between zero and -120000, (3) great black = be in the black in a 
large scale; fair black = be in the black in a small scale; great red = be in the red in a large scale; 
fair red = be in the fluctuation between 5000 to -5000 for the case of 'current account net, Mio 
ECU', and between 5000 to -10000 for the case of 'current and capital account net, Mio ECU'; 
black in recession = be in the black and on the decrease 
Source : Eurostat Yearbook 2000: A statistical eye on Europe, Data 1988-1998; Eurostatistics, 
Data for short-term economic analysis, 8-9,2000,12,1999; Eurostat, 12,2000,11,2000,5, 
2000,12,1999,11,1999,4,1999,2,1999,5,1998; Eurostat Yearbook 2000: A statistical eye 
on Europe, Data 1988-1998. 
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As such, the rationale for French protective foreign investment policy is founded on sound 
economic indicators. This is to say that market logic cannot lead the French government to the 
liberalisation of investment, and consequently that the abovementioned hypothesis based on neo- 
classical logic of economics, i. e. `market induces changes in policy', must be abandoned. 
5.3.3.2 Money: capital mobility 
Let us take account into the effect of capital mobility through the market logic of monetary and 
financial policy effects under a floating exchange rate. Today's investment flows among the 
developed countries comes to be almost perfectly correlated with deregulation, the development 
of information and communication technology and the decrease in transaction costs. Perfect 
capital mobility means that, between two countries, capital flow does not confront any barrier 
and financial assets are completely substitutable: as capital moves at once from one country of 
lower interest rate to the other country of higher interest rate after every single subtle difference 
in interest rates so that interest rates of these two countries become the same. As such, the 
domestic interest rate is the same as that is decided in foreign countries so that any unbalance of 
current balance is corrected by capital flows at once. As a result, the BP curve, representing 
balance-of-payments and the combination of income and interest rate, becomes horizontal at the 
level of foreign interest rate. 
In the case of perfect capital mobility under a floating exchange rate, monetary policy never 
impacts on income level, whilst financial policy can be very effectively utilised. By contrast, 
under a fixed exchange rate, monetary policy impacts seriously enough on income to be an 
effective policy tool, whilst financial policy does not impact on income. As such, capital 
mobility plays a significant role in deciding national income through its impact on the domestic 
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economic policy of individual states. In addition, capital mobility generates a significant effect 
on national economies through inducing change in exchange rates and, consequently, in trade 
conversion or price change. 
Today's world economy is characterised by the floating exchange rate system and high inter- 
state interdependency. In such an international environment, individual states generally orientate 
toward the international free movement of goods and services, independent economic policy and 
stability of exchange rates. However, it is not easy to achieve these three objectives at once. Thus 
the state needs to make a choice, and generally speaking international free movement of goods 
and service is preferred in common, whilst of the last two one is taken and the other given up. 
Such a context leads individual states to take financial policy into account. 
In the 21' century, developed countries target the stability of exchange rates. Generally 
speaking, they think that it is better to utilise monetary and financial policies harmoniously rather 
than intervene directly in the foreign exchange market. As such, capital mobility exerts a 
structural power over the policy intentions of individual states by impacting on this harmony of 
monetary and financial policies. Such a structural power forces states to consider international 
economic cooperation for the establishment of an international rule aiming at acquiring a better 
payoff. However, economic cooperation is not easily available, since players have enough 
incentives to cheat on partners as they believe that they can get better payoffs from the other 
players' sacrifice. In other words, players can utilise a realist strategy that emphasises not 
absolute gain, but relative gain as the basic logic of their strategic choice. 
Meanwhile, it is also possible to get an explanation from the viewpoint of individual 
decision-makers. It is decision-makers, i. e. human agents and politicians that are in charge of 
international economic cooperation. Their basic objective lies in political survivability so that 
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they would like to pay market price of monetary and financial policies rather than political price 
such as resignation, unsuccessful candidacy and power shift, whenever market logic and political 
rationality are in conflict. Consequently, it is necessary to explore whether capital mobility, i. e. 
investment flow, impacts on economic performance enough to effect domestic economic policy 
or not. As such, a hypothesis is established as the following. 
Hypothesis 5.12: Capital mobility shifts the policy preference of individual states by impacting 
on their economic performance. 
To verify this hypothesis a few indicators need to be adopted. Current and capital balance, i. e. 
BP curve and the combination of income and interest rate, is adopted as an indicator for the 
extent of capital mobility. This also means net foreign investment, as was explained before. In 
the meantime, as for basic lines of foreign investment policy of individual states such as 
Germany, France and the UK, the extent of access permitted for foreign investors to domestic 
market and the governmental attitude to the local foreign firms are adopted as an indicator. 
5.4 Framework of an empirical analysis 
5.4.1 Setting modelling and measurement of variables 
To verify the abovementioned series of hypotheses, a model is established as the following: 
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Yi=a+b1X1; +b2X2; +b3X3; +ei (5.1) 
Yi: the predicted score on the dependent variable 
Xii: the score on the independent variable (the international context) 
X21: the score on the independent variable (the domestic context) 
X3l: the score on the independent variable (market context) 
a: the Y-intercept, or the point where the line crosses the Y-axis; therefore a is the value of Yi 
when XI, , X2j and Xs; are zero. 
This is known as the regression constant. 
bl, b2 and b3: the slope of the line, or the change in Yi with a unit change in X1, , X2i and X3j 
These are known as the regression coefficient. 
e;: the potential impacts of the other variables 
As an analytical tool, multiple regression analysis has been adopted. This analytical method is 
used to investigate how a dependent variable changes as independent variables change when all 
component variables of a population correlate. As such, independence, interaction and 
correlation are subject to verification. Meanwhile, two technical methods have been adopted to 
improve the validity of analysis outputs. First, every model for verifying individual hypotheses is 
going to be analysed in a grouping: international context, European security context, domestic 
context (political system, economic system and social system context) and market context. This 
is to avoid serious omitted variable biases. Secondly, the model (1) is bound to take logarithms 
of the skewed variables to reduce heteroscedasticity, so that instead of it, we estimate: 
logY, =a+ logb1X1, + 1ogb2X2i + logb, jX31 + e; (5.2) 
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Possible variables and their measurement are depicted by figure6.3. The international context 
means globalisation and power politics, and each account consists of trade in goods, gross in real 
trade less growth in real GDP, gross capital flows, gross foreign direct investment and the speed 
of European integration (European security order). As for the domestic context, political, 
economic and social systems are referred to. The political system is represented by the 
independency of central banks and the Left-Right cleavage of political parties, whilst the account 
of economic system consists of union density, the share of corporate tax in total governmental 
revenue and Voters' Left-Right propensity. The specific gravity of employees tax in inland 
revenue, expenditure on unemployment function, specific gravity of individual Member States in 
the EU budget, GDP, interest in politics and satisfaction with domestic democracy construct the 
perspective of social system. On the other hand, the market context is going to be explored by 
two perspectives of dynamic supply-demand and money: the former consists of the overall 
balance of individual states, unemployment, trade balance, R&D expenditure (Business 
enterprise sector, 1989-1997), and total expenditure on social protection at current prices, and the 
latter is represented by the capital mobility of individual states. e; indicates the impacts of the 
other potential variables that are not included in this model. As for dependent variables, the 
diverse preferences of individual states on foreign investment and the elasticity of national 
economy to international economy are adopted. Inward FDI shifting balance is an indicator for 
the former, and the latter is expressed by the special gravity of national economy in the 
international economic performances. 
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Table 5.1 Measurement of variables 
Variables Measurement Unit 
International "Globalisation " International Average % of PPP GDP (h)and % % 
Context Trade in goods of goods GDP (12) 
(Il and 12) 
" International Average % of PPP GDP % 
Gross capital 
flows (13) 




"Power politics " The speed of Slowly (1-3) (15), At medium pace % by 
European (4) (16) and Quickly (5-7) (17) country in 
integration interval 
(European scale (1 to 
security order) 7) 
Is, I6 and I7 
Domestic " Political " The Political independence and Weighted 
Context system independence of economic independence value 
central banks (Di) 
" The Left-Right Interval scale 1 to 5 (LL, L, M, R % 
cleavage of and RR) 
political parties 
(D2) 
" Economic " Union density Overall Net Density (% dependent % 
system (D3) labour force) 
" The share of Corporate tax/tax revenue % 
corporate tax total 
governmental 
revenue (D4) 
" Voters' Left- Voters' self-evaluation (after % 
Right propensity 1992) - Extreme Left(Ds), 
(D5, D6, D7, DS Left(D6), Middle(D7), Right(Ds) 
and D9) and Extreme Right (D9) 
" Share of Employees tax / tax revenue % 
employees tax in 
inland revenue 
(Dio) 




" Social system " Share of financing of expenditure % 
individual 
Member States in 
the EU budget 
(D12) 
"GDP (D13) Bn ECU 
"Interest in Frequently + occasionally (1-2) % by 
politics (D14 and (Dla), Never (3) (D15) country in 
D15) interval 
scale (1 to 
3) 
"Satisfaction with Very satisfied + fairly satisfied (1- % by 
domestic 2) (D16), Not very satisfied + not at country in 
democracy (D16 all satisfied (3-4) (D17) interval 
and D17) scale (1 to 
4) 
Variables Measurement Unit 
Market " Dynamic " Overall balance Current and capital account net Mio ECU 
Supply-Demand of individual 
states (Ml) 
" Unemployment % 
(M2) 
" Trade balance Balance of international trade in % of GDP 
(M3) goods and services at current 
prices 





" Total Total expenditure on social % 
expenditure on protection 
social protection 
at current prices 
(M5) 
" Money " Capital mobility Current and capital balance, net Mio ECU 
of individual foreign investment, and vertical 
states (M6) and horizontal BP curve 
Dependent Preferences of " Inward FDI FDI inward flows Mio ECU 
variable individual states shifting balance 
in foreign Yl 
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investment " Elasticity of Average national economic % 
policy national economy activity / Average international 
to international economic activity 
economy (Y2) 
5.4.2 Interpretation of analysis outputs 
The interpretations of these regression outputs are given in the following order: 1) above all, it 
needs to suggest two hypothesis: the null hypothesis, symbolised as Ho, and the experimental 
hypothesis, i. e. the alternative hypothesis, symbolised as H1. The former is Ho: bl, b2 and b3 = 0, 
stating that independent variables do not have any correlation with dependent variable. That is, 
Ho states that in the population, there is no difference between performance under the mnemonic 
and control conditions. By contrast, the latter contradicts the null hypothesis, i. e. Hl: bl, b2 and 
b3 #0 stating that there is a significant correlation between independent variables and dependent 
variable. If Ho fails the test, we shall conclude that our experimental hypothesis, which in 
statistical terms is known as the alternative hypothesis, is correct. This test is undertaken by using 
the p-value of the statistic that indicates the probability, assuming that Ho is true. This study 
adopts 5% as the level of significance. 2) analysing correlations between input variables, since if 
there is not any correlation among variables, then it is impossible to get a desirable output, 3) 
analysing the suitability of model through reading R2 in `Model Summary' or Sig. in analysis of 
variance (ANOVA for short). This research adopts the latter. 4) the last stage of regression is to 
evaluate the significance of the individual independent variables. Only if the impact of individual 
variables on a dependent variable is significant, is it possible to determine the extent to which an 
independent variable changes a dependent variable. 
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5.4.2.1 France 
Table 5.2 Regression output (France) 
Independent Coefficients Coefficients Independent Coefficients Coefficients 
variables 1 2 variables 1 2 
Il -. 960* . 711 D3 . 730 (-. 701) D4 -. 729* -1.548 
IZ -. 804 -1.436 D5 . 695 13 -. 989* D6 . 717 14 (-. 775) D7 -. 110 
-. 702 D8 -. 422 
D9 -. 862 
Dlo . 016 4.475 D11 . 517 
(Constant) (Constant) 
4.304 ANOVA Sig. 24*** (. 373) 2.223 ANOVA Sig. 31*** 
Is . 286 -1.851 D12 . 558 16 -. 276 1.389 D13 -. 881* -13.705 
17 -. 348 -2.192 D14 . 260 - 1.510 D15 -. 209 
D16 -. 047 . 914 D17 -. 388 
(Constant) (Constant) 
7.729 ANOVA Sig. 
. 





(. 691) -. 021 Ml -. 452 . 474 D2 -. 950 -. 225 M2 -. 823** -. 216 
(-. 811) M3 -. 731* -. 893 
M4 -. 102 6.882 
M5 -. 694 . 
573 
(Constant) (Constant) 
4.066 ANOVA Sig.. 049*** 0.329 ANOVA Sig.. 027*** 
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Notes: 
1. ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed); * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 
level (2-tailed); *** A model is significant at the 0.05 level 
2. The figures in ( ): Analysis results in the case of `Elasticity of national economy to 
international economy as a dependent variable. 
3. Coefficients 1: standardised coefficients in regressions of every independent variables and 
dependent variable, or simple correlations. 
Coefficients 2: unstandardised coefficients in regressions of every contexts. 
4. Il: International Trade in goods (% of PPP GDP); 12: International Trade in goods (% of goods 
GDP); 13: International Gross capital flows; 14: International Gross foreign direct investment; Is: 
The speed of European integration (slowly); 16: The speed of European integration (at medium 
pace); 17: The speed of European integration (quickly); Di: The independency of central banks 
(sum of political and economic independency); D2: The Left-Right cleavage of political parties; 
D3: Union density; D4: Specific gravity of corporate tax in inland revenue; D5: Voters' Left- 
Right cleavage (Extreme Left); D6: Voters' Left-Right cleavage (Left); D7: Voters' Left-Right 
cleavage (Middle); Ds: Voters' Left-Right cleavage (Right); D9: Voters' Left-Right cleavage 
(Extreme Right); Dlo: Specific gravity of employeed tax in inland revenue; D11: Expenditure on 
unemployment function; D12: Specific gravity of individual Member States in the EU financing 
of expenditure; D13: GDP; D14: Interest in politics (frequently + occasionally); D15: Interest in 
politics (never); D16: Satisfaction with domestic democracy (very satisfied + fairly satisfied); 
D17: Satisfaction with domestic democracy (not very satisfied + not at all satisfied); Ml: Overall 
balance of individual states; M2: Unemployment; M3: Balance of international trade in goods 
and services at current prices; M4: R&D expenditure (Business enterprise sector); M5: Total 
expenditure on social protection. 
The regression outputs show that all hypotheses are verified in terms of negative or positive 
value, whilst only a few hypotheses are supported by statistical significance. 
  International context 
In terms of simple correlations, international trade is in negative simple correlation with foreign 
investment policy and is not supported by significance, whilst International gross capital flows is 
in a significant negative correlation with the dependent variable. 
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A regression analysis, consisting of international gross capital flows and international trade 
in goods (% of PPP GDP) (independent variables), and inward FDI shifting balance (dependent 
variable), results in a significance 0.024. Thus, this model is acceptable by the significance 
criteria of p<0.05, and the null hypothesis (Ho) is rejected, whilst the alternative hypothesis 5.6 
is approved. As for unstandardised coefficients in a regression, international gross capital flows 
is negatively correlated with the dependent variable, whilst international trade in goods is 
positively correlated with the dependent variable. This is equivalent to: 
Y1=4.304+0.711X1]-1.436X1; +e; (5.3) 
In the meantime, when according to the hypothesis 5.3, international trade in goods and 
international gross capital flows are adopted as independent variables, whilst the elasticity of 
national economy to international economy is adopted as the dependent variable, the regression 
output shows that the model is not significant showing greater p-value than 0.05. Thus, the null 
hypothesis is accepted, whilst the alternative hypothesis 5.3 is rejected. 
  The context of the European security order 
The speed of European integration (slowly) is positively correlated with a dependent variable, 
whilst the speed of European integration (at medium pace) and the speed of European integration 
(quickly) are negatively correlated. Both of them are not significant. Meanwhile, the regression 
model is not significant due to a greater p-value than 0.05. Thus, the null hypothesis is accepted, 
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whilst the alternative hypothesis 5.9 is rejected such that the abovementioned function (5.1) is 
not valid for the French government. 
  Domestic context (the political system) 
Taking account of the political system and inward FDI shifting balance (dependent variable), the 
independence of central banks and the dependent variable are positively correlated, whilst the 
Left-Right cleavage of political parties is negatively correlated with an inward FDI shifting 
balance. Both of them are not significant. However, the significance of a model is significant in 
that it generates a smaller p-value than 0.05. Thus, the null hypothesis is rejected and the 
experimental hypothesis 5.7 in chapter 2 is accepted. In addition, the hypothesis 5.6 is approved, 
which is equivalent to: 
Yi=4.066-0.021X1; -0.225X21+e; (5.4) 
On the other hand, looking at the relationships between the elasticity of national economy to 
international economy and the domestic political system, the model is not significant as it shows 
a greater p-value than 0.05. Thus, the null hypothesis is accepted, and the alternative hypothesis 
5.10 is rejected. Furthermore, the hypothesis 5.6 is rejected. 
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  Domestic context (the economic system) 
Union density is positively correlated with the dependent variable but is not significant. The 
share of corporate tax in governmental tax revenue proves negatively correlated with the 
dependent variable, and is significant Voter's Left-Right cleavage variables of Extreme Left and 
Left are not significant but are positively correlated with the dependent variable. Voter's Left- 
Right cleavage variables of Middle, Right and Extreme Right are negatively and not significantly 
correlated with the dependent variable. The share of employees tax in tax revenue, expenditure 
on unemployment function and the dependent variable are positively correlated, but are not 
supported by statistical significance. 
According to the output of a regression adopting the variables of the share of corporate tax 
in tax revenue and the share of employees tax in tax revenue, the model is significant. Thus, the 
null hypothesis is rejected, whilst the alternative hypothesis 5.6 is approved. The result is 
equivalent to: 
Yi = 2.223 -1.548X1 + 4.475X21 + ei (5.5) 
  Domestic context (the social system) 
The share of individual Member States in EU financing of expenditure, representing a 
superpower, is positively correlated with the dependent variable, whilst GDP, representing the 
developed country, is negatively correlated. The former is not significant, whilst the latter is 
significant. Meanwhile, interest in politics and satisfaction with domestic democracy are not 
significant, and both of them are negatively correlated with the dependent variable. 
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According to a regression output from a model that consists of GDP, interest in politics and 
satisfaction with domestic democracy (independent variables), and inward FDI shifting balance 
(dependent variable), the model is not significant showing a greater p-value than 0.05. Thus, the 
null hypothesis is accepted and the experimental hypothesis 5.11 is rejected. 
  Market context 
The overall balance of individual states is negatively correlated with transforming national 
preference to the liberalisation of international foreign investment. This variable is not 
significant. As for unemployment, it is also negatively correlated with inward FDI shifting 
balance, but is significant. The balance of international trade in goods and services at current 
prices are significant, and correlated negatively with the dependent variable. The significance of 
variables indicates that they are significant factors for determining the policy preference of 
individual states. R&D expenditure and total expenditure on social protection are negatively 
correlated with the dependent variable, and are not significant. 
Meanwhile, in the regression of these variables, the model concerning market context is 
significant at the level of p<0.05. As a result, the null hypothesis is rejected, and the alternative 
hypotheses 5.5 and 5.12 are accepted. In particular, the overall balance of individual states, the 
balance of international trade and R&D expenditure have a very high t-value, meaning that 
these variables are consistent, despite their little variances. This correlation is equivalent to: 
Yi = 0.329 + 0.4748X1; - 0.216X2; - 0.893X3 i+ 6.882X41+ 0.573X5 + e; (5.6) 
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5.4.2.2 UK 
Table 5.3 Regression output (UK) 
Independent Coefficients Coefficients Independent Coefficients Coefficients 
variables 1 2 variables 1 2 





2.001 ANOVA Si 
. . 034*** 
(. 786) 9.317 ANOVA Si .. 039*** 
Is -. 521 5.907 D12 -. 315 
16 . 459 -8.426 D13 . 004 -12.324 17 . 707 7.465 D14 . 314 -5.741 Dis -. 396 
D16 
. 144 . 974 D17 -. 289 
(Constant) (Constant) 
-3.853 ANOVA Sig. . 024*** 
48.625 ANOVA Sig. . 532 
Dl -. 617 (-. 289) -. 057 Ml . 182 -. 096 D2 -. 611 . 334 M2 . 521 . 850 (. 926) M3 . 252 . 193 M4 -. 375 -2.831 
Ms -. 299 -7.325 
(Constant) (Constant) 
(-. 380) ANOVA Sig. . 037*** 14.054 ANOVA Sig.. 048*** 
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As for the UK, like the French government, only a few hypotheses are supported by statistical 
significance. 
  International context 
In terms of simple correlations, all variables are negatively correlated with inward FDI shifting 
balance. A regression analysis, consisting of international gross capital flows and international 
trade in goods (% of PPP GDP) (independent variables), and inward FDI shifting balance 
(dependent variable), shows the significance of the model. Thus, the null hypothesis (Ho) is 
rejected, whilst the alternative hypothesis 5.4 is approved. This is equivalent to: 
Y1 =2.001 +10.316X11-13.487X2 +ei (5.7) 
In the meantime, in terms of the elasticity of the national economy to international economy 
(dependent variable). Both elasticity and international trade in goods are not statistically 
significant, whilst they have positive correlations. However, the output of regression shows that 
the model is not significant, and thus the null hypothesis is accepted, whilst the alternative 
hypothesis 5.3 is rejected. 
  The context of the European security order 
In terms of relationships with European security order, all variables are not significant. In detail, 
the speed of European integration (slowly) is negatively correlated with liberal foreign 
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investment policy, whilst the speed of European integration (at medium pace) and the speed of 
European integration (quickly) are positively correlated. In addition, the greater speed it has, the 
greater correlation comes out. On the other hand, the model is significant at the level of p<0.05. 
Thus, the null hypothesis is rejected, whilst the alternative hypothesis 5.9 is accepted such that it 
is equivalent to: 
Yi = -3.853 + 5.907X1, - 8.426X2; + 7.465X3 + e; (5.8) 
  Domestic context (the political system) 
The independence of central banks and the Left-Right cleavage of political parties are all 
negatively correlated with the dependent variable. Both of them are not significant. On the other 
hand, the model is not significant, as it generates a greater p-value than 0.05. Thus, the null 
hypothesis is accepted and the experimental hypothesis 5.7 is rejected. In addition, the 
hypothesis 5.6 is invalid. 
On the other hand, looking at the elasticity of the national economy to the international 
economy and the domestic political system, the model is significant, as it shows a smaller p- 
value than 0.05, i. e. 0.037. Thus, the null hypothesis is rejected, and the alternative hypothesis 
5.10 is accepted. The Hypothesis 5.6 is also accepted, which is equivalent to: 
Yi = -0.380 - 0.057X1; + 0.334X21 + ei (5.9) 
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  Domestic context (the economic system) 
Union density is positively correlated with the dependent variable but is not significant. The 
share of corporate tax in tax revenue is negatively correlated with the dependent variable but is 
also not significant. A series of voter's Left-Right cleavage variables from Extreme Left to 
Extreme Right are all not significant, and positively correlated with the dependent variable. The 
share of employees tax in tax revenue is both negatively correlated and significant, whilst the 
expenditure on unemployment function and the dependent variable are positively correlated but 
again not significant. 
According to the output of regression by adopting as variables the share of corporate tax in 
tax revenue and the share of employees tax in tax revenue, the model is significant. Thus, the 
null hypothesis is rejected, whilst the alternative hypothesis 5.6 is approved. In this model, the 
share of corporate tax is not significant with the p-value of 0.596, whilst the share of employees 
tax is significant, as it shows a smaller p-value than 0.05. The result is equivalent to: 
Y, =9.317+0.596X11 +0.097X11 +ei (5.10) 
  Domestic context (the social system) 
The share of individual Member States in the EU financing of expenditure, representing a 
superpower, is negatively correlated with the dependent variable, whilst GDP, representing the 
developed country, is positively correlated. Both of them are not significant. Meanwhile, interest 
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in politics (frequently + occasionally) and satisfaction with domestic democracy (very satisfied + 
fairly satisfied) are not significant showing positive correlations. By contrast, interest in politics 
(never) and satisfaction with domestic democracy (not very satisfied + not at all satisfied) are not 
significant, showing negative correlations. 
According to a regression output from a model that consists of GDP, interest in politics and 
satisfaction with domestic democracy (independent variables), and inward FDI shifting balance 
(dependent variable), the regression model is not significant, as it produces a greater p-value than 
0.05. Thus, the null hypothesis is accepted and the experimental Hypothesis 5.11 is rejected. 
  Market context 
The overall balance of individual states, unemployment, balance of international trade in goods 
and services at current prices are all positively correlated with transforming national preference 
to the liberalisation of international foreign investment. All these variables are not significant. R 
&D expenditure and total expenditure on social protection are all negatively correlated with 
dependent variable, and are not significant. 
Meanwhile, in the regression of these variables, the model concerning market context is 
significant at the level of p<0.05. As a result, the null hypothesis is rejected, and the alternative 
hypotheses 5.5 and 5.12 are accepted, stating that market context as a structure operates as a 
positively decisive factor for forming foreign investment policy. All of these outputs are 
equivalent to: 
Y, = 14.054 - 0.96X1; + 0.850X21 + 0.193X31- 2.831X4; - 7.325X5; + ei (5.11) 
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5.4.2.3 Germany 
Table 5.4 Regression output (Germany) 
Independent Coefficients Coefficients Independent Coefficients Coefficients 
variables 1 2 variables 1 2 
Il . 668 
(-1.568) D3 -. 670 
(-. 271) D4 . 200 . 082 12 . 611 
(. 619) D5 . 097 13 
. 750 
D6 . 531 (-. 389) D7 . 962** 14 . 616 Ds . 867* D9 . 619 Dlo -. 403 -1.716 
D11 . 928 
(Constant) (Constant) 
(1.710) ANOVA Sig. . 323 
(. 040***) 4.843 ANOVA Sig. . 763 
I5 . 800 . 473 D12 . 
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16 -. 699 . 785 D13 . 479 -21.947 17 -. 737 . 863 D14 -. 358 . 575 Dis 




-3.749 ANOVA Sig. . 450 78.911 ANOVA Sig. . 045*** 
Dl -. 667 (. 909) (-. 293) Mi . 320 . 474 D2 
. 658 
(-. 798) M2 . 158 -. 216 (-. 842) M3 -. 625 -. 893 
M4 -. 501 6.882 
M5 . 708* . 573 
(Constant) (Constant) 
(3.353) ANOVA Sig.. 362 (. 04***) -36.847 ANOVA Sig.. 551 
201 
Like the two countries in the previous sections, the regression outputs for Germany show that all 
hypotheses are verified in terms of negative or positive value, whilst only a few hypotheses are 
supported by statistical significance. 
  International context 
In terms of simple correlations, all variables with foreign investment policy are positively 
correlated. However, international gross in real trade less growth in real GDP is the only one that 
is supported by significance. 
A regression analysis, consisting of international gross capital flows and international trade 
in goods (% of PPP GDP) (independent variables), and inward FDI shifting balance (dependent 
variable), results in no significance at the level of p<0.05. Thus, the null hypothesis (Ho) is 
accepted, whilst the alternative hypothesis 5.4 is rejected. 
In the meantime, international trade in goods and international gross capital flows are all 
negatively correlated with elasticity of the national economy to the international economy. The 
regression output shows that the model is significant, as it shows a smaller p-value than 0.05. 
Thus, the null hypothesis is rejected, whilst the alternative hypothesis 5.3 is accepted, which is 
equivalent to: 
Y1=1.710-1.568X1, +0.619X2 +e; (5.12) 
  The context of the European security order 
The speed of European integration (slowly) is positively correlated with the dependent variable, 
whilst the speed of European integration (at medium pace) and the speed of European integration 
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(quickly) are negatively correlated. Both of them are not significant. The regression model is not 
significant, as it results in a greater p-value than 0.05. Thus, the null hypothesis is accepted, 
whilst the alternative hypothesis 5.9 is rejected such that the abovementioned function (1) is not 
valid for the German government. 
  Domestic context (the political system) 
Taking account of the political system and the inward FDI shifting balance (dependent variable), 
the independence of central banks and the dependent variable are negatively correlated, whilst 
the Left-Right cleavage of political parties is positively correlated with inward FDI shifting 
balance. Both of them are not significant. Meanwhile, the regression model is not significant, as 
it shows a greater p-value than 0.05. Thus, the null hypothesis is accepted and the experimental 
hypothesis 5.7 is rejected. In addition, the Hypothesis 5.6 is rejected. 
On the other hand, looking at the relationships between the elasticity of the national 
economy to the international economy and the domestic political system, the regression model is 
significant showing a smaller p-value than 0.05. Thus, the null hypothesis is rejected, and the 
alternative hypothesis 5.10 is accepted. Furthermore, the Hypothesis 5.6 is also accepted, which 
is equivalent to: 
Y1= 3.353 - 0.293X1, - 0.798X21 + ei (5.13) 
  Domestic context (the economic system) 
Union density and the share of employees tax in tax revenue prove positively correlated with the 
dependent variable, but are not significant. The share of corporate tax in tax revenue is 
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negatively correlated with dependent variable, and is significant. The other variables including 
voter's Left-Right cleavage variables, are positively correlated with the dependent variable. 
Among them, only voters' Left-Right cleavage variables (Middle) and voters' Left-Right 
cleavage variables (Right) are significant. 
According to the output of a regression which adopts the variables of the share of corporate 
tax in tax revenue and the share of employees tax in inland revenue, the regression model is not 
significant at the level of p<0.05. Thus, the null hypothesis is accepted, whilst the alternative 
hypothesis 5.6 is rejected. 
  Domestic context (the social system) 
The share of individual Member States in the EU financing of expenditure, representing a 
superpower, and GDP, representing the developed country, are positively correlated with the 
dependent variable. Both of them are not significant. Meanwhile, interest in politics (frequently + 
occasionally) and satisfaction with domestic democracy (very satisfied + fairly satisfied) are 
negatively correlated with dependent variable. However, the former is significant, whilst the 
latter is not significant. 
According to a regression output from a model that consists of GDP, interest in politics and 
satisfaction with domestic democracy (independent variables), and inward FDI shifting balance 
(dependent variable), the regression model is significant, as it shows a smaller p-value (0.045) 
than 0.05. Thus, the null hypothesis is rejected and the experimental hypothesis 5.11 is accepted. 
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  Market context 
From the viewpoint of market context, the overall balance of individual states and 
unemployment are positively correlated with transforming national preference to the 
liberalisation of international foreign investment. However, these variables are not significant. In 
the meantime, the balance of international trade in goods and services at current prices and R& 
D expenditure are not significant, and correlated negatively with the dependent variable. Total 
expenditure on social protection is positively correlated with the dependent variable, and is 
significant. 
In the meantime, in the regression of these variables, the model concerning market context is 
not significant at the level of p<0.05. As a result, the null hypothesis is accepted, and the 
alternative hypotheses 5.5 and 5.12, which state that the market context as a structure does 
operate as a positively decisive factor for forming foreign investment policy, are rejected. 
5.5 Conclusion 
According to the above series of verifications, the following conclusions are generated: first, for 
the French and British governments, globalisation led by capital and goods flows provides 
significant impacts on changes in actors' knowledge in the development of international 
investment regimes. By contrast, for the German government, globalisation led by capital and 
goods flows has no significant impacts on changes in actors' knowledge in the development of 
international investment regimes. Meanwhile, we have another conclusion concerning the impact 
of international context: for the British government, like the French government, the elasticity of 
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the national economy to economic globalisation does not have a significant relationship with the 
international structural context. By contrast, for the German government, the elasticity of the 
national economy to economic globalisation does have a significant relationship with the 
international structural context. As such, it proves that individual states generate different 
reactions to the same international structural contexts. It also proves that the account of the 
international structural contexts, like the billiard balls model, is not supported by the space 
applicability, which is a necessary condition of generalisation. 
Secondly, in terms of the relationships between security and economic interests, the analysis 
outputs indicate that for the British government, the acquisition of European security order 
through European integration has a supplementary impact on FDI flows. By contrast, for the 
French and German governments, European integration does not provide a supplementary impact 
on liberal FDI flows. As such, it is possible to interpret this as indicating that for the British 
government, there is no cleavage between economic interests and security interests. It also means 
that the basic line of British foreign policy, traditionally understood in terms of the balance of 
power in the European continent, constructs a necessary condition of FDI flows and activities of 
TNCs. By contrast, for the French and German governments, there is a cleavage between 
economic interests and security interests. Besides, it also means that the basic line of French and 
German foreign policies does not construct a necessary condition of liberal FDI flows and 
activities of TNCs. As such, it proves that for the German and French governments both the 
perspectives of power politics and the diverse preferences of individual states on foreign 
investment policy are not significant, whilst they are significant for the British government. 
Thirdly, in terms of domestic political system, the results imply that for the French 
government, the diverse preferences of individual states on FEP derive from the difference in 
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domestic political systems. By contrast, for the British and German governments, it is invalid to 
say that the diverse preferences of individual states on FEP derive from the difference in 
domestic political systems. Meanwhile, for French government, the extent to which a national 
political system is open is not significantly correlated with the elasticity of the French economy 
to the changes in global economy. By contrast, for the German and British governments, the 
extent to which the national political system has openness is positively correlated with the 
elasticity of their national economies to changes in the global economy. 
Fourthly, in terms of domestic economic system, the outputs prove that for the French and 
British governments, differences in the domestic economic system leads individual states to 
different strategic choices in the formation of FEP. By contrast, the verifications, for Germany, it 
is possible to say that the difference in domestic economic systems does not lead individual 
states to different strategic choices in the formation of FEP. By the way, it is interesting to note 
that in the case of the British government that is supported by significance, there is a close 
linkage between FDI policy and domestic firms, whilst the linkage with labour is negative. By 
contrast, the case of the French government was quite the other way round. 
Fifthly, in terms of domestic social system, it is interesting to note that the traditional 
German government's decision-making concerning FDI has been constrained by the social 
system, whilst the French and British governments have been free from that constraint. As a 
result, in France and the UK, there have been not many rooms for social agents' interactions with 
structures. By contrast, it is also interesting to note that the structure of the French domestic 
ratification game over the MAI of 1998 was different from that of the traditional FDI policy. The 
former was not a two-level game derived from the preference-convergence between decision- 
makers and the social agents, whilst the latter is a two-level game in which diverse domestic 
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preferences are contending. This structural inconsistency provided relatively better opportunities 
for the agents' actions in 1998. The further account of this point is undertaken in chapter 6. 
Finally, in terms of market context, for the French and British governments, market context 
as a structure operates as a positively decisive factor for forming foreign investment policy, and 
the structural changes led by dynamic supply-demand and capital mobility, shifts policy 
preferences of individual states. By contrast, for the German government, the market context as a 
structure does not operate as a positively decisive factor for forming foreign investment policy. 
Furthermore, the structural changes led by dynamic supply-demand and capital mobility does not 
shift policy preferences of individual states. 
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Chapter 6: 
Agent-structure interactions in the formation of an inter- 
mestic policy: the 1998 Multilateral Agreement on Investment 
(MAI) as a game 
6.1 Introduction 
Unlike the structural contexts addressed in Chapter 5, in the perspective of an objective agent 
that underlies the theory of rational choice, an objective actor is able to reorganise successfully 
his or her own policy environment. In this chapter, therefore, the verification of two 
experimental hypotheses 6.1 and 6.2 in chapter 2 concerning agential perspectives runs parallel 
with structural hypotheses that have been outlined in chapter 5. 
Linked to these hypotheses, agential accounts explore an agent's cognitive scope of 
objectives, an agent's actions in terms of reactivity or pro-activity, the individual context and the 
arbitration of principled, causal and private knowledge between agents and structures. These 
factors enjoy `causal autonomy' from the objective surrounding, i. e. the structure (Parsons, 2000, 
p. 51). In particular, emphasis is placed on the context of knowledge, which is derived from the 
fact that the institutions of individual states which are concerned with investment vary due to 
differences in the dominant political or economic idea or motive in individual societies. Despite 
the value of this perspective as a basis for comparative politics and international political 
economy, it has been ignored due to the intellectual dominance of economics (Strange, 1998). 
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6.2 Changes in the structure of an international game by an agent 
who is produced by the structure: civil society organisations as 
transnational actors 
6.2.1 An actor's recognition of his or her own objectives is broad enough to 
induce structural changes: normalised objectives and transnational 
linkages 
The matter of the extent to which an agent understands the scope of his or her own objectives is 
critical to the question of how to verify the abovementioned hypothesis. This is because it is 
likely that if an agent limits his or her own objectives to a scope narrow enough to not form an 
interactive relationship with the structure, he or she remains a simple reactor to the structure. By 
contrast, if an agent recognises his or her objectives in a broad scope, he or she forms more 
sensitive reactions to structural impacts. 
These reactions are undertaken in a positive manner and result in structural changes 
(Rosamond and Yang, 2000). In the late 1990s, during the stage of determining appropriate 
actions against the MAI, the objectives of civil society organisations were expanded to 
transnational scope in order to realise the common generalised principles of the community, 
away from specific interests at the national or private levels. Such a wide construction of 
objectives derives from the following fundamental resources. 
6.2.1.1 Actor's Sosein in the public sphere 
First, the expanded scope of civil society organisations' objectives links closely to the basic 
concept of civil society organisations. This concept varies across time between classical thinkers, 
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Scottish philosophers of the Enlightenment, Hegel, Marx and modern sociologists (Bryant, 
1992). The conceptual difference among them derives from their viewpoint that centres around 
the pursuit of special and universal interests and their way of how to define the relationships 
between civil society organisations and the state, and more fundamentally, regarding their 
diverse ways of understanding the state in terms of its permanency and transitionality. l 
As for the classical thinkers such as Aristotle, Locke, Kant and Rousseau, the conceptual 
distinction between civil society organisations, political society and state did not exist either in 
Locke's idea of civil society organisations, which was the same thing as political society, or in 
Rousseau's notion of etat civil. Such classical thought recognised the state as Sosein that has 
supreme morality, and was based on a dichotomy between the private and public lives. In 
accordance with this dichotomy, they classified the state, political society and civil society 
organisations as the public sphere, distinguishing it from private life. 
The complete distinction of civil society organisations and state was provided by Hegel 
(1821,1989). Hegel regarded civil society organisations as the sphere in which individuals 
pursue their own specific interests within the legal boundary guaranteed by the state. This was 
located between the state and the private sphere of households. For Hegel, civil society 
organisations was located between the state and private life, and mediated national interests and 
private interests. He argued that such arbitration is an historical movement through which the 
development of moral beings and ultimately the completion of rationality beyond special 
interests and the realisation of the common national interests are evolved. 
Unlike Hegel who emphasised the arbitration of specific interests, Gramsci, a neo-Marxist, 
argued that it is possible to distinguish civil society organisations from political society by 
putting an emphasis on ideological hegemony (Martin, 1998, Holub, 1992). For Gramsci, civil 
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society organisations are the sphere in which bourgeois monopoly is not acceptable, and 
autonomous and diverse organisations are allowed, through which industrial workers or their 
spokemen grasp (political, moral and intellectual) hegemony. Economic society is where 
bourgeois control prevails and is characterised by the concepts of control and pressure. 
Meanwhile, Gramsci recognised that civil society organisations and political society construct 
the state together with political economy, (i. e. economic structure or economic society), and it is 
possible that these two societies are both isolated from and included in the state. 
In modern times, civil society organisations are defined as the part of society which tries to 
realise the common principles of the community, free of state control or regulation, and away 
from private life that is characterised by the pursuit of private interests. In addition, civil society 
organisations is isolated from the economic sphere that pursues economic interests linked 
exclusively to its members. Nevertheless, it is not to say that civil society organisations do not 
have anything to do with the state. Rather, besides keeping their own independence, civil society 
organisations try to reflect citizens' interests and concerns through exerting an influence on 
national organisations. 
The United Nations (UN) has adopted the term of the non-governmental ogranisations 
(NGOs) in its charter, which aims to define non-governmental actors' relatively limited universe, 
in particular, development, disarmament, the equality of women and human rights. However, 
besides NGOs, civil society organisations are also made up of the Community-based and grass- 
root organisations, representative organisations of professional associations, enterprises and 
financial communities, trade unions, the media, scholar organisations, expert guilds and a series 
of major social interest groups. These all provide an interface between citizens and states, and 
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reject the argument that regards them as belonging to the same category as those in private 
sectors that are led by the profit motive. 
6.2.1.2 Actor's cognition of the goals and the appropriate level to act at 
Secondly, the broadness of the goals in civil society organisations' cognition is also linked to 
both the nature of the goals and the appropriate level at which these goals can be achieved. As it 
was defined in the previous section, civil society organisations in the public sphere set goals such 
as achieving development, the defeat of poverty, equality, gender discrimination, disarmament, 
democracy, culture, environmental protection, labour standards, sovereignty and ensuring human 
rights. These goals are not issues of order or power that derive from the realist account of 
interests, but of justice and distribution. In the late 1990s, NGOs are interested in ensuring that: 
"[T]he MAI does not impair the ability of governments to exercise their powers 
over the environment, labour practices, consumer standards, anti-competitive 
activities, and other important matters of public policy. [NGOs] are also 
concerned about the position of countries who are not directly engaged in the 
MAI negotiations, especially developing countries. ))2 
These goals require both universality and consistency as necessary conditions. The former is 
required to pursue objectives in a transnational context, whilst the latter is needed to expand the 
coverage of targeting to all of the regions. In particular, in terms of transnational linkages, 
`consistency' resembles that of domestic political cross-border alliances such as agricultural 
groups within the EU. However, the objectives of civil society organisations become norms at 
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the international level where they operate as structural powers. As such, the concepts of national 
or private interests, i. e. national or private justice, are excluded from actors' selfish pay-offs. It is 
obvious that it is not appropriate to take actions for realising such objectives as transnational 
norms at the national level. In the late 1990s, civil society organisations shared this knowledge 
with regard to the MAI negotiations. In the late 1990s, a coalition of development, environment 
and consumer groups from around the world, with representation in over 70 countries, agreed 
that the MAI is unacceptable. 3 
Simultaneously, civil society organisations also sought to restrict the exercise of national 
discretion, aiming to ensure a regulatory floor for labour and environmental standards, at both 
national and international levels (Smythe, 2000, p. 88). However, it was not easy to reach an 
agreement between citizens and governments. In particular, for developing countries, it seemed 
easy to establish a shared knowledge of labour standards compared to the issue of environmental 
standards. Thus, civil society organisations took a strategic choice to engage in both domestic 
ratification games of individual states and international negotiations simultaneously. 
In the meantime, the late 1990s is a time when the norms or principles of `participation' and 
`consultation' are being given the recognition in the processes that shape international debates. 
These norms provide civil society organisations with a rationale for establishing that the 
transnational linkage needs to be clearly defined. Therefore, the attributes of civil society 
organisations which were defined and recognised as the public sphere which existed only in the 
national context, has evolved, beyond national borders, to the transnational category as 
international society has developed. The game structure accompanied by these features differs 
from that confronted by traditional nation-states. Civil society organisations, so far, have been 
defined and recognised only in the national context. However, since the late 1990s, in the game 
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structure accompanied by the development of civil society organisations based on transnational 
linkage, civil society organisations has worked together with international organisations in the 
processes of reflecting the globalised agenda on policy outputs. 
The Business and Industry Advisory Committee (BIAC) and the Trade Union Advisory 
Committee (TUAC) represented civil societies that were involved in the MAI negotiation. These 
two bodies are well-established organisations enjoying official consultative status with the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) such that they are able to 
readily communicate their opinions to the OECD. 4 The BIAC consists of a federation of business 
bodies from 29 member states. The chairs of the policy committee of the BIAC consist of 
representatives from the biggest enterprises based in the member states (BIAC, 1996). The BIAC 
is highly influential on OECD decisions due to the legal procedures of these large TNCs. From 
the beginning of the MAI negotiation, the BIAC assembled an expert group that consisted of the 
corporate legal staffs from some of the biggest enterprises. They all were authorised for the 
issues of trade, investment and employment. At the beginning of 1997, the BIAC had provided 
detailed comments even on the draft text of the MAI (BIAC, 1997). 
The TUAC consists of over 55 national trade union organisations from the 29 OECD 
industrialised countries, which together represent some 70 million workers. 5 The TUAC is also 
in contact with the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) and the 
International Labour Organisation (ILO). These two organisations have in the past and present 
operated as international umbrella bodies for the labour movement. The TUAC has also been 
present as an observer in a series of general meetings or conferences, in which the BIAC has 
participated. Furthermore, the Committee on Capital Movements and Invisible Transactions 
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(CMIT) and the Committee on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises (CIME) 
have regularly consulted with the TUAC (Smythe, 2000, p. 82). 
6.2.2 Agents' proactive actions sufficient to shift the structures 
It is necessary for another exploration of the experimental hypothesis to take the following 
question into account: do civil society organisations recognise themselves as reactive or 
proactive agents in their relations with governments or the international forum? That is, do civil 
society organisations recognise their role as one of forming an appropriate response to 
information regarding the domestic or international environments that they collect? Or do civil 
society organisations recognise themselves as an autonomous player, directly shaping the 
domestic and international environments? 
6.2.2.1 Actor's agenda-setting power 
The question of reactive versus proactive actors is linked with the influence of civil society 
organisations. In general, as an actor, the influence of civil society organisations can be 
understood in three ways: first, civil society organisations have an agenda-setting power. The 
extent to which an actor gets easy access to information is the starting point in determining the 
attributes of their actions. In the late 1990s, people were not very well informed regarding the 
MAI negotiation. It was in fact an isolated process. From 1995 when the MAI negotiation was 
launched to 1998 when an agreement on the MAI in fact failed to occur, the Financial Times 
reported only less than 30 articles concerning the MAI, and the Le Monde only about 21 (from 
1997 to 1998). As for the Financial Times, the MAI negotiation never was in the headlines. 6 
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Such a lack of information means that a necessary condition for enabling agents' significant 
actions to happen has not been fulfilled. However, as the working documents were opened to 
unlimited access in late 1996 and the beginning of 1997, many of the groups which comprise 
civil society organisations started promoting their own diverse opinions to the MAI decision- 
makers. The actions of civil society organisations were then significantly recognised by the 
decision-makers. Governments could no longer negotiate behind closed doors and had to explain 
to their civil societies what goals they were pursuing through the negotiations. Submitting the 
results of these negotiations to the legislators for their final approval was no longer sufficient. 
On the other hand, as the principles of `participation' and `consultation' had been accepted 
incrementally as an international norm, civil society organisations have indeed taken a part of 
setting the list of matters to be considered or decided in a series of international negotiations with 
economic society. Until September 1996, the agenda of the MAI focused on `wider investment 
instruments' such as the liberalisation of investment regulations and improvement in the national 
treatment of foreign investors. Such a content of negotiation was confronted with the challenge 
from the TUAC, which emphasised labour and environmental standards. 
The TUAC was a representative NGO during the MAI negotiations, and was a counterpart to 
the BIAC which supported the liberalisation of international investment rules. When labour and 
environmental standards pushed onto the agenda, major business groups (especially those in the 
US and Europe) including the BIAC expressed concerns that the agreement may dismantle some 
international barriers while creating costly new ones relating to environmental and labour 
standards. 
By contrast, from the viewpoint of the TUAC, intensified capital mobility, if not 
accompanied by core labour standards, magnified the possibility for states to attract FDI by 
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suppressing labour rights and reducing labour standards (Smythe, 2000, p. 83). The TUAC, 
therefore, appealed for the need to take labour issues into account through a series of informal 
consultations with Negotiating Group Members. Consequently, since September 1996 the issue 
of labour has been discussed by the Negotiating Group, and at the December 1996 meeting of the 
Group, the Chair (the Netherlands) concluded: 
"[that] a clear majority was in favour of addressing labour matters in the MAI 
through a package of provisions, based on "three pillars" namely: -a preamble 
statement; a provision stating that "Parties should not weaken domestic core 
labour standards in an effort to encourage foreign investment"; and association of 
the Guidelines. "7 
The TUAC has been campaigning for the agreement to include the protection of the rights of 
labour and of working conditions. To achieve this, the TUAC attempted to put stronger emphasis 
on core labour standards in the text of the MAI agreement. Furthermore, the TUAC asked the 
decision-makers to ensure that the signatories to the MAI would be prevented from using lower 
labour and environmental standards as an incentive for attracting Foreign Direct Investment 
(FDI) (TUAC, 1998a). 
"That enshrining legally binding investors rights in the Agreement should be 
balanced inter alia by binding commitments by signatories to observe 
internationally recognised core labour rights and not reduce or offer to reduce 
domestic labour standards to attract foreign direct investment. Without this, the 
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Agreement will be perceived as unbalanced and unfair and many TUAC affiliates 
will be campaigning against ratification of any agreement in national 
legislatures. "8 
In regard to this attempt at agenda-setting, some delegates were indeed opposed to the inclusion 
of a provision on labour standards in the MAI agreement, as this issue had already been dealt 
with by the ILO. Responding to this rationale from opponents, the TUAC argued the case for 
such provision as follows: 
"The OECD Guidelines are a parallel instrument to the ILO Tripartite Declaration 
on Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy which are also not legally binding, 
and contain elements that are included in several ILO "core" Conventions on 
fundamental workers rights. However, the Guidelines are addressed to 
multinational enterprises, not governments. Moreover, whilst covering the core 
standards of freedom of association and collective bargaining, they do not cover 
explicitly the other core labour standards identified by the IIA. s9 
Clearly, civil society organisations actively generated a series of debates, from the narrow and 
technical in scope to broader issues of regulation and globalisation. In return, this expanded 
scope of issues offered civil society organisations the capacity to generate structural changes. 
This will be addressed in more detail in a later section. 
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6.2.2.2 Actor's direct actions 
Secondly, civil society organisations also exerted influence by taking direct action, or by 
exercising its legitimate rights in regard to elections. These actions can generate two effects, 
depending on the preferences of civil society organisations, which may diverge from or converge 
with the policy preferences of the relevant government. In a divergent case, civil society 
organisations operate as an actor in ratification games comprised of more than two states. In 
these games, the actions of civil society organisations serve as negative political influence, 
lowering the popularity of the government. It is therefore possible for civil society organisations 
to acquire a measure of control over the possibilities that their preferences will be reflected in 
new domestic policies. On a broader level, civil society organisations can also simultaneously 
engage in international negotiation games, based on the transnational linkage. In such a situation, 
it is possible for civil society organisations to execute the so-called hijacking of inter-state 
negotiations. '° 
In February 1997, in the Briefing Note concerning the inclusion of the protection of the 
rights of labour and working conditions into the MAI, the TUAC made the following two 
demands: 
"[first], the incorporation of the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises 
into the MAI so that the increased rights of investors are counterbalanced by 
obligations on their behaviour towards their workforce and host countries: 
[second] the inclusion of a labour clause in the MAI and a similar approach to 
environmental issues. "" 
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These were to establish a legally binding power on both firms and governments. This pair of 
regulations appears to confer a degree of power on civil society organisations, allowing it to 
exercise some substantial control over the other two parts of the social construction, i. e. the 
government and economic society. Such a feature would contrast heavily with the social 
structure in which economic society dominates, as observed by as Gramsci. However, this new 
ability of civil society organisations to break through the balance of the social structure did not 
occur in the late 1990s, when the MAI negotiation failed. 
By contrast, where the preferences of government and civil society organisations converge, a 
democratic rationale in a bottom-up manner comes into effect for governmental decisions. For 
example, campaigns against international agreements conducted by civil society organisations 
amplify the effects of a `No Campaign' implemented by a government during the rational 
ratification game. Throughout the MAI negotiations of 1998, civil society organisations' anti- 
MAI campaigns were expressed in such practical actions as internet guerrillas, 12 letter-writing 
campaigns, petitions, public protests and mock auctions. 13 Opening the negotiations to the public 
through web sites in February 1997 allowed more than 600 civil society organisations from more 
than 70 countries to participate in these anti-MAI campaigns. 14 
Working through a guerrilla internet network, civil society organisations actors were able to 
inundate MAI decision-makers with a barrage of electronic protests. As a result, decision-makers 
called for a time-out to consult with domestic social groups such as NGOs, firms and trade 
unions. In addition, the government found it needed to consult with its counterparts in the 
international negotiations. Finally, after three years of negotiation and protest the MAI was in 
fact dropped in April 1998. 
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It is also possible for a non-cooperative game to take place amongst domestic groups with 
diverse preferences. Throughout the MAI negotiation in 1998, economic and civil society 
organisations confronted a lack of consensus, centred around the issue of labour and 
environmental standards. At that time, individual governments chose a strategy which took the 
side of civil society organisations. Economic society reacted to civil society organisations' 
efforts with extensive lobbying, as Guy de Jonquieres notes: 
"Business organisations have stepped up their lobbying partly to counter demands 
by trade unions and other non-government bodies for tough provisions in the MAI 
to enforce core labour standards and strengthen environmental safeguards. "'5 
As such, in a situation where economic and civil society organisations confront each other, it was 
for civil society organisations to be able to take a strategic choice to confer legitimacy to the 
state that allowed it to realise its objectives. This strategy is able to protect a state which supports 
the pursuit of transnational objectives from the influence of economic society based on private 
interests. Generally speaking, such a strategy is undertaken through elections, which result in the 
acquisition of social power by the state. 
6.2.2.3 The recognition of agents by structures 
Thirdly, it is not until the recognition of agents by the domestic and international structures that 
these agents' proactive actions gain political significance. Throughout the MAI negotiation in the 
late 1990s politicians recognised the significance of civil society organisations: 
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"[t]he profile of the negotiations of the draft MAI, low at first, increased 
considerably during the second half of 1997 and in 1998. This change came about 
largely through the efforts of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) throughout 
the world who, rightly or wrongly, were alarmed at various aspects of the draft 
Agreement and complained that it was being negotiated in secret. "16 
Only when an organisation is well established, would it be likely that the significance of agents' 
actions are recognised by the structures. A large group in civil society organisations, like 
Greenpeace, ensures its constituents by collecting funds through specialised bodies and 
supporting political organisations. This indicates that it is possible to think of Greenpeace not 
only as a civil society organisation, but also as an economic society or political society 
organisation in the extended scope of its influence. It is not easy, however, for groups in civil 
society without widespread popular support and large memberships to establish an organisation 
powerful enough to undertake significant and sustained influence. 
It is the `issue-linkage' strategy that enables some groups in civil society organisations to 
establish a significant organisation. In fact, throughout the MAI negotiation, the TUAC became 
interested in environmental standards, which is reflected in: 
"We have also supported the inclusion of a labour clause in the MAI and a similar 
approach to environmental issues. Moreover a specific labour clause should be 
added whereby governments would undertake not to seek to attract foreign 
investment by violating internationally recognised core workers rights. This is 
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akin to Article 1114 in NAFTA on environmental standards although referring to 
international as opposed to domestic standards. s17 
Furthermore, such an expansion of actors' concerns is reflected in their cognitive shift of roles. 
The TUAC came to recognise that within its role of balancing global markets lay an effective 
social dimension, as globalisation brings out a series of structural changes. Such a cognitive 
change is confirmed in the acknowledgment of the TUAC, in the following way: 
"The OECD is not changing again, taking in new members and becoming the forum for 
intergovernmental discussions on globalisation. TUAC's role is now one of ensuring that 
global markets are balanced by an effective social dimension. s18 
The liberalisation of foreign investment was an issue that impacted upon political, social and 
cultural sensitivities, not to mention those of labour and the environmental groups. In the late 
1990s, the decision-makers recognised the importance of this issue-linkage, emphasising: 
"[Ministers recognise] the need to complete work on MAI disciplines and 
exceptions with a view to achieving a high standard of liberalisation and a 
satisfactory balance of commitments, which takes full account of economic 
concerns and political, social and cultural sensitivities. " 19 
Such a cognitive shift brought out by the abovementioned series of anti-MAI campaigns by civil 
society organisations was reflected in the decision-makers' pay-offs in individual two-level 
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games comprised of domestic ratification and international negotiation games. Furthermore, the 
structural change in the pay-offs embodied the decision-makers' practical responses in the 
following manner: French MPs took heed of the intellectuals' argument, which stated that the 
MAI would allow crude foreign culture to penetrate France; the issue of the MAI was therefore 
elevated from the level of officials to the level of ministers (Kobrin, 1998); according to the 
statement of Belgian Foreign Trade Ministry the increase in pressure from civil society 
organisations exacerbated disagreement within the OECD; and, the OECD (1998) Ministers 
possessed a shared knowledge that government needed to discuss the implications of 
globalisation and the MAI with their respective social interest groups: 
"They re-affirm the importance they attach to achieving a comprehensive 
multilateral framework for investment with high standards of liberalisation and 
investment protection ... They also recognise the 
importance of the public debate 
on the implications of globalisation. s20 
The British government also took the viewpoint of civil society organisations into account during 
its review of the rationale underlying the MAI: 
"Several NGOs, including Consumers International, Oxfam and Save the 
Children, criticised the suggestion that the draft MAI would be primarily aimed at 
developing countries, the vast majority of whom have not been able to participate 
in the OECD negotiations,... ,, 21 
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In particular, as for the UK, during the MAI negotiations, priority consideration concerning a 
rationale of the international investment rules was given to civil society organisations rather than 
to local governments. The potential implications of the international investment rules to local 
governments were indeed not subject to hot debate. As such, the British local governments, 
throughout the MAI negotiation, could not effectively participate. They lacked dialogue with the 
section of the department of trade and industry (DTI) in charge of the MAI, and even any MAI- 
related information they did receive from the World Development Movement (WDM), which 
campaigned for the rights of the poor. As a result, "it was not until 4 February 1998 that the MAI 
was an item on the agenda of the Policy Board meeting of the Local Government Association 
(LGA)". 22 
Finally, further progress on the MAI was delayed after the French Prime Minister, Jospin, 
proclaimed that France would not participate in the MAI negotiation on the 14 October 1998.23 
With France's withdrawal from the process, negotiations at the OECD level stalled and 
discussion of the MAI was deferred until the WTO Ministerial Meeting in 1999.24 It is worth 
noticing that the French government took the viewpoint of civil society organisations into 
account when deciding to withdraw from the MAI negotiation. An interim report was written by 
Catherine Lalumiere, Deputee europeenne, in September 1998, entitled Rapport sur I'Accord 
multilateral sur 1'investissement (AMI). This report, nine pages long, contained four pages 
concerned with civil society organisations. In particular, the analytical section of the `diagnostic' 
in this report was marked by a detailed consideration of civil society organisations, in the 
following way: 
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"More than any other international agreement of economic vocation, the MAI has 
brought out objections and tensions at the core of civil society 
organisations... [The MAI] has brought new actors into play. In addition to 
traditional representatives of the professions, unions and other economic sectors, 
one should note the lobbying undertaken by non-governmental organisations. , 25 
"In opposition, certain non-governmental organisations (notably, Greenpeace) 
fundamentally reject the agreement for the reasons of sovereignty evoked 
beloVi'26 
"The French democratic federation of labour favours the inclusion of practices 
that constrain social norms, but even more, to the idea that union organisations 
might actively participate in the management and application of the agreement. It 
sees it as a dynamic instrument for raising awareness of the social impact of 
international investments. "27 
These viewpoints led the French government to the conclusion that the concerns raised by 
French civil society organisations with regard to the MAI could not ultimately be met by any 
reform or adjustment of the MAI negotiating process. 28 
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6.3 Knowledge of foreign investment and policy outputs: principled 
and causal knowledge 
The following hypotheses concerning FDI are subject to verification in this section. 
Hypothesis 6.4: Agents induce structural changes by participating in the construct of 
knowledge (system) as a proactive player. 
Hypothesis 6.5: A decision-maker, as an incumbent politician, tries to accrue not only tangible 
electoral benefits through the creation of new jobs, but also intangible benefits by presenting a 
tough image as a protector of national jobs. 29 
Hypothesis 6.6: while decision makers favour politically manipulating the terms of trade in 
this way because it attacks short-term balance-of-trade and unemployment problems, they fail 
to recognise the potential long-term costs to both the state's autonomy and the balance of 
payments associated with such a policy. 30 
Knowledge concerning foreign investment is principled as well as causal. The former derives 
from the existence of disagreement over the question of whether the liberalisation of foreign 
investment is a legitimate objective or not. By contrast, the latter addresses the issue of what kind 
of foreign investment policy is the most effective. That is, the latter focuses on the relationships 
between desirable objectives and necessary measures. 
By the criteria of degree of access granted by the state to foreign firms and the type of 
support provided by the state to domestic firms, France can be classified in the case of `limited 
access and discriminatory support'. The UK is characterised by `unlimited access and non- 
discriminatory support'. Meanwhile, Germany belongs to the group of `unlimited access and 
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discriminatory support' (Reich, 1989). This difference in policies of individual states partially 
derives from the different coherent frameworks of knowledge. As such, the following questions 
are raised: to what extent is French foreign investment policy based on the coherent framework 
of knowledge; and what makes a specific knowledge exert asymmetrical influence in individual 
states? 
In the meantime, it is necessary to approach the knowledge system by two models: 'elite 
networks' and `interest groups networks'. The former shapes groups within bureaucracy, and 
these groups try to mount persistent and sustained campaigns aimed at achieving objectives. In 
addition, it is likely that their knowledge system operates as a major coherent framework in the 
process of national policy-making. On the other hand, the latter tries to push knowledge systems 
that reflect specific private interests by avoiding systematic decision-making within diverse 
governmental machines. These networks, recently, have come out in more varied and stronger 
manners, as transnational linkages develop. 
6.3.1 Principled knowledge in elite networks 
Above all, from the viewpoint of elite networks, let us compare principled knowledge of 
individual states concerning foreign investment. For the UK, since the end of World War II, 
officials have been trained by the logic of liberal economy. Knowledge that national control 
should be administered on a non-discriminatory basis to avoid economic distortion has 
established elite groups including the neo-Cambridge school as a traditionally prevalent idea in 
England. This is the case for foreign investment policy. In terms of principled knowledge 
concerning the liberalisation of foreign investment, the British government has believed that 
foreign investment flows are heavily influenced more by economic fundamentals than 
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investment rules. This derives from the fact that the British FDI policy has already been non- 
discriminative such that the multilateral investment rule does not mean anything negatively to 
the British economy. In fact, in chapter 5, the case study indicated that the explanatory power of 
the market context for the British FDI policy is significant. By the way, throughout the MAI 
negotiations of 1995 to 1998 the British government suggested that the MAI would not divert 
foreign investment flows from non-signatory countries, and rather induce the increase in global 
FDI flows (Hillyard, 1998, pp. 15-16). 31 
In addition, the decision-makers of the UK expected the MAI not to impact seriously on the 
national economy, since British foreign investment policy is based on a non-discrimination 
principle concerning the ownership of investment. This is characterised partially by a relatively 
liberal foreign investment policy towards foreign investors. Concerning inward FDI, the UK has 
adopted a liberal approach. Thus, a non-discriminatory policy is usual. For example, foreign- 
owned firms have been dealt with with the same or almost the same national treatment as 
domestic-owned firms in terms of taxation and industrial and commercial laws. Even though 
there are some sectors to which this rule is not applied, it could be said that these cases are more 
the exception than the rule. In accordance with this, generally the British government does not 
think that the MAI would impair the capacity of the UK to attract high value-added investments. 
Rather, British enterprises will gain benefits through liberalising capital transfer and removing 
risks caused by expropriation that is not accompanied by compensation. 32 
In Germany, since World War II, national economic policy has been dominated by 
liberalism and Keynesianism, as liberalism and corporatism have mixed. Consequently, 
persuasion for foreign investment and propensity towards discriminatory behaviour in favour of 
domestic firms have coupled. Under Erhard liberalism, who was the liberal economic minister of 
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the Bonn Republic, a liberal foreign investment policy was undertaken, and FDI was preferred as 
a valuable resource for the shortage of capital. On the other hand, the Bonn Republic conferred 
market access to US enterprises until the middle 1960s. This reflected liberalism in the macro 
level. However, simultaneously in strategic sectors, Germany has pursued a discriminatory 
foreign investment policy. This mixed strategy results in the maintenance of profitability of 
domestic firms, large market shares and a high employment rate. 
Meanwhile, as for France, knowledge that the government shall make a choice in shaping 
the national economic structure has prevailed. Thus, knowledge that the government shall not 
allow the pattern of international competition to determine the national economic structure in a 
passive way is principled. As such, the value of gain derived from the international difference in 
comparative advantage does not mean anything to French decision-makers (Hayes, 1993). In 
accordance with this, interventionism has always dominated French policy-making, and grandes 
ecoles politicians have closely engaged in supporting this interventionist knowledge. The elite, 
composed of French politicians, officials, industrial managers and bankers who have trained in 
the tradition of public service in grandes ecoles, have been extremely preoccupied by 
interventionism (Hayes, 1993, p. 63). In the Fifth Republic, despite the reinforcement of a 
propensity towards less interventionism, it was not easy to change the dirigiste way of thinking 
in grandes ecoles elite networks. As a result, there was no significant change in the formal 
attitudes of the French government. 
Recently, FDI flow has rapidly developed compared to trade flows. Until the MAI 
negotiation of 1998, its rate of growth over the past decade (1986-96) was more than twice that 
of gross fixed capital formation indicating an increasing internationalisation of national 
production systems. 33 Together with this phenomenon, the main idea of FDI which goes way 
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back to the 1970s reappeared in the 1990s. This is concerned with whether the liberalisation of 
foreign investment is a legitimate objective or not, the main viewpoint concerning FDI in the 
1990s has based its rationale on the improvement of developing countries, non-discrimination, 
transparency and predictability. A World Trade Organisation study reports: 
"Low levels of trade and inflows of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) are 
symptoms rather than causes of the plight of many of the poorest countries. 
Without an increased inflow of FDI in these countries and increased trade, it is 
difficult to imagine how a major improvement in their economic prospects can be 
achieved. FDI brings with it resources that are in critically short supply in poor 
countries, including capital, technology and such intangible resources as 
"3 organisational, managerial and marketing skills. a 
In 1995, developing countries took in approximately US $ 90 billion (38%) of the US $ 240 
billion total of world-wide FDI. 35 This investment flow has been undertaken to establish the 
basis of economic development in developing countries by providing capital, organisation, 
management and marketing skills and technology. It is, therefore, necessary to protect 
investment activities of foreign investors and reduce transaction costs through emphasising 
nondiscrimination, transparency and predictability principles in promoting foreign investment 
flow. As such, a series of foreign investment regulations based on a number of bilateral 
agreements needs to be established as an international rule. 
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Such expected gains from the promotion of the foreign investment flow through establishing 
an international foreign investment rule are also the case for the developed countries. In the same 
context, Tony Blair, the Prime Minister of the UK, understood: 
"[It] is actually very important for British business and British exports that we 
prevent countries using regulation as a backdoor means of discriminating against 
foreign investment"36 
As such, a series of knowledge that found market logic to be the most valuable has been shared 
by decision-makers. They think that market logic deserves the effective location of capital and 
the consequent stimulus of economic activities brought out by the common foreign investment 
rule, as the Secretary General of the OECD appealed: 
"While market factors are, of course, the primary determinants of investment 
decisions, the investment climate is also a major factor. Investors need long-term 
stability of rules and procedures, guarantees for entry and establishment, equal 
competitive opportunities and protection of existing investment. By adhering to 
common international rules of the game, countries become more attractive for 
investment and economic activity, and avoid distortions bound to have a 
detrimental effect on economic growth and development. "37 
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6.3.2 Causal knowledge in 'interest group networks' 
Nevertheless, despite the aim to ensure the effectiveness in the location of resources on a global 
scale, in terms of a method, i. e. causal knowledge, the MAI did not receive support from civil 
society organisations and intellectuals. The process of global-level foreign investment 
rulemaking does not reflect monolithic preferences of financial or corporate capitals and 
specifically significant economic agents. In this process, specific agents refuted knowledge that 
appeals for the need of establishing globally binding rules on foreign investment. This reactive 
knowledge is to be understood as causal knowledge. For example, generally speaking, even the 
NGOs, concerning developmental and environmental issues, were hostile to the MAI, and have 
done no more than criticise the potential negative effects that would be caused by globalisation. 
Their concerns were not to deny the need for establishing an international foreign investment 
rule itself. That is, they had a shared knowledge by admitting the need for a multilateral 
investment rule, and this knowledge was principled among civil society organisations actors. By 
contrast, civil society organisations appealed to divergent viewpoints derived from causal 
knowledge based on the fear concerning the political, social and cultural sensitivity of the MAI. 
In the late 1990s, civil society organisations set a rationale for the need of MAI in social and 
environmental disruption instead of the supply-demand of foreign investment. For example, in a 
joint statement on the MAI, a coalition of development, environment and consumer groups from 
around the world, with representation in over 70 countries, declared: 
"There is an obvious need for multilateral regulation of investments in view of the 
scale of social and environmental disruption created by the increasing mobility of 
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capital. However, the intention of the MAI is not to regulate investments but to 
regulate governments. As such, the MAI is unacceptable. " 38 
Such a disagreement from agents was also found in Jagdish Bhagwati's statement, who is an 
economist at the University of Columbia and has called for the liberalisation of foreign 
investment and trade: 
"MAI, in its current form, is unbalanced in three ways. It argues for eliminating 
restrictions on the functioning of corporations, presumably to ensure efficiency in 
world allocation of resources. But it fails to extend the proscriptions to 
subventions to attract corporations: but these distort efficiency equally! The MAI 
more generally is conceived as a set of rights of corporations, instead of 
systematically including also their obligations. The latter would also require that 
notions such as the `stakeholder' obligations of corporations to the communities 
they operate in should also be laid down in the agreement. Moreover, MAI makes 
little concession to the political sensibilities of the host countries and to their own 
definitions of their economic interests. 9939 
As this letter shows, the MAI did not take enough account of subvention in technical terms, and 
emphasised nothing but the rights of firms, whilst it did not examine the obligation of foreign 
investors. In addition, the MAI lacked the account of political sensitivity of the host country. 
That is, the MAI examined only the perspective of supply-demand to spur investment flow based 
on economic logic, whilst it excluded the problems that would occur through making a 
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connection with the other issues. Thus, the liberal economist, Bhagwati suggested that the 
negotiation be moved onto the World Trade Organization (WTO) level, and extend the scope of 
account into the issue-linkages between capital, labour and environment, stating: 
"These deficiencies may well be fixed if the MAI is negotiated at the World Trade 
Organisation, ... what 
is good for "capital" at the WTO is not good for "labour" 
or for "nature". "4° 
Such a series of knowledge from civil society organisations and intellectuals shifted structural 
contexts by bringing out the changes in the framework in terms of causal knowledge concerning 
investment. This shift in a cognitive framework compromised of two spheres: first, in terms of 
the scope of an issue, agents' knowledge extended the issue area from a narrow and technical 
level to a broad and global level through issue linkage. As such, a single issue was examined in 
the extension of complex issues such that the linkage between investment and environment, and 
between investment and labour was undertaken. Throughout the MAI negotiation of 1998, 
decision-makers' reports also contained the understanding of political and social implications 
generated by such agents' knowledge. Alan Larson, US assistant secretary of state, said in Paris: 
"[T]he current draft of the MAI was unacceptable, particularly because it did not 
deal adequately with environmental and labour standards and needed to gain 
public confidence. "al 
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Secondly, the cognitive shift provoked the need for the protection of global public goods 
including the environment as well as common concerns over national sovereignty, development 
and labour, i. e. the issue of justice and distribution in international relations. The cognitive shift 
did not find a rationale from the effective relocation of capital brought out by the common 
investment rule and the consequent impetus for economic activities, i. e. market logic. The 
Secretary General of the OECD made a speech in an informal consultation with NGOs: 
"Those rules must, of course, account for other vital public policy goals: 
governments must be able to protect their national security, protect the 
environment, maintain high labour standards, and offer solid consumer protection. 
The task of the negotiators is to find the right approach to achieve that objective. 
s42 We are, therefore, glad to have this opportunity to hear your views. 
As this speech indicates, in the late 1990s, the following knowledge was being established: the 
application of market logic for the economic effectiveness and the establishment of an 
investment environment to spur investment flow should be undertaken through a method by 
which a number of relevant issues such as national security, environment, high labour standards 
and consumer protection are simultaneously considered. In accordance with this knowledge, the 
profile of negotiations became more significant such that decision-makers evaluated this shift as 
a consequence of agents' actions. 43 
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6.4 Actors' private knowledge concerning foreign investment and 
political survivability 
6.4.1 Setting a modelling and interpretation of analysis' outputs 
Concerning foreign investment, decision-makers' private knowledge is significant in the sense 
that it reflects different preferences on a specific policy, and as a result generates a different 
policy output. Private knowledge concerning foreign investment can be divided into two 
categories: for one thing it is the one concerned with employment and trade balance, and for the 
other it is also concerned with the overall balance of payments or income distribution (i. e. 
potential welfare). The function of the former is closely connected to some political interests. 
Decision-makers, as politicians, would not like to lose the votes of those who are damaged by 
structural changes. In particular, significant large groups such as labour groups impact directly 
on decision-makers' political survivability through voting. Thus, it is likely that governmental 
policies will be based on avoiding the absolute diminution of a real income in specific sectors of 
the community. 
According to the logic of such a `conservative social welfare function' (Corden, 1984), 
politicians did not take into account `if foreign investors exercise their rights to withdraw 
investment in the future, then what is going to happen'. As for decision-makers, their most 
important concern is to ensure the tangible benefits at elections through job creation, and the 
intangible benefits by projecting a tough image as a protector of domestic jobs (Reich, 1989, pp. 
545-546). Decision-makers favour politically manipulating the terms of trade in this way because 
FDI attacks short-term balance-of-trade and unemployment problems. They fail to recognise the 
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potential long-term costs to both the state's autonomy and the balance of payments associated 
with such a policy. 
Meanwhile, the balance of payments consists of the current balance and the capital balance, 
meaning the all of economic transactions that are performed between a country and the others in 
a definite period. The former is the difference between receipt and payment brought out by 
ordinary transactions in which goods and services are bought and sold with other countries. The 
latter is the difference between receipt and payment produced by capital transactions. The 
balance-of-payments is in the black when the sum of the current balance and the capital balance 
results in a greater receipt than payment. The opposite case generates adverse balance-of- 
payments. 
The balance-of-payments of a country is an important macroeconomic indicator, which 
exerts its influence on that country's production, income, employment, consumption, investment 
and the amount of currency in circulation. The current balance in the black is accompanied by 
the increase in the export of goods, domestic production and employment, and consequent 
growth in national income. Furthermore, these increases enable a country to redeem foreign 
loans such that foreign exchange holdings would be improved. It is also possible for a country to 
increase FDI to overseas aiming at ensuring the stable supply of major raw materials, and to 
avoid trade frictions. Even when a country tries to choose an economy-invigorating policy, it 
does not need to worry heavily about the increase of imports. As such, a country can manage its 
national economy more properly, since the scope of choices for an economic policy become 
broad. 
Based on this market logic, in this section, the following hypotheses 6.5 and 6.6 are going to 
be explored. To verify these hypotheses let us conduct a new regression model compromised of. 
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a group of independent variables such as overall balance (Xii), unemployment (X2) and balance 
of international trade in goods and services at current prices (X3 ), and a dependent variable of 
inward FDI shifting balance (Y1). This is equivalent to: 
Y, =a+blX1; +b2X1i +b3X3; +el (6.1) 
Every item in this model shares its meaning with those in the model 5.1. In addition, the same 
two technical methods as in the model 5.1 have been adopted in this model. As a result, we 
estimate: 
logY, =a+ logb1Xll + logb X2i + logbjXji + ei (6.2) 
The results said that France and the UK are significant, whilst Germany is not significant at the 
level of p<0.05. The results indicate that French decision-makers preferred the balance of 
international trade in goods and services at current prices and the overall balance to 
unemployment. The two formers are positively correlated with the dependent variable, whilst the 
latter is negatively correlated with the dependent variable. These relationships are equivalent to: 
Yj = 6.400 + 1.759E-02X1 - 2.668X11 + 6.299E-02X3 + ei (6.3) 
For the UK, the outputs indicates that decision-makers preferred the overall balance of individual 
states to unemployment and balance of international trade in goods and services at current prices, 
which is equivalent to: 
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Y1=2.824+3.637E-05X1; +1.119X2; +7.254E-02X3+e; (6.4) 
In the meantime, the German model is not significant at the level of p<0.05. As a result, the null 
hypothesis (Ho) is accepted. Thus, the two hypotheses above, which state that decision-makers' 
policy preferences differ from each other in terms of balance-of-payments, short-term balance- 
of-trade and unemployment, are invalid for the German decision-makers. That is, it is possible to 
say that German decision-makers do not take a strategic choice between variables in the 
formation of FDI policy. However, in terms of a simple correlation and significance, balance of 
trade is the strongest factor in shaping German FDI policy, implying that German decision- 
makers would like to consider this point urgently. 
6.4.2 Empirical illustrations 
As shown in the practical time-series data of France, in figure 5.2 in Chapter 5, decision- 
makers preferred current and capital balance and trade balance to unemployment as resources of 
policy-making. The unemployment rate in France has always been higher than those of the UK, 
Germany and the EU 15. The tendency has been similar to the average of the EU 15. In terms of 
current and capital balance, France recorded by and large a stable consistency of more or less 
than 10000. This contrasted with the dull drop that happened to the UK and Germany within 
2000 in1997 II to - 5000 in 1999 N. These tendencies of the UK and Germany implies that 
during late 1998 to 1999 III, inward FDI flow exceeded outward FDI flow. However, in 1999 N, 
FDI flow turned to equilibrium again. 
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This tendency indicates that the French government inward FDI flow has been less than 
those of the UK and Germany. The average of the EU 15 net FDI developed near to equilibrium 
until 1996 II, and incrementally inward FDI flow tended to increase. In particular, since 1998 
rapid inward FDI flow occurred, and then fluctuations near to equilibrium repeated. By contrast, 
France has kept a relative equilibrium, except a small variation between inward and outward FDI 
flows since 1998 IV. Finally, French decision-makers chose a policy option of investment 
balance rather than the liberalisation of foreign investment. 
This option resulted in both current and capital balance and trade balance in the black, whilst 
it produced no dramatic improvements in the unemployment rate. As such, French decision- 
makers decided to take policy preferences for current and capital balance and trade balance 
rather than unemployment, as the economic basis of enforcing private knowledge that is not 
exposed to the need for a new international investment mechanism. 
For the British government, during the subject of period of study, balance-of-payments 
fluctuated between being in the black and the red. Balance of investment developed near 
equilibrium, and since 1995, inward flow is tending upwards showing dramatic fluctuations 
during 1998-1999 between equilibrium and minus 200000. This fluctuation was accompanied by 
the rapid decrease in the unemployment rate since 1993. Contrasting to this tendency, even 
though still remaining in the red, the balance of trade did undergo steady improvements during 
1988 to 1991. 
After that, the deficit ran in a horizontal tendency until 1997, and since late 1997 again the 
range of deficit was magnified. Meanwhile, current and capital balance fluctuated badly between 
5000 and minusl0000, and since late 1998 turned thoroughly to red figures around - 5000. 
Finally, preferences of the British government in favour of inward FDI flow operated as a 
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positive factor in improving unemployment, whilst as a result the balance-of-payments became 
worse. As such, the British decision-makers inclined towards private knowledge, i. e. conviction, 
which put greater value on unemployment rather than balance-of-payments in making FDI 
policy. 
Germany recorded a great range of black figures in balance of trade, whilst current and 
capital balance worsened. Unemployment rate tended to increase keeping under the average of 
the EU 15, and since 1997 turned to the tendency of a steady decrease. This level generally has 
represented the most stable unemployment rate within the EU except 1995 and 1996 when the 
UK recorded a relatively lower unemployment rate. By contrast, in terms of the current and 
capital balance Germany recorded a steep fluctuation between 5000 and - 5000 during 1997 to 
1998. Yet since 1999 current and capital balance worsened coming to minus 10000. 
Meanwhile, even though there was a time when trade balance in goods was tending 
downwards, it has been always in the red. Its tendency indicates that since 1991 trade balance 
turned to cumulative improvements between 5000 and 10000. This improvement contributed to 
the increase in household income. Turning to the tendency of FDI in Germany, except times 
when inward FDI flow exceeded outward flow in 1998 and outward FDI flow rocketed in 1999 
IV, inward FDI flow has kept slightly in excess of outward FDI flow near a equilibrium. 
This implies that German FDI policy is characterised by its conservatism, and it reflects the 
negative attitude of the German government in giving a preference to the settlement of 
unemployment rate. Finally, it is possible to say that the German decision-makers did not 
orientate heavily towards settling the unemployment rate compared to current and capital 
balance. By contrast, they had private knowledge, i. e. conviction, that puts greatest value on 
trade balance as the resource of decision-making. 
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6.5 Conclusion 
From the observations and verifications above, we shall conclude that: first, civil society 
organisations, occupied by the cognition of realising global objectives at the transnational level, 
were not a simple reaction to the structural powers. Rather, civil society organisations monitored 
the implications of structural powers for the shaping of their behaviour through their objective or 
subjective understanding of those structures. On the other hand, civil society organisations also 
tried to reflect their own preferences on structures. In these processes, civil society organisations 
were a proactive agent that transformed the structural contexts through this cognitive shift, rather 
than being prisoners to the structural environment (Rosamond and Yang, 2000). 
Secondly, it is possible to interpret that a series of agents took a part in shaping principled 
knowledge concerning the liberalisation of FDI rather than that principled knowledge concerning 
liberalisation brought out changes in the agents' knowledge system. Furthermore, it is desirable 
that constructivism in terms of knowledge is adopted as a better approach starting from a 
dialectical viewpoint based on the interactions between agents and structures. 
Finally, decision-makers of individual states reflect their objectives as politicians in policy- 
making by putting different values on the national competences, economic security, investment 
security and ultimately economic sovereignty against the market logic. As such, their different 
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Agent-structure interactions in the formation of foreign 
economic and economic diplomacy policies: `political 
conditions' in trade and cooperation agreements 
7.1 Introduction 
The dialectical dynamism between agents and structures is understood as the way in which actors 
assist the shaping of structures by reproducing or transforming international institutions and 
other structures. Structures, on the other hand, conceptualise the situations where actors are 
located, and exert influence on actors' choice of strategic actions (Carlsnaes, 1992, pp. 261-262). 
This complex and dynamic process implies potential redefinition of both the unit of collective 
actions and the principle of authoritarian allocation. As a result, the concept of sovereignty 
within the EU has to undergo a dynamic evolution derived from structural changes. As such the 
evolution has been legitimised by Europeans (agents) and ultimately becomes the legitimate 
concept of sovereignty on which individual Member States take actions. This accompanies the 
restructuring of the European system or the wider international system (Carlsnaes, 1992, p. 262). 
As such, agent-structure codetermination occurs as time flows and the space crosses, i. e. the 
contexts change or cumulate. 
In accordance with the abovementioned perspectives, above all, this chapter explores, in 
terms of the structural effects on agents, whether the fundamental structural shifts in the EU 
impact on the conceptual changes of sovereignty of individual Member States in shaping FEP or 
not. Then from the viewpoint of agential power to structures, the attention moves on to whether 
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the EU undergoes a fundamental restructuring of FEP. In addition, this chapter examines the 
timing and the content of policy outputs with `When' and `Why' questions concerning the 
appearance of knowledge of human rights and democracy in a series of trade and cooperation 
agreements between the EU and non-EU countries. Thus, to explore the timing, it is necessary to 
summarise the development of the EU's human rights policy over the last decade. Meanwhile, in 
terms of the policies' content, the inconsistency of norms or principles that appeared in different 
forms of clauses is subject to comparative study, which reflects the difference in political and 
economic negotiating powers between parties. 
7.2 The significance and development of human rights and 
democracy principles within the EU 
7.2.1 The characteristics and typical classification of the EU human rights 
policy 
Before World War II, there was not a single country that had a human rights policy. After the 
end of World War II, the US and Europe developed human rights policies until 1988 through a 
gradual process. European human rights policy differs from that of the US in terms of the timing 
of policy choice, the target of human rights pressure and the tools or channels used in enforcing 
the policy. In terms of the timing, it was not until the middle of 1970s that the US adopted the 
human rights issue as one of its foreign policy components. This was when the Nixon 
administration (1969-1974) institutionalised human rights. By contrast, Europe has run human 
rights regimes since the post-World War era. Meanwhile, looking at the nature of human rights 
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policy, Europe preferred utilising the multilateral channels or legal tools provided by the 
European Convention. By contrast, the US tends to prefer bilateral channels or more political 
forms of pressure (Sikkink, 1993). In addition, even in Europe individual Member States have 






Figure 7.1 Human rights policies of the United States 
and Western European states 
Multilateral human rights policy (partial 
















Source: Sikkink (1993, p. 144) 
Countries in Box I have a external and multilateral human rights policy such that they can he 
regarded as having a comprehensive human rights policy. Countries in Box IV have no human 
rights policy. Countries in Boxes II and Ill possess a partial human rights policy. Most European 
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countries are located in Box III, even though the Netherlands is characterised by a more active 
human rights policy compared to the UK, which has only made limited initiatives on human 
rights. Meanwhile, in terms of the history of development of human rights policy, most countries 
have moved from Box N onto Box III except Greece (Sikkink, 1993). 
In terms of the EU, the Treaty of European Union (TEU) Article F reveals the position of the 
Community on human rights. Article J. 1 (2) refers also to human rights concerning the 
objectives of CFSP. 1 Besides this, the EC Treaty Article J. 1 (2) describes the linkage between 
human rights, democracy and development. In the meantime, in terms of the foreign economic 
policy of the EU, all these human rights and democracy clauses continue consistently by 
appearing in the fourth Lome Convention, which entered into force in 1991. In fact, the tendency 
to inscribe `political conditions' as the basis of Community policy has started in the field of 
development policy (Kuyper, 1993, p. 405). A first attempt to inscribe human rights and 
democratic values was undertaken during the negotiations for the Lome Convention. The Lome 
Convention originated as a trade and cooperation agreement between the EU and African, 
Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries. `Political conditions' clauses concerning human rights 
and democracy have been discussed since the second Lome Convention in 1979, and third Lome 
Convention contained a preambular paragraph which referred to the parties' "faith in 
fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of 
men and women and of nations large and small. "2 However, no direct reference to classical 
individual human rights was contained in its text. It was not until the Preamble and Article 5 of 
the fourth Lome Convention that the perspectives of human rights and democracy ware 
reaffirmed, and references to specific measures such as the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights and the European Convention were included. Article 5 stated that: 
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"Cooperation shall be directed towards development centered on man[sic], the 
main protagonist and beneficiary of development, which thus entails respect for 
and promotion of all human rights. s3 
Besides this convention, human rights and democracy clauses became a regular feature in a 
series of trade and cooperation agreements and association agreements between the Community 
and non-EU countries. Above all, it was the European Council Resolution of 28 November 1991 
that operated as a direct driving force in inserting human rights and democracy clauses into a 
series of such agreements. 4 
7.2.2 Competence allocation on the issue of human rights and democracy and 
its significance: subsidiarity and priority 
As figure 7.2 shows, since the Amsterdam Treaty, we find that support for EU joint decision- 
making is most widespread for the fight against human trade and exploitation, humanitarian aid, 
accepting refugees and rules for political asylum. By contrast, people want the national 
governments to take a choice in areas that concern their families or countries more directly. 
Figure 7.2 depicts that people are most likely to support national decision-making in the areas of 
policing, justice and defence. As such, people tend to follow the principle of subsidiarity by 
supporting joint EU decision-making in areas that either transcend national borders or have a 
limited impact on their day-to-day life. 
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Figure 7.2 Policies: national or EU level decision- 













Source: Eurobarometer 52 (1999). 
Generally speaking, since the middle of 1990s, human rights and democracy issues have been 
evaluated as one of the Community's exclusive competence areas, despite little variances 
between individual Member States. The trend line in figure 7.3 shows the convergent tendency to 
recognise the subsidiarity principle as a principled knowledge. Meanwhile, the variance between 
the Member States derives from the different way of understanding subsidiarity concerning 
centralisation and decentralisation. Even in a member state the extent to which people agree with 
subsidiarity has fluctuated, as figure 7.3 depicts. 
253 
0 20 40 60 80 
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Sources: Eurobarometer 34 (1990) to 52 (1999). 
In the meantime, figure 7.4 gauges the extent to which the public regards the current actions of 
the EU as priorities. The issue of human rights belongs to the second group in terms of priority 
of the EU actions. The first group consists of K, I, G, E and D, whilst J, H and C construct the 
third group. The proportion of people who consider this action a priority range from 71% in 
Germany to 90 % in Denmark. It is remarkable to note that the desire of people for internal 
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actions of the EU is not accordance with that for external relations. This is because priority of the 
EU actions on the issue of foreign policy downgrades into the third group. As such, it is not 
likely that internal actions of the EU on the issue of human rights and democracy will continue to 
be linked with significant initiatives on `political conditions' in external relations with non-EU 
countries. 
Figure 7.4 EC actions: priority or not 
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Source: Eurobarometer 52 (1999). 
In addition, principles of human rights and democracy have been considered one of the important 
criteria in evaluating membership of the applicants to the EU. In December 1997, the EU 
launched the process to enlarge to the South and the East, through which new countries should 
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be in a position to join the Union from the end of 2002 as soon as they have demonstrated their 
ability to assume obligations of membership. It was necessary to set up the criteria for examining 
these new applicants, and thus during the 1993 Copenhagen European Council, the Heads of 
State and Government agreed on a number of criteria, which countries wishing to join the 
European Union had to meet. The components of the criteria are: the respect of human rights and 
democracy, fighting drug and organised crime, the capacity to pay their allocated budget share, 
acquis communautaire, ' that it should not be costly for existing member countries, and that the 
applicant has the level of economic development and readiness to put the interest of the EU 
above its own national interest. As figure 7.5 shows, there is widespread public support for these 
criteria, and in particular more than 9 in 10 people feel that applicant countries should respect 
Human Rights and the principles of democracy. 
Figure 7.5 Importance of enlargement criteria 
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7.3 The structural and agential explanations for introducing 
`political conditions' to foreign economic policy 
7.3.1 Impacts on human rights and democracy principles by structural contexts: 
conceptual changes of sovereignty caused by structural shifts within the 
EU 
7.3.1.1 Changes in the nature and structure of agential choices: experimental 
hypotheses 
In this section, the following hypotheses are examined: 
Hypothesis 7.1: Structural changes shift the content of policy outputs through the agents' 
cognitive conversion. In the same context, it was through the conceptual change of 
sovereignty that enabled `political conditions' such as human rights and democracy to be 
inserted into a series of trade and cooperation agreements between the EU and non-EU 
countries. 
Hypothesis 7.2: Internal demand for human rights and democracy is in accordance with the 
introduction of `political conditions' and other general principles of the EU in external 
relations. That is, the voice for the need of human rights and democracy at the national level 
continues to pursue objectives at the EU level, and also reflects in the external relations with 
non EU countries in the same manner. 
Hypothesis 7.3: The introduction of `political con ditions'toforeign economic policy of the EU 
in the beginning of the 1990s was the output derived from the independent policy choice of 
domestic constituents. 
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Hypothesis Z4: In shaping the FEP of the EU, there is not a gap between market 
interdependence and policy interdependence (This is a null hypothesis against Susan 
Strange's argument). 
7.3.1.2 Setting modelling and measurement of variables 
As mentioned in chapter 1, the FEP of the EU, including human rights and democracy clauses, is 
subject to the application of the subsidiarity principle in the sense that individual Member States 
and supranational institutions make decisions and enforce them in the cooperation process. In 
addition, according to the democratic approach, which is one of the FEP approaches, decision- 
makers of individual states would like to choose policy options, which positively reflect public 
demand. Of course, when preferences between decision-makers and the public are convergent, a 
two-level game would not occur. Under this assumption, concerned with human rights and 
democracy principles, the change in the public's support rate for subsidiarity corresponds to the 
decision-makers' cognitive shift. As such, the adoption of this variable as the dependent variable 
is in accordance with the goal of measuring the conceptual changes in knowledge of sovereignty. 
Together with this, when a series of variables constructing structural powers are introduced as 
the independent variables, the following model is established. 
Yj=a+b1X1; +b2X21+b3X3; +ei (7.1) 
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In this model, every item's explanation is the same as that in the model 5.1 in chapter 5. As an 
analytical tool, multiple regression analysis has been adopted, and the same two technical 
methods as in the Model 5.1 have been adopted to improve the validity of analysis outputs. As 
such, instead of the model 7.1, we estimate: 
logY, =a+ logb1X1; + logbJX2i + logb3X3i + e; (7.2) 
From this model, to verify the above three hypotheses let us conduct a new regression model 
compromised of a group of independent variables such as international structural contexts (Xv 
for trade flows and X2, for capital flows) and domestic context (X3; ), and an independent 
variable of the support for subsidiarity principle by people or sectoral support for subsidiarity by 
peoples such as cooperation with developing countries, including the third world, or foreign 
policy towards non-EU countries (Y1). Possible variables and their measurement are depicted in 
Table 7.1 below. 
Table 7.1 Measurement of variables 
Independent Variables X X21, X3, and X41) Measurement Unit 
International " International Average % of PPP GDP and % of % 
Context Globalisation Trade in goods goods GDP 
(X1i) % 
Average % of PPP GDP 













(X3 and X4) 
Very satisfied + fairly satisfied (1- 





scale (1 to 
4) 
Market " Market " Exports to EU As % of total national exports % 
Context context countries (Xs; ) 
" Recipients of Million ECU Million 
EU direct ECU 
investment, intra- 
flows (X6; ) 
" Subsidiarity Jointly within the EU % 
(general) 
" Cooperation Jointly within the EU % 
Dependent variables (Yi) with developing 
countries and 
third world 
" Foreign Policy Jointly within the EU % 
towards non-EU 
countries 
Concerning operational definitions for every variable, above all, all the operational definitions of 
the relevant independent variables in previous chapter 6 are also adopted for this model. In 
particular, the extent to which the public is satisfied with domestic democracy represents the 
domestic context, and enables us to extract the imbalance between internal and external policies 
concerning human rights and democracy. 
Meanwhile, for the operational definitions of the dependent variable, the public's support for 
the application of the subsidiarity principle to the general areas is adopted. In addition, its 
sectoral application such as cooperation with developing countries and the third world, and 
foreign policy with non-EU countries is also adopted. The adoption of this method is based on 
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the democratic approach of FEP that is characterised by the decision-makers' will to positively 
reflect the public's preferences and the consequent reflection of this in policy outputs. In this 
case, the public's preferences and those of decision-makers are convergent such that a two-level 
game would not occur. The issue of human rights and democracy in the FEP of the EU is subject 
to the application of concurrent competence, and did not occur suddenly, cutting out time and 
space. Rather, it was an output of cumulative contexts of time, space and knowledge. 
In fact, as figure 7.3 shows, the conceptual change of sovereignty concerning human rights 
and democracy has been established as a principled knowledge through such a cumulative 
process among decision-makers. This is to say that the initial game between decision-makers and 
the domestic constituents, not having shared preferences or knowledge, has evolved to a single- 
level game (Level I, i. e. the international level) or a two-level game (against the three-level 
game) representing convergent preferences or knowledge. As such, it is reasonable to adopt the 
change in the public's support for subsidiraity as the dependent variable representing decision- 
makers. The following operational definitions are available: 
Operational definition 1: The high rate of support for the application of subsidiarity to 
cooperation with developing countries and the third world indicates the conceptual change 
of sovereignty from Westphalian sovereignty to the pooling of sovereignty. 
The adoption of three dependent variables derives from the potentiality in which the 
interpretation of the general subsidiarity principle distorts the implications of the outputs in the 
sense that it includes both internal and external perspectives, despite mainly focusing on the 
former. 
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7.3.1.3 Interpretation of analysis outputs 
7.3.1.3.1 The international structural contexts 
In the model of subsidiarity (general) (the dependent variable, Y1) and trade and gross capital 
flow (the independent variables, X1 and X2j), the results say that this model is not significant at 
the level of p<0.05. As a result, the null hypothesis (Ho) is accepted, whilst the abovementioned 
alternative hypothesis 7.1, which states that structural changes shift the content of policy outputs 
through the agents' cognitive conversion, is rejected. As such, the international structural 
contexts do not generate changes in the contents of policy outputs, i. e. the change in the concept 
of sovereignty. 
In the same context, `political conditions' was not inserted into a series of trade and 
cooperation agreements with non-EU countries by changing the concept of sovereignty derived 
from the international structural contexts. On the other hand, a regression analysis, consisting of 
cooperation with developing countries and the third world (the dependent variable, Y1), X3; and 
X41 results in no significance, saying that this model is not acceptable. Thus, the null hypothesis 
(Ho) is accepted. As such, we reach the same conclusion as that in the previous model. 
By contrast, the model concerning Foreign policy towards non-EU countries (the dependent 
variable, Y1), X3i and X4 is significant at the level of p<0.05. As a result, the null hypothesis is 
rejected, and the alternative hypothesis 7.1 is accepted. As such, it is possible to say that 
`political conditions' were introduced into a series of trade and cooperation agreements with 
non-EU countries by changing the concept of sovereignty. This redefinition of sovereignty 
originated from international structural contexts. In addition, in terms of the significance of 
individual variables, trade is not significant and is negatively correlated with the dependent 
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variable. By contrast, capital flows are significant and positively correlated with Yi on a high t- 
value meaning that this variable is consistent, despite their little variances. These correlations are 
equivalent to: 
Y1=1.813 - 3.021E-03X11 + 5.075E-02X21 + e; (7.3) 
7.3.1.3.2 The domestic contexts 
In the model of subsidiarity (general) (the dependent variable, Yi) and satisfaction with domestic 
democracy (Very satisfied + Fairly satisfied, X3l, and Not very satisfied + Not at all satisfied, X4i) 
(the independent variables), the results say that this model is significant at the level of p<0.05. 
As a result, the null hypothesis (Ho) is rejected, whilst the hypothesis 7.2 is valid, allowing us to 
conclude that the internal demands for human rights and democracy principles corresponds to 
those in both the EU level and the external relations. These relationships are equivalent to: 
Y1=0.369+0.505X31 +0.291X41 +e; (7.4) 
Meanwhile, a regression analysis, consisting of cooperation with developing countries and the 
third world (the dependent variable, Yi) and satisfaction with domestic democracy (Very 
satisfied + Fairly satisfied, X3i, and Not very satisfied + Not at all satisfied, X4; ) (the independent 
variables) results in a significance of 0.774. Thus, this model is not acceptable by the 
significance criteria of p<0.05, and the null hypothesis (Ho) is accepted. By contrast, the 
alternative hypothesis 7.2 is rejected. Thus, we can conclude that the inclusion of `political 
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conditions' in a series of trade and cooperation agreements with non-EU countries does not 
derive from the changing concept of sovereignty caused by domestic contexts. In the model of 
Foreign Policy towards non-EU countries (the dependent variable), X3; and X4; are also the case. 
7.3.1.3.3 The international structural and domestic contexts 
Unlike the models in which the international and domestic contexts are isolated, the model 
consisting of cooperation with developing countries and the third world (the dependent variable, 
Y1), the international structural and domestic contexts (the independent variables) are not 
significant. This is also the case in the models with the other two dependent and independent 
variables. This indicates that when the international structural contexts and the domestic contexts 
are operating in combination with the dependent variable, the significances of these two groups 
would be offset. As such, decision-makers can take strategic choices in a relatively looser 
situation between the domestic and international structures. 
7.3.1.3.4 Market interdependence and policy interdependence 
According to the output of a regression adopting the independent variables of recipients of EU 
direct investment (infra-flows) and exports to EU countries (as % of total national exports), and 
the dependent variable of subsidiarity, the model is not significant. Thus, the null hypothesis is 
accepted, whilst the experimental hypothesis 7.4 is rejected. This result indicates that there is a 
gap between market and policy interdependences. 
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Meanwhile, in the regression of these independent variables and the dependent variable of 
cooperation with developing countries and the third world, the model concerning market 
interdependence is significant at the level of p<0.05. As a result, the null hypothesis is rejected, 
and the alternative hypothesis 7.4 is accepted, which states that there is no gap between market 
and policy interdependences. In addition, in terms of significance of individual variables, all the 
independent variables are significant, whilst `exports to EU countries' is negatively correlated 
with the dependent variable. This correlation is equivalent to: 
Yi = 2.274 - 0.266X5; +2.271E-O1X6i + ei (7.5) 
Foreign policy towards non-EU countries (the dependent variable) and the independent variables 
also forms a significant model. This leads us to the same conclusion that market and policy 
interdependences are positively correlated. In this model, 'exports to EU countries' is significant 
with the p-value of 0.032, whilst 'recipients of EU direct investment' is not significant, as it 
shows a greater p-value than 0.05. The result is equivalent to: 
Y, = 2331 - 0.315X55 + 1.543E-02X61 + ei (7.6) 
7.3.2 Agents' principled and causal knowledge 
The perspective of knowledge between agents is accompanied by accounts of the changes in the 
construction of FEP contents, and the competence allocation or sovereignty concerning the 
availability of this change in the content about to happen, in particular, in the case of the EU 
`political conditions' to be introduced. These issues link the consistency and symmetry of the 
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basic line of the EU's FEP with the competence allocation within the EU. In particular, the latter 
is necessarily accompanied by discussion over the different understanding of subsidiarity that has 
been introduced by the Maastricht Treaty. As such, the following hypothesis is suggested: 
Hypothesis 7.5: The agents' knowledge impacts directly on the policy such that the power of 
principled knowledge shaping a policy generates changes in the structure offoreign economic 
policy. As a result, the basic possible strategies of a country have been changed 
7.3.2.1 Principled knowledge of national interests 
Decision-makers' knowledge consists of `principled knowledge' and `causal knowledge'. 
Regarding the issue of human rights and democracy, `principled knowledge' questions whether 
human rights and democracy are legitimate objectives of foreign economic policy or not. By 
contrast, `causal knowledge' questions what kind of foreign economic policy is the most 
effective for promoting human rights and democracy in the external relations of the EU (Sikkink, 
1993, p. 141). Above all, as for the former, there is no complete consensus between decision- 
makers. Some groups of political entrepreneurs would argue that the defence of human rights 
and democracy is the optimal strategy for ensuring safety or security. 
By contrast, the other more realist decision makes are more concerned with securing and 
reinforcing material means; their thoughts being centred on the concepts of interest and power. 
Traditionally, foreign policy has focused on the choice of the appropriate method to promote 
national interests, starting with the definition of national interests. In this context, for defining 
national interests, the knowledge that constructs the consensus (at least acquiring the relative 
majority) between decision-makers becomes shared. Then, shared knowledge is established as 
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principled knowledge and then ultimately reflected in a series of policies. Human rights and 
democracy are introduced to the priority list of foreign policy through a similar process. 
Above all, in terms of the definition of national interests, human rights and democracy must 
be the most necessary elements of national interests. The concept of national interests is nearly 
regarded in the same light as objectives of foreign policy that express values and interests. These 
values and interests are the internal elements operating in the process of setting up objectives. 
Such national interests are the means of political actions and structure the way of thinking 
concerning objectives. 
If so, what are practical national interests? In practice, national interest is not a scientific 
concept, since it contains preferred values. This feature of containing preferred values is 
accompanied by conceptual ambiguity, which is divided into two categories. First, from the 
viewpoint of realism based on the concept of power, national interest is defined as `one guiding 
star' or `one standard for thought' (Morgenthau, 1951, p. 242), as a technical function is 
emphasised. As a result, the state is regarded as the supreme good, the survival of the state and 
the basic objectives that are shared with all the other social groups are regarded as optimal, and 
national selfishness is regarded in the same light as national interest. 
Second, by contrast, it is possible to define national interest as some ideal set of purposes, 
which a certain country is trying to realise in enforcing a foreign policy. As such, normative and 
citizenry perspectives are emphasised (Seabury, 1963, p. 86). This knowledge orientates a better 
world or international society or world community, as it sees the state as the need of all citizens. 
Such a nature of national interest constructs a large part of international political economy based 
on the concepts of `justice and distribution' rather than international relations based on the 
concepts of `order and power'. 
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Meanwhile, since 1991, a series of trade and cooperation agreements between the EU and 
non-EU countries are obviously third generation agreements with references to democratic 
principles and observance of human rights. A "third generation agreement" aims at stepping up 
and diversifying trade and providing for very extensive cooperation covering not only economic 
and industrial aspects but also culture, environment, training, drug abuse control, tourism, etc. 
Furthermore, it also contains a future developments clause meaning that no area of cooperation is 
ruled out, but it must be based on observance of democratic principles and human rights. The 
emphasis of these new norms or principled knowledge and the setting of new objectives proves 
its consistency as a policy by being allocated a budget within the EU budget, and expending it 
since the early 1990s. 
Figure 7.6 The EU budget - External action (Subsection B7) 
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Figure 7.6 shows the changes in the percentage of the budget allocated to the EU's initiatives for 
human rights and democracy within the EU budget. However, human rights and democracy 
clauses within the Community agreements are characterised by asymmetry by region or country. 
This feature reveals the gap of political and economic bargaining powers between signatory 
parties, and the inconsistency between national interests and the values of new norms or 
principles. This will be described in greater detail in section 7.4 below. 
7.3.2.2 Causal knowledge of national interests 
On the other hand, even decision-makers who have a shared principled knowledge often show 
differences in causal knowledge. The direct driving forces of differences in causal knowledge are 
summarised as follows. First, difference in causal knowledge derives from the fact that 
knowledge of human rights that is mainly embodied by institutions and laws creates bureaucratic 
interests based on the perpetuation of policies (Sikkink, 1993, p. 167). The bureaucratic interests 
are nested in a series of institutions for implementing principled knowledge orientating towards a 
popularity bonus. Such a structure generates the potentiality in which the public sphere is 
refracted by the legitimacy of the political society. Civil society organisations operate as a 
counterforce against bureaucratic interests. 
Knowledge of human rights and democracy can be also promoted by NGOs. These NGOs 
emerged as organised groups during the late 1970s, for example, Amnesty International, Human 
Rights Watch and Lawyers' Committee on Human Rights. They have contributed to the 
integration of human rights into foreign policy. In Europe, such NGOs have interacted with 
bureaucratic and institutional interests. This interplay is not always congenial, but its linkage has 
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been mutually reinforced (Sikkink, 1993, p. 167). In fact, these NGOs do not have the power to 
mobilise the constituents for elections concerning human rights and democracy unlike other 
interest groups in international relations. In addition, they do not provide political funds to any 
political bodies so that they do not have direct political or economic influences. These NGOs' 
influence can be recognised only through responding to decision-makers' normal concerns. 
However, NGOs can induce changes in the structure of decision-makers' knowledge by 
broadening the scope of their objectives, pursuing the achievement ofthese objectives in both the 
national and transnational levels, exercising agenda-setting power, and extending issue linkage. 
In particular, civil society organisations are not prisoners who are constrained by structures, in 
the sense that all such actions of civil society organisations are not simply reactive, but proactive 
to external environments and in collecting relevant information. As Moravcsik (1995, p. 157) 
observed, European regimes have FEPs which are based on the pursuit of human rights and 
democracy, and do not function through external sanctions or reciprocity, but through an 
autonomous and independent civil society and robust municipal (domestic) legal institutions. 
In the meantime, concerning the supranational institutions of the EU that are associated with 
these NGOs, the ECJ and the Commission are regarded as the most effective bodies in promoting 
human rights and democracy (Sikkink, 1993, p. 168). However, in terms of its enforcement, i. e. 
from the viewpoint of causal knowledge, between individual organisations, there is no 
consensus. In particular, the Commission shows a negative position in enforcing human rights 
and democracy principles. In the Lome Convention IV in May 1994 the insurance of democracy, 
the control of law, good governance and the respect of human rights have been established as 
necessary elements. By contrast, the Commission was in an ambiguous position concerning the 
issue of accompanying with an immediate and unilateral suspension clause, which would be 
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taken if these elements were violated. In the trade and cooperation agreements with Ukraine, 
Russia and the Baltic countries, the Commission has also taken a positive attitude towards a 
unilateral suspension. 
Secondly, on the other hand, different causal knowledge also derives from individual agents' 
private knowledge. Agents understand and interpret structural contexts through their own private 
knowledge such that agents decide their own specific rational and strategic actions. This process 
is characterised by subjectivity and contextuality in the sense it can be multi-dimensional, and in 
nature ad hoc. When these actors' subjectivities intersect each other through their interactions, 
repeated intersections make autonomous individual knowledge converge to an intersubjective 
knowledge, which becomes principled. 
From another perspective of knowledge, concerned with the availability of including 
`political conditions' in FEP of the EU, i. e. the allocation of policy competences, it is necessary 
to explore the decision-makers' cognition of subsidiarity. Individual states say in the formation 
of the EU's FEP premise that they are ready to put the interest of the Community above their 
own. Linked to the issue of `effectiveness', this premise is based on knowledge that actions at the 
level of individual Member States are not `better' than those of the Community level. In terms of 
`Enlargement', this knowledge concerning the priority of the Community interests to the national 
interests has been discussed as an important criterion to judge the membership of new applicants 
to the EU, as figure 7.5 depicts. 
However, it is possible that the pursuit of Community interests generates significant 
damages to a certain country. In addition, there is another potential risk that unlike expectations, 
the Community actions are not effective or better than those of individual Member States. 
Concerning the potentiality of this `government failure', the subsidiarity principle was 
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introduced to prevent it from occurring. Looking at a series of formal documents as below at the 
beginning of the 1990s, principled knowledge concerning the necessity of subsidiarity has been 
shared by elites' private knowledge at the EU level. 
Throughout a series of conferences and consultations, there is a consensus, i. e. principled 
knowledge, over subsidiarity between individual agents and institutions at the EU level. In 1992, 
the most important question on the agenda of the meeting of the Consultative Council of 
Regional and Local Authorities was that of subsidiarity. At this meeting, Bruce Millan, 
Commissioner for regional policies, addressed and stressed the importance of a regional and 
local representation within the Community and the need to listen to its views, especially on 
regional issues, 6 saying: 
"I am convinced that the subsidiarity principle needs to be applied below the 
national level, and not only between the Community and Member States and there 
are references to the role of the regions in the Commission's document on 
subsidiarity. " 
In a speech given to the EEP-Group of the European Parliament in London, 10 September 1992, 
Peter Schmidhuber, the Member of the Commission with responsibility for the budget, put 
forward eight propositions outlining how the principle of subsidiarity should be interpreted and 
implemented. He understood subsidiarity as a principle for the decentralisation as much unity as 
necessary, and as much decentralisation as possible by emphasising that subsidiarity requires a 
new way of thinking. He tries to say that the question is no longer what the Community could do, 
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but what it really must do. In other words, the Community must do no more than is absolutely 
necessary. 7 
Bruce Millan in the address at the European League for economic cooperation's conference, 
Cleveland, 10 July 1992, also said: 
"[Y]ou could be forgiven for thinking that the concept [subsidiarity] had only just 
been invented. Moreover, you could be forgiven for inferring that subsidiarity 
means no more and no less than the renationalisation of decision-making - taking 
back to Dublin, Bonn or London those areas of activity that had hitherto been 
collectively agreed in Brussels. However, as Commissioner for regional policies, I 
do want to stress firstly that subsidiarity means much more than the relationship 
between the Member States and the Community, and secondly, that it is a 
principle that has been fully incorporated into regional policy since 1989. "$ 
Leon Brittan thought of subsidiarity as the rationale of Community actions, mainly in the bases 
of the `negative externality' and the `community-wide effect', as he states: 
"Obviously member States cannot be expected to take account of the external 
impact of their policies. [On this point, ] an independent referee is needed to 
ensure fair play. That is why the Treaty made the Commission responsible for 
controlling state aids. ... 
However, the Commission is only responsible for state 
aids which affect intra-Community trade. It is not for us to say whether the local 
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Council may give the local baker a grant to extend his premises or change his 
shop front. s9 
Meanwhile, vice-President Henning Christophersen emphasised this point at the Maastricht 
colloquium on subsidiarity, 22 March 1991, in the following way of thinking: 
"[T]he fundamental element in the concept of subsidiarity is political and 
economic liberalism. The concept of subsidiarity is therefore not only a guideline 
for the distribution of power between nation states and the supranational level in 
the Community integration process. In a wider sense the principle of subsidiarity 
means a decentralised market-oriented economy where decisions are taken either 
by the individuals themselves or at the level that is closest to them. This level is 
not necessary the nation state. "lo 
7.4 The interpretation of the timing of introducing `political 
conditions' in FEP and the content of `political conditions' 
7.4.1 The interpretation of the timing: international, European and historical 
contexts 
Historically, compared to the US, Europe has been interested in human rights and democracy for 
longer. In the Post-World War II era, unlike the US in which this idea is less important than 
ideological forces combined with anti-communism, isolationism and segregationist feelings, the 
European experience with Nazi Germany during the war shaped knowledge that heavily 
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emphasised the significance of the issue of human rights and democracy (Sikkink, 1993). 
Furthermore, this knowledge resulted in sufficient direct impact on decision-makers' recognition 
of these issues to appear in the list of policy priority. As such, the Second World War gave birth 
to the issues of human rights and democracy in foreign policies of the European countries. 
From historical experiences, Europeans started thinking that the issue of human rights links 
to the causes of war, and that the respect of human rights generates an increase in European 
security (Sikkink, 1993, p. 155). Such knowledge keeps its consistency through being 
institutionalised by the consensus on its importance as well as policy measures or legal forms. In 
fact, human rights policy in Europe has been institutionalised as normal in agreements through 
being embodied in a series of European human rights documents. In addition to this 
institutionalisation, the Western European countries, except Greece, have held fast to human 
rights regimes. 
Finally, Europe has recorded 40-years of expansion of human rights and its activism 
(Sikkink, 1993, p. 166), and this long history continued into a series of trade and cooperation 
agreements between the EU and non-EU countries throughout the 1990s. As such, in terms of 
timing, those trade and cooperation agreements were not outputs of a sudden change in policy 
orientation or principle knowledge. Nevertheless, it is remarkable to note that it was since the 
beginning of the 1990s that `political conditions' such as human rights and democracy started 
being introduced into a series of trade and cooperation agreements. Here, the explanation of its 
timing moves on to other accounts. 
In the late 1980s, and the early 1990s, in the Community trade agreements, European 
decision-makers' recognition of the significance of human rights and democracy was riding on 
the back of political shifts. In the late 1980s, the collapse of communist regimes resulted in 
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increased trust in democracy. This derived from knowledge that the democratic governmental 
system can provide stability, which is necessary for economic development. Consequently, as the 
basis for economic transformation, the need for good governance based on legal rules became 
significant such that it continued into the protection of human and fundamental rights. 
On the other hand, as the bloodshed of Tiananmen Square in China, apartheid in South 
Africa and the so-called `ethnic cleansing' in the former Yugoslavia in 1991 happened, 
Europeans (agents) paid attention to the issue of human rights and democracy. Linked to this 
recognition, it was a neo-functional account that Europeans took as a practical method of 
strategic choice aiming at promoting the observance of human rights and democracy principles 
through economic exchange. This account constructs a causal knowledge expecting a spill-over 
effect from economic cooperation to political dialogue based on non-automatic evolution that is 
characterised by `carrot and stick. ' However, in terms of access, the EU would like to distinguish 
the values of human rights and democracy, i. e. normal knowledge, and democracy from causal 
knowledge of them. For example, in the Communication from the Commission to the Council, 
"Towards a New Asia Strategys11 the EU stated that: 
"[The Union] will not be able to take for granted automatic acceptance of 
European values and ways of doing things. Universal Human rights are 
recognised in Asia as in Europe, but the manner in which these are advocated 
and defended is crucial. " 
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This paragraph connotes the understanding that the practical method, in terms of causal 
knowledge of human rights, should be different from its implications in terms of normal 
knowledge. 
Meanwhile, in the European context, this was a time when the Maastricht Treaty was 
concluded. The Maastricht Treaty, unlike the Single European Act (SEA) was aiming at 
completing the European Single Market, and was orientated to political and security cooperation. 
Formally entitled the Treaty on European Union (TEU), the Maastricht treaty was the output of 
two Intergovernmental Conferences (IGCs) and was agreed at a meeting of the European 
Council in Maastricht, the Netherlands, in December 1991. Formally signed in Maastricht on 7 
February 1992, the Treaty entered into force in November 1993. It was the Amsterdam Treaty 
and the Nice Treaty that succeeded and enforced this objective further. In particular, at the Nice 
Summit, European decision-makers declared military autonomy from NATO. 12 These meetings 
concerning political and military security paved a way towards the establishment of common 
foreign and security policy at the EU level. In the same context, the basic line of such political 
integration has been reflected in a series of third generation agreements between the EU and non- 
EU countries since 1991, which include, in practice, political dialogues with external parties. 
The abovementioned contexts explain the timing when, since 1991, the human rights and 
democracy clause appeared in a series of trade and cooperation agreements between the EU and 
non-EU countries. The priority of human rights and democracy was also recognised by the 
Community and continued to be written in a series of documents and agreements including the 
TEU Title I Article 6 (2) (ex. Article F), which states that: 
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"The Union shall respect fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
signed in Rome on 4 November 1950 and as they result from the constitutional 
traditions common to the Member States, as general principles of Community 
law. "13 
7.4.2 The interpretation of contents: the inconsistency of principled 
knowledge concerning human rights and democracy 
The EU has pursued the objective of promoting the extent of integration between the EU and 
third countries by introducing human rights and democracy principles in trade and cooperation 
agreements with non-EU countries. This objective has not run parallel to that in a series of 
agreements with Latin America and Asian countries, at least until 1996 (Cremona, 1996). 
7.4.2.1 The Framework Agreement for trade and economic cooperation 
between the EEC and Latin American countries 
It was not until the beginning of the 1990s that trade and cooperation agreements between the 
EU and Latin American countries contained a human rights and democracy clause (mainly, 
Article 1). In previous cooperation agreements, there was only a general reference to 
international cooperation based on the fundamental rights, equality, justice and progress in the 
Preamble. 
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The Framework Cooperation Agreements between the EC and the Republic of Chile, the 
Argentine Republic14 and other Latin American countries were one of the first of the "third 
s 
generation" agreements. This is because they are evaluated as being highly structured and 
complete due to all possible forms of cooperation and its special nature. Above all, it is 
remarkable to note its "ultimate objective" to establish a political and economic association, 
which goes well beyond traditional cooperation. Eventually, the forming of the basis of such an 
association is accompanied by the way for gradual and reciprocal liberalisation of all trade. In 
addition, based on this knowledge, these agreements rank amongst the most progressive of 
Community agreements due to their future development clauses, which supplement most- 
favoured-nation treatment. The future developments clause completes the arsenal of means. 
Generally speaking, on the basis of EEC Treaty Articles 113 and 235, through these agreements, 
cooperation is of the widest possible kind and the future development clause allows for further 
broadening, in the following way: 
"1. The Contracting Parties may by mutual consent expand this Agreement with a 
view to increasing the levels of cooperation and supplementing them, each in 
accordance with its laws, by means of agreements on specific sectors or activities. 
2. With respect to the application of this Agreement, either of the Contracting 
Parties may put forward suggestions for widening the scope of mutual 
cooperation, taking into account the experience gained in its execution. " 15 
In addition, it is remarkable to note the terms of Article 1 on the democratic basis for cooperation 
between the EC and Argentina, Chile and other Latin American countries, which spell out the 
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legal framework for the development of Community policy towards non-member countries. The 
democracy clause establishes the bedrock of cooperation and for setting out the relevant 
mechanisms. 
"Cooperation ties between the Community and Chile and this Agreement in its 
entirety are based on respect for the democratic principles and human rights 
which inspire the domestic and external policies of both the Community and 
Chile, 16 [and other Latin American countries]. " 
In addition, in the cases of Paraguay and Central America (Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama), Article 1 in the agreements is followed by a provision that 
supports domestic democratisation (Article 2), in the following way: 
"l. The Contracting Parties consider the support that the Community can offer 
towards the consolidation of the democratic process in Paraguay to be crucial. In 
this regard, the Community reaffirms its readiness to help strengthen the 
democratic institutions of Paraguay [and other relevant Latin American countries] 
to the extent of its powers and its ability. 
2. The Parties likewise agree to devote special attention to encouraging, by 
appropriate measures, the return to Paraguay [and other relevant Latin American 
countries] of persons obliged to leave it on political grounds. s17 
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Contrasting these general features, the Framework Agreement with Mexico of 1991 did not 
include `political conditions' such as human rights and democracy clauses, whilst it contained a 
future developments clause (Article 45). Article 1 states: 
"Both Parties hereby undertake to impart renewed vigour to relations between 
them. To achieve this essential objective, they resolve to promote in particular the 
development of cooperation relating to trade, investment, finance and technology, 
taking account of Mexico's special situation as a developing country. s18 
The 1991 cooperation agreement continues to apply in part, pending conclusion of the new 
agreement which is entitled the `Economic Partnership, Political Coordination and Cooperation 
Agreement between the European Community and its Member States, on the one part, and the 
United Mexican States, on the other part'. 19 This new agreement, signed on 8 December 1997 
and not yet in force, is an extremely comprehensive and complex agreement. All trade and 
cooperation fields are covered as well as means of protection, including for intellectual property, 
and respect for democratic principles forms the basis of the agreement (Article 1). In addition, 
the future developments clause (Article 43), as a pactum ad contraendum, completes the 
extensive range of partnership instruments. 20 
7.4.2.2 The Framework Agreement for trade and economic cooperation 
between the EEC and Asian countries 
Before 1990, the trade and cooperation agreements between the EU and Asian countries did not 
include `political conditions', as they had a reference to cooperation based on freedom, equality 
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and justice. It was in the trade and cooperation agreement between the EU and Macao in 1992 
that `political conditions' such as human rights and democracy were first introduced. However, 
the human rights and democracy clause was a weak version, in terms of its binding power, 
compared to that in trade and cooperation agreements between the EU and Latin American 
countries, as the second paragraph was attached to Article 1 in the following way: 
"The two parties undertake to strengthen their relations and resolve to promote 
cooperation between them, taking account of Macao's special situation and of its 
level of development. [an attached paragraph] 
Cooperation ties between the Community and Chile and this Agreement in its 
entirety are based on respect for the democratic principles and human rights 
which inspire the domestic and external policies of both the Community and 
Macao. [usual paragraph)"2' 
By contrast, since 1993, other trade and cooperation agreements with Mongolia and Sri Lanka in 
1993, and with India in 1994, contained a strong version of `political conditions'. These 
agreements stated that human rights and democracy clause were an essential element of 
agreements in the same way as agreements with Latin American countries. 
Meanwhile, it is interesting to note that in the trade and cooperation agreement with Vietnam 
and a new agreement with ASEAN, the Community institutions do not share knowledge. The 
European Parliament (EP) argued that human rights and democracy clauses should be developed 
as essential element of agreements, whilst in the Commission there was an ambivalence in the 
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approach to `political conditions' and trade issues (Cremona, 1996). In the Communication from 
the Commission to the Council "Towards a New Asia Strategy"22 the Commission stated that the 
development of democracy, consolidation, legal rules and the respect of human rights and 
fundamental freedom construct the major objectives of foreign policy of the EU. By contrast, the 
Commission did not mention the human rights and democracy clause in new Asian trade 
agreements. This silence implies that the Commission would like to leave `political conditions' 
as the basis of economic cooperation to political dialogues. In fact, negotiations for a new third 
generation cooperation agreement with ASEAN groups were deadlocked because of the East 
Timor issue. 
Unlike other trade and cooperation agreements with Asian countries, that with China is not a 
third generation agreement because it does not contain `political conditions'. This agreement 
contained a reference to the MFN status instead of `political conditions', providing two 
implications: first, from the viewpoint of the Community level, the Commission tries to adopt an 
independent stance in accordance with its general principles; secondly, in the international 
context, the ambivalence of the Commission, as its general knowledge, corresponds to the 
decision of the Clinton administration to extend MFN status to China, implying de-linking 
between trade and `political conditions'. 
7.4.2.3 Central and Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union 
The first association agreement that was concluded between Poland, Hungary and 
Czechoslovakia in December 1991, the so-called Europe Agreement, mentioned the Helsinki 
Final Act and Charter of Paris. However, it did not include `political conditions' concerning 
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human rights and democracy. However, in 1992 and 1993, the second Europe Agreement 
between the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Bulgaria and Rumania contained a human rights and 
democracy clause. 
In the agreements with Baltic countries and Albania in 1992, unlike the existing agreements 
with Latin American and Asian countries, express reference to unilateral and immediate actions 
that could be undertaken in the case of violation of human rights was included, which states that: 
"The parties reserve the right to suspend this Agreement in whole or in part with 
immediate effect if a serious violation occurs of the essential provisions of the 
present Agreement. "23 
As such, the EU raised the enforceability of `political conditions' by identifying the essential 
provisions for the unilateral suspension to signatory parties. By contrast, in 1994, the newly 
concluded free trade agreement with Baltic countries did not repeat the provision of unilateral 
suspension, even though it embraced a strong form of human rights and democracy. On this 
point, it is possible to say that this arrangement derives from the fact that, as integration with 
Baltic countries deepens, the existing provisions became unnecessary in a strong manner. In 
addition, this feature indicates that the human rights and democracy policy of the EU is regional 
and multilaterally bounded in Europe. 
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7.5 Conclusion 
From the accounts above, the following conclusions are reached. First, whether the international 
structural contexts impact on the conceptual change of sovereignty or not, i. e. the explanation of 
policy outputs, depends on the dependent variable. This variation derives from the fact that the 
conceptual change of sovereignty concerning general subsidiarity and that in external relations, 
i. e. the pooling sovereignty, are isolated in terms of the level of significant activities. That is, the 
former is considered at the internal level (Levels II and III), whilst the account of the latter is 
undertaken at the external level (Level I). As such, in the late 1980s and the beginning of the 
1990s, `political conditions' in a series of trade and cooperation agreements between the EU and 
non-EU countries was not an output of the conceptual change of sovereignty at the internal level. 
Rather, it was an output of the conceptual change at the external level following the impacts of 
the international structural contexts. 
Second, the domestic preference or need represented by the extent to which the public are 
satisfied with domestic democracy accommodates general subsidiarity at the internal level, 
whilst it does not admit subsidiarity at the external level. Consequently, the agents' cognitive 
scope of the appropriate level to achieve the objectives accommodates the conceptual change of 
sovereignty at the internal level, as it is limited to Levels II and III. By contrast, in settling the 
problems derived from the national level, agents do not prefer potential tools which become 
available through the pooling of sovereignty to the external level beyond the EU level. As such, 
it is obvious that the inclusion of `political conditions' into a series of trade and cooperation 
agreements with non-EU countries is not an extension of the specific domestic preferences of 
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individual Member States. In addition, it indicates that the policy outputs of the EU orientate 
towards regionalism, in which in terms of the allocation of competences for problem-solving, the 
maximum permissible level is defined at the internal level. This feature has a connection with the 
fact that the existing European human rights policy, unlike that of US, is characterised by the 
bounded multilateralism at the European level. 
Third, from all the above models, market interdependence as a structure operates as a 
positively decisive factor for forming foreign economic policy. By contrast, in terms of the 
internal level of the EU, there is a gap between market and policy interdependences. As such, in 
external relations of the EU, the extent of the Member States' market interdependence is in 
accordance with that of policy interdependence, in particular, in shaping foreign economic 
policy. 
Finally, the FEP of the EU connotes ambivalence. This derives from the sense that, despite 
TEU Article J. 1 (2) containing a reference to positive measures including the support for 
elections and free media, there is no express link between trade and `political conditions' such as 
human rights and democracy in transforming the objectives to actions. `Political conditions' is a 
means of the EU's FEP in terms of the economic diplomacy, in the sense that it has a double 
objective to change the practices of the repressive governments and to isolate the EU from their 
practices. However, strains between the EU Member States occur, since they take national 
development and EU policy development into account. Such a conflicting causal knowledge 
derives from decision-makers' different purposes or intentions concerning the three angular 
points that construct the objectives of FEP. In particular, the EU's FEP has generated 
inconsistency in terms of the purpose or intention of human rights and democracy policy, whilst 
development aid policy has comparatively kept its consistency. 
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Part IV. Conclusion 
Chapter 8: 
Ontological, epistemological and methodological suggestions for 
establishing an explanatory framework for, and alternative scenarios 
to, the EU's foreign economic policy-making process: civil society 
democracy 
8.1 New necessary recognition for the analysis of FEP 
The guiding research question in this thesis is how to improve our understanding of the global 
dynamics in both the process of establishing and the actual content of the EU's foreign economic 
policy. To answer this question this study has raised, first, in terms of the concept of FEP, the 
question of whether traditional accounts of inter-mestic policy, centred around economic 
performance, i. e. uni-dimensional FEP, are reasonable or not. As a result, this study suggests that 
it is desirable to take into account other dimensions of FEP, such as economic diplomacy and 
foreign economic policy, in order to generate a multi-dimensional account of FEP. 
The traditional dichotomy between low politics and high politics reflects distinctiveness in 
the characteristics of those two categories of politics, but also implies a hierarchy of importance. 
It seems that in such a dichotomy, a political process operates in the formulation of foreign 
economic policy only when the practical policies diverge from economic rationality or theories. 
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That is, the dichotomy excludes the explanation of political processes in their own frameworks, 
even though it is necessary to discern the political causes or consequences of foreign economic 
policy (Pastor, 1980, Brown, 1997, Hocking and Smith, 1997). In fact, foreign economic policy 
contains multiple dimensions. FEP aims to make domestic politics and economics compatible 
with international political economy, ultimately seeking to protect the national interest - survival, 
prosperity, and prestige. In addition, according to policy-makers' intentions, FEP would expose 
different features of economic diplomacy which reflect political purposes: foreign economic 
policy for setting rules for economic transactions; or inter-mestic policy for pursuing a home 
country's benefits. 
Second, this multi-dimensional account requires us to establish a new framework, and to 
deal with issues related to the establishment of methodology. There have been a series of debates 
between those who emphasise comparative politics and those who emphasise international 
relations. In addition, those who suggest the analysis of foreign policy have been contending 
with those who are in favour of an international political economy approach. This study 
recognises that all of those approaches have individual merits and discovers the possibility of 
convergence in terms of a meta-theoretical dimension. 
This discovery fundamentally derives from an absence of exclusiveness among the 
abovementioned three categories or boundaries of FEP. Such non-exclusiveness leads to a 
necessary arbitration of relevant sub-fields of political science, concerning the relevant unit of 
analysis and agent-structure. Thus, FEP basically includes not only the realm of international 
politics that concerns economic issues only in terms of economic diplomacy, but also the realm 
of IPE in which the questions of who-gets-what, when and how are mainly asked surrounding the 
issue of justice and distribution including global inequality. 
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In accordance with these fundamental features of FEP, this study suggests an analytical 
synthesis of the traditional foreign economic policy approaches, which is based on the dialogue 
of agent-structure and structure-structure relationships. This cognitive framework of dialogue 
encompasses a series of concepts such as order, power, heterogeneity, similarity, justice and 
distribution. The account of such a series of concepts constructs the epistemological components 
of meta-theoretical convergence between comparative politics, international relations, the 
analysis of foreign policy and the international political economic approach. Consequently, 
general explanation and explanations of the timing and content of policy outputs are provided. 
8.2 Meta-theoretical implications for establishing a practical 
Method: agent-structure dialogue through knowledge system 
In this research, from the considerations above, meta-theoretical components for a dialectical 
synthesis are suggested as the following. First, in terms of the unit of analysis, i. e. concepts, 
adopting reduced subtypes of the EU, i. e. actor-like entity or multi-level governance, is more 
appropriate than `precising' the concepts or engaging in conceptual stretching. Generalisation 
recommends that we move up the ladder of abstraction as far as possible. Stretched terminology, 
however, leads us to excessive extension, in which "all the cows look black and eventually the 
milkman is [mis]taken for a cow (Sartori, 1970, p. 1040). " Here, most researchers confront the 
substantial question of how high an empirical term can go up the ladder without losing its 
concreteness. Thus, it is necessary to find a way of moving up the ladder of abstraction and 
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increasing extension without losing more accuracy and empirical nature than is necessary. 
Adopting the diminished subtypes of the EU is in accordance with such a need. 
Second, in terms of the level of analysis, the simultaneous analysis of domestic and 
international politics is vital, thus avoiding holism and individualism. Furthermore, it is 
necessary to introduce a deeper understanding of domestic structure to the framework. As 
hegemonic states decline and the international economic system loosens, the explanatory power 
of the traditional systemic theories which regard the domestic structure as billiard balls has been 
eroded. By contrast, domestic structure has been recognised not as the consequence, but the 
cause of international politics. Meanwhile, despite such an evident shift in the level of analysis, 
structuralism and system theory have consistently been adopted when taking international affairs 
into account. This is because of their capacity to provide a precision that encompasses manifest 
implications for domestic sources of foreign economic policy, and parsimony that is a 
component of building a theory. 
Theory-building, however, necessitates other components of cogency and predictive quality 
or accuracy. Rather, it may be possible to say that parsimony is less important than accuracy in 
the sense that a structural lens is not suitable to understand the complexity of foreign economic 
policy (Pastor, 1980, pp. 29-30). The complexity of foreign economic policy derives from the 
diverse levels of analysis, which is led by high sensitivity based on the relationships with other 
issue areas. Furthermore, it is practically represented by the number of relevant agents and 
structures. As mentioned before, FEP, unlike FP, is directly connected with civil life. In this 
close linkage, on the one hand, educational and ideological agencies shape culture and morality, 
which have been maintained by the coherent apparatus of the state. As such, civil society is 
shaped by this structure. On the other hand, civil society can shape the structures by playing the 
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role of a potential agent in maintaining the status quo, reproducing the existing structure and 
generating variations. This dialectic inherence enables the state and civil society to interact (Cox, 
1999). The next generations of the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) should be 
negotiated giving consideration to demands from this non-governmental agent. A structural lens 
cannot provide a framework for understanding this dialectic inherence such that it cannot 
produce a comprehensive explanation of FEP connected with civil life. Such insufficiency is 
proved by the cross-cases analysis in chapters 6,7 and 8. 
Third, dialogue needs to contain a consideration of the greater sensibility of agent-structure 
and structure-structure. This study examined the EU's foreign economic policy through a set of 
theoretical models that consist of a one system-level model, three domestic-level models, one 
market model and agential models. In this examination, the question of `which model is 
reasonable for fully understanding the EU's FEP, and is distinct from most other studies that take 
a domestic approach without theorising about systemic variables or vice versa' is asked. It can be 
concluded, via the series of those models, that not one of those six conceptual lenses directly 
indicates the dependent variables of the EU's foreign economic policy. More practically, the 
dialectical synthesis approach in this study attempts to give due weight to the importance of 
domestic influences and interests in international negotiations. 
At the same time, it argues the case for recognising the role of policy-makers, i. e. an agential 
perspective, operating at the interface between domestic and international arenas and being 
capable of influencing both of them. The rationale for this framework is that the traditional 
framework in political science has dealt with agent and structure in a separate way because of the 
parsimony of theory, even though those are always interacting. Nevertheless, Galtung's problem 
(pointing out the plausible independence caused by the `diffusion' effect of individual variables) 
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that is raised in comparative politics may also occur in the case of the separation of agent and 
structure. Therefore, it is desirable to take a look at agent and structure together to bear more 
fruitful explanation. If existing international relations analysis adopts interactions between the 
actor's choices and the structural constraints or opportunities as an explanatory variable, then the 
embedded basic logics could be seriously undermined. Nevertheless, it is necessary to take 
account of agent-structure relations to achieve a framework in which the significant aspects of 
the empirical reality itself can be dealt with, i. e. increase the predictability of empirical theories 
of strategic actions. 
Meanwhile, the rationale derives from the fact that the relationships between the 
international and domestic structural contexts and the policy outputs are asymmetrical. In chapter 
6, through the cross-cases analysis of Germany, France and the UK, it is proved that these three 
countries vary in terms of causation of structural context. Furthermore, the account of the 
domestic structural context also proved an asymmetry in the explanatory power of political, 
economic and social systems. The other rationale is that, in an international context, reference to 
the state as an agent has been done at the expense of human agents who are representing the 
state. In such an international context human agents are constrained by both domestic and 
international structures (Buzan, Jones and Little, 1993), and international linkage forces human 
agents to come to terms with domestic and international accounts. As a result, the position of a 
country in a negotiation would be defined by the dynamic interactions of endogenous and 
exogenous variables, and structural and agential constraints or opportunities. 
In the meantime, the state plays the role of a bridge to mediate those structures and agents. 
In this case, the state should be understood as an institution used to change or manipulate the 
specific agents' interests and to redefine national interest, not as an actor. Furthermore, structure 
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needs to be accepted as a social construct in which it is intersubjectively understood by states and 
reproduced by interactions with states rather than fixed and external to the interactions with state 
(national) structures. Regarding a practical method, such a framework evaluates correlations or 
causal roles of different structures, unlike structural monism. Meanwhile, it involves the analysis 
of national domestic structure (state-society relationships) centred around four social structures, 
which are domestic-economic, domestic-political, international-economic and international- 
political factors that constitute the state (Wendt, 1987). 
Finally, agents act under the influence of the structure of prevalent knowledge. Knowledge 
is one of the structural powers that construct structure together with security, credit and 
production (Strange, 1988). Knowledge shapes a specific structure that engenders certain 
strategies, whilst it impedes others. Such knowledge is understood as principled knowledge 
concerning the dimension of norms or principles. However, agents can induce structural changes 
through applying or reflecting their own knowledge in their understanding of particular structural 
powers. At this stage, knowledge is concerned with practical method or apparatus being 
recognised as causal knowledge. As such, knowledge is more a mediator than simply a unilateral 
structure, since it connects agents with structures. In such a process of arbitration, knowledge 
refers to the extent of dynamics between agents and structures rather than to the relationships 
between them. 
The arbitration of knowledge between agents and structures also appeared in agenda changes 
throughout the MAI negotiation of 1998, and `political conditions' in trade and cooperation 
agreements between the EU and non-EU countries. The MAI started to reinforce protection of 
investors and to sweep away the barriers of FDI. It aimed to establish a binding disputes 
mechanism by which investors can sue governments which are accused of asset expropriation or 
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discriminatory policies. In this process, agents participate proactively in the formation of a 
knowledge system as a structural power by interacting with the structures throughout the 
mediation of knowledge. 
On the other hand, French decision-makers put greater value on national competences, 
economic security, investment security and ultimately economic sovereignty against the market 
logic in which the structural powers of global production and capital mobility enforced states to 
surrender a set of national regulations of foreign investment. This knowledge resembled that of 
civil society, in particular, as well as labour and environmental bodies. The latter took account of 
the possibility in which capital mobility erodes the national regulatory sovereignty by persuading 
competitive deregulations. As a result, firms have competences that enable them to control the 
states. In the same context, the French domestic ratification game was deviated from a two-level 
game, since agents' preferences (i. e. decision-makers' and the other agents') and knowledge 
were convergent. In addition, these agents were interacting with structural powers (such that they 
were participating in the process of foreign economic policy-making as proactive actors) 
sufficiently to bring out structural changes. 
On the other hand, it is obvious that the human rights and democracy policy of the EU has 
become principled knowledge, in the sense that it has been institutionalised in a series of 
agreements. By contrast, in terms of causal knowledge, the enforcement of `political conditions' 
leaves much to be desired, in the sense that there is a gap in enforcing its policy objectives. As 
such, the perspective of the inter-mestic policy in the EU's FEP is embossed, whilst the 
perspective of economic diplomacy to promote human rights and democracy indicates the gap 
between the goals and their enforcement. By contrast, the principled knowledge of orientating 
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towards the settlement of global inequality and consistent development is operating consistently 
by being pursued throughout practical performance. 
8.3 Alternative scenarios of the EU's foreign economic 
policy-making process: civil society democracy 
This study suggests the following agent-centred visions or scenarios of the likely course the EU 
might take in the formation of the EU's foreign economic policy in the near future. We may 
distinguish these visions from those of the traditional realists in IR or interest-centric foreign 
economic policy-making processes based on intergovernmentalism and undertaken in the 
boundary of foreign policy. These are the three models of `civil society democracy' in the 
citizen-friendly institutional or regulatory structures, and the European and international public 
spheres, where international and domestic structures or other political, economic and social 
agents are conferred the recognition of true partners with legitimacy in their own right to civil 
society organisations. The two former ones are characterised by the European boundary, whilst 
the concept of the public sphere is expanded to the third one. In the civil society democracy of 
these three models, civil society organisations enjoy civic dialogues with institutions, which 
could be effectively undertaken by providing for a large measure of co-operation with NGOs and 
grassroots activists, scientists, or committed members of the associations. The explanatory power 
of these visions depends essentially on whether civic identity is established and on the degree of 
institutional rearrangement involved. 
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8.3.1 Scenario 1: ever closer Union in citizen-friendly subsidiarity 
through `soft' state-centric model 
Besides the Advisory bodies, a dialogue is embodied in a series of institutions including norms 
and principles within the EU's foreign economic policy-making. Above all, particular attention is 
paid to the principle of subsidiarity, which is introduced by the Maastricht Treaty in order to 
solve democratic deficit and balance of power between the supranational, national and 
subnational institutions. Its introduction derives also from the calling for `an ever closer union 
among the peoples of Europe, in which decisions are taken as closely as possible to the citizen'. 
This intention is an advanced form of citizen-friendly policy-making process despite continuing 
problems concerning the criteria for applying this principle. Thus, in terms of national, 
economic, individual and distributional justice, this study suggests the following test of 
subsidiarity. 
The economic approach for the rational application of subsidiarity is concerned with the 
matter of whether or not the assignment of functions to the EU level is appropriate. The main 
problem is what kind of criteria are appropriate for the propriety of EU action. It may be possible 
to find an answer for this problem in the economy of federalism. Political economy theory offers 
three main reasons why certain policy functions can better be executed at the Union level than at 
the level of the separate Member States: transaction costs, economies of scale and externalities 
(internal and external or negative and positive). These reasons can be used as criteria for the 
application of subsidiarity. Using these criteria and interpreting Art. 3b of the EC Treaty, a 
framework for implementing subsidiarity that does derive the assignment of competences 
between the EU level and the Member States through four steps is generated as the flowchart in 
diagram 9.1 shows. 
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At stage one, the starting point of test, transaction costs, externalities, economies of scale and 
possibly other criteria (scale or effects or EU interest) can be used to decide which area belongs 
to the concurrent competence and why. At this stage, there might be conflicting points of view. If 
this consideration results positive, then the test should proceed to the next, that is, `need to act' 
stage which belongs to the `reason' stages of the test together with `credible co-operation' stage. 
In `need to act' stage, comparative efficiency of the Member States action and the Community 
action and the direct relationships between the Community action and the objectives being 
pursued in a policy area should be examined. If it is concluded that those criteria are positive, 
then in the next stage, the question of whether `credible co-operation is possible or not' should 
be examined. What should be considered above all here is the fact that the existence of important 
spill-over or economies of scale is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the transfer to the 
Community level. 
It must be examined whether the externalities or economies of scale in question cannot be 
taken care of by ad hoc voluntary co-ordination to the Union level. This is justifiable only if the 
gains it permits from removing the `market failure' are not offset by high administrative or 
compliance costs, or by `government failure', i. e., by the poor quality of the Community policy 
replacing the previous national ones. If in this stage, the answer is yes, then the test should be 
stopped, and Community action should be eliminated. Based on the scale of the matter, scales of 
co-operation are divided into bilateral, multiple, and Community-wide. Each matter requires the 
scale of co-operation corresponding to its scale, and if this is fulfilled, the intervention of the 
Community becomes unnecessary. 
By contrast, if the answer is no, then the Community action will confront the stage of 
measures in which proportionality, consistency, communication and `near to citizens' play 
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important roles. These criteria mean that measures should be directly related to objectives and be 
least disruptive to existing practices in the Member States, that new measures should 
complement existing ones, and that measures should be discussed at an early stage of policy- 
making by those most affected and be explained to the public. Through this process, government 
failure deriving from the poor quality of the Community policy replacing the previous national 
ones can be averted to a large extent by striving for a maximum degree of decentralisation in the 
execution of Community measures. In addition, this would at the same time avoid the 
uncontrolled growth of a Brussels bureaucracy too distanced from the ordinary citizen. 
8.3.2 Scenario 2: ever closer Union in European public spheres 
through recognition of civil society organisations within Europe 
Homogeneous international organisations including the UN, the OECD or the OSCE confer civil 
societies with the right to speak within the Economic and Social Council, subsidiary bodies and a 
series of meetings. By contrast, at the EU level, the legitimacy of NGOs has never been fully 
recognised. Indeed, the EU regards civil society organisations as merely auxiliary rather than as 
true partners. On 24 April 1986, according to the European Convention on the recognition of the 
legal personality of international non-governmental organizations, seven members of the Council 
of Europe, Austria, Belgium, Greece, Portugal, Slovenia, Switzerland and the UK, adopted a 
common concept of NGO. In the case of the Maastricht treaty, it has a short declaration 
addressing with Art. 117 on `social policy, ' but this annex remained limited. 
In recent times, with increasingly good news concerning the legitimacy of civil society 
organisations becoming available, many commentators have adapted their expectations and 
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switched from more to less pessimistic visions. On 4 July 1996, France joined this Convention 
and ratified it in December 1998. In 1996, the `First European Forum on Social Policy' referred 
to `the building over time of a strong civil dialogue at European level to take its place alongside 
the policy dialogue with national authorities and the social dialogue with the social partners'. In 
particular, Convention No 124 in 1996 provided a system of mutual recognition that would make 
it easier for civil society organisations to become fully established within the EU, as Art. 2 in the 
Convention states: 
"[T]he legal personality and capacity, as acquired in the Party in which it has its 
statutory office, shall be recognized as of right. " 
Meanwhile, in the preamble to the Treaty on European Union (TEU), the Member States refer in 
passing to `the solidarity between their peoples', the strengthening of `economic and social 
progress for their peoples' and 'the safety and security of their peoples'. However, the TEU 
assumed the model of the state, in which the state was recognised as a mover of the common 
foreign and security policy together with the Community. On the other hand, the Amsterdam 
Treaty started taking individuals into account, as the preamble to the Treaty seeks to `establish a 
citizenship common to nationals of their countries' reproducing the state model on a different 
scale. For example, `national treatment' was replaced by `European treatment', and resulted in a 
better protection of individuals against discrimination. 
In the meantime, after the MAI failure in 1998, the European Commission has set up the 
Investment Network. This is a formal new channel for consultation and partnership with 
European Business interests over investment issues that runs in parallel with a number of other 
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outreach initiatives involving non-business civil society. ' Indeed, the current Commission has 
exercised civil society dialogue by establishing institutional arrangements such as Ad hoc 
meetings with civil society, New Issue Groups, Contact Group, Internet Dialogue and General 
Meetings. 2 This new phase of dialogue started in February 2001 on broader representation on the 
civil society side and the legitimacy of the dialogue aiming to develop a confident working 
relationship between all interested groups or individuals. In addition, it also aims to get better 
mutual understanding of concerns and better contacts between all the key players. General 
principles for the dialogue are `timely information and agenda-setting' `broad representation' 
and `transparency of participation. '3 
Throughout this process, the EU has been oriented towards the creation of civil society 
democracy via dialogues beyond the simple aggregation or synthesis, by increasing the 
transparency of policies and promoting the development of citizens as components of Europe. 4 
Dialogue is evidently self-interested, in which civil society organisations are frequently 
perceived as intermediaries. In addition, dialogue generates an arbitration of knowledge among 
political, economic and social agents. Through dialogue, civic knowledge can be reflected in the 
decision-maker's knowledge and choice to pursue power. As such, it is natural that political 
agents' power is based on civic power. Such a dialogue nullifies the structure of a two-level 
game between individual states and external negotiating partners in which decision-makers' 
preferences differ from those of domestic constituents, for example civil society organisations. 
Furthermore, in the case of the EU's foreign economic policy-making, the structure of three or 
four-level games between the EU institutions, individual member states' decision-makers, local 
governments and domestic constituents is nullified. Consequently, in a close alliance of 
knowledge and power, the members of the Committees that are established by the 
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institutionalisation of dialogue would possess greater moral legitimacy. In addition, they would 
produce a great effect on public opinion in elucidating the social issues leading to the 
establishment of civil society democracy. 
The necessary condition for this creation is to officially recognise NGOs' political 
legitimacy by setting up a genuine action programme together. Europeans have always been 
provoked into forming defensive alliances against hegemonic attempts. Thus, the core discipline 
of international relations in Europe has been balance of power. In European history, no empire 
lasted for an extended period of time, and the shared knowledge of most intellectuals and the 
founders of the EC was confederation. Indeed, the European public would not like to create a 
European state. In the same context, Europeans are not willing to respond to a project of strong 
political unity in a reconstructed Europe. This seems to implicate that it is more desirable to 
accept a European civil society rather than a supranational European state as the ultimate goal of 
the construction of Europe (Alexander, 1998, p. 220). 
Within the EU, several instances of partnership with NGOs including the Advisory Body on 
the Ethics of Biotechnology and the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia 
have already been set up. Committees composed of independent experts or qualified legal 
personalities are operating. These autonomous bodies have been established in order to maintain 
close links with the Council of Europe, 5 and to enforce the effectiveness of work in collecting 
and analysing information. Such a'structured dialogue' between European bodies and organs of 
civil society (Decaux, 1999, p. 912) through institutions would be very useful in taking into 
account the experience gained by NGOs in the field beyond a simple means of offering 
information. As a result, the quality and efficiency of the EU institutions could be greatly 
increased. 
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To ensure parliamentary legitimacy in establishing foreign economic policy within the EU, 
EU governance needs another zone of democracy between the European citizens, the Europe of 
nation states and the EU bureaucrats, in which balances, mediation and intermediate bodies are 
fully recognised. In this zone, it is more possible to expect `ever closer Union' among the 
peoples of Europe or confederation, and individuals are recognised as significant actors at the 
heart of the Community. In a large and complex society, it is obvious that representative 
democracy does not correspond to knowledge prevalent among the European public. In a 
representative democracy, the individual's knowledge is easily reified to that of the 
representatives, who are usually incorporated into political parties. As such, there are more 
potentialities for the gap between decision-makers' political decision-making capacity and 
democratic consensus in foreign economic policy-making to occur. 
By contrast, the individual-centric European society is certainly to be found in a space where 
national, economic, individual and distributional justice are set up as main objectives. As a 
result, the balance in national status within the system of states and equal inter-state economic 
relations are ensured. In addition, individual or group interests are not reified to the national 
interests or collective actions of the state, and regional inequality and the democratic deficit 
become meaningless. The subject of European (political) unity should not be absent from the 
everyday conversation of the majority of Europeans. This continuous civic dialogue is a 
necessary condition for building European political construction in the present and future. As 
such, it involves a critical mass of concerned European citizens and allows a lively internal 
pluralism. That is a feature of civil society democracy beyond the purely economic vision of civil 
society that was recognised by classical thinkers. 
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By civil society this study means an ideal type referring to `a set of political and social 
institutions, characterised by limited, responsible government subject to the rule of law, free and 
open markets, a plurality of voluntary associations and a sphere of free public debate (Alexander, 
1998, pp. 220-22 1). ' Civil society within the European public sphere consists of free individuals 
who do not pursue their own private interests, and engage pro-actively in communication on 
public affairs and in the formation of civic identity. This perspective of civil society provides the 
basis for democracy in the sense that it establishes the ground rules for the proper relations 
between decision-makers of foreign economic policy and citizens. Civil society democracy is 
characterised by good governance, the rule of law, good citizenship, participation, consultation 
and solidarity. Civil society democracy is governed by the rule of law, and good citizenship. 
Participation and solidarity prevent the danger of depoliticisation and withdrawal in a private or 
uncivil society with no foundation other than selfish calculation, i. e. not in the national or 
international public sphere, from occurring. This type of democracy is agent-centred like most 
policy-making processes including foreign economic policy. 
In civil society democracy, foreign economic policy is established on the basis of three 
angular points of intentions: national economic growth, the promotion of human rights and 
democracy, development and breaking of poverty and inequality. As such, the individual is 
perceived in all his or her dimensions, i. e. in a citizen-friendly knowledge system, based on 
international political economy themes of `justice and distribution', away from the foreign policy 
of international politics, based on the theme of `order. ' 
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8.3.3 Scenario 3: global civil society democracy in international 
public spheres through dialogue with non-EU civil society organisations 
`European citizenship' has produced the risk of discrimination against nationals of European 
non-member countries, since it is perceived as one of the elements of European identity vis-ä-vis 
the external world (Decaux, 1999, p. 900). This potentiality contrasts the with objective of the 
new Article 2 of the Amsterdam Treaty (ex Article B), which states that: 
"... maintain and develop the Union as an area of freedom, security and justice,... " 
Despite this objective, it seems that there is very limited space for individuals within the EU 
governance. For example, concerning human rights within the EU Member States, associate 
countries and trade and cooperation partnerships with non-EU countries, in so far as they adhere 
to respect for human rights, democratic principle and the rule of law, individuals are not subject 
to legal consideration. This situation may be construed as a difficulty but also as a new 
opportunity to be able to build an international public sphere. Today, we live in an international 
civic society, in which numerous voluntary and non-profit organisations and movements, 
including human rights groups, are taking pro-active action on public policy issues in the 
international public spheres. A European sphere indicates `a critical mass of concerned citizens 
who discuss European issues and will be ready to support European policy. ' 
By contrast, the international public sphere is the expanded concept of the European public 
sphere as being defined as sites `of interaction in which actors routinely reach understanding 
about norms, identities and interests through the public exchange of discourse (Lynch, 1999, p. 
11). ' The international public sphere does not necessarily correspond to state borders, and thus 
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state interests should be understood in terms of the interaction between the preferences of state 
actors and public deliberation (Lynch, 1999, p. 3). Above all, it is remarkable to note that in the 
international public sphere, state actors, individuals, institutions and non-state actors interact. In 
this process, state and individual interests are arbitrated by the international civil society 
organisations. 6 
Rather, this concept refers to the capacities of individuals to have some say over 
international political and economic processes, including FEP, that affect them. Besides, it also 
refers to the responsibilities between persons who suggest the need for democratic political 
change in world politics. In the European single market based on the free movements of the four 
elements of goods, services, capital and people, the capacity of the European supranational 
institutions to face up to the challenges of competitiveness and productivity would be defective. 
This is the case in particular in external relations with the US or Japan. In such a situation, an 
adequate FEP should not be pursued country by country or government by government. Rather, 
it is desirable to be based on the perspective of individuals beyond nationality. 
Meanwhile, international public spheres can be conceived as institutions such as 
international law, regimes and international organisations in the sense that they seek decision- 
making capacities in relation to relevant issues. These institutions invested with international 
decision-making authority are empowered to the extent that sovereign states participate in and 
authorise their activity. More formal organised agents like NGOs have engaged in international 
public spheres. They may not be international public authorities invested by states with the 
power of international decision-making capacities, however, they use strategies of publicity, 
advocacy and networking to make international public authorities accountable to those affected 
by their policy choices. 
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In fact, the Commission remains involved in active discussions with international civil 
society beyond Europe. Through programmes like the Transatlantic Environment and Consumer 
Dialogues and non-EU parties' participation in dialogues, the Commission has been contacting 
and discussing issues with US and other countries' organisations or individuals as well. ' As a 
result, not only national but also transnational civil society organisations have been given 
opportunities to express their opinions directly to the Commission rather than for the purpose of 
any Commission pre-conceived position. 8 However, the construction of international civil 
society democracy takes second place to domestic political and economic matters including 
welfare and democratic consensus as well as the inter-mestic perspective of FEP like the 
adjustment of domestic economy to the global economy. This phenomenon interrupts the 
creation of international and European public spheres. 
Meanwhile, today, national public spheres are challenged by both internal plurality and the 
pressure on governments to control the effects of globalisation in a citizen-friendly manner. 
Typically, the scope of the public sphere has been identified with national boundaries that are 
limited to shared culture. However, globalisation encourages the production of `one culture, one 
public sphere' (Bohman, 1998, p. 199). As a result of the effects of globalisation, publicity is 
expanding beyond the public sphere of the nation-state not to create one cosmopolitan public 
sphere or European public sphere but a 'gradual transformation of local public spheres through 
transnational civil society organised institutions as they emerge at different levels' (Bohman, 
1998, p. 195). 
On the other hand, after the launch of the European single market, the EU's endeavour to 
integrate Europe into a political and social unity has gone beyond the European civil society 
democracy that includes a multilateral human rights policy only within the European boundary. 
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Consequently, this feature of European society has moved on to the global civil society 
democracy. As such, the political implications of European and international civil society 
democracy for regionalism and globalisation have become one of main themes of current 
research. 
It is to be hoped that the Member States of the EU and the associate states will ratify the 
convention without further delay such that the legitimacy of NGOs is fully recognised. 
Furthermore, it is desirable to hope that the two dominant value systems in European politics 
such as national identity and democracy reconcile so that supranational identity and civic and 
transnational democracy form. In this form of democracy, internally generated European civic 
values and non-European civic values reconcile through externalisation and internalisation 
orientating towards international justice. 
In fact, the European Union can hardly establish civil society democracy as the basis for its 
association without embedding civic identity (Habermas, 1992, Howe, 1995, Weiler, 1997) in its 
own institutional procedures. The relative homogeneity of European cultural and socio-economic 
systems has never led to stable political unity in Europe (Alexander, 1998, p. 219). However, 
shared civic values or civic identity that are a kind of infrastructure of civil society democracy do 
not necessarily guarantee open and tolerant political, economic and social systems (Lord, 1998, 
pp. 119-121). As such, some would argue that the notion of civic identity is unduly dependent on 
the outputs and procedures of the European political system itself. It is, therefore, necessary to 
ensure the institutional structure to avoid the reification or downgrading to the basis of rigid and 
imposed value systems. 
On this point, the development of European public spheres and institutional arrangements, 
i. e. the accountability of the European public authority to European citizens, is an important 
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research theme. In particular, it is worthwhile to pay attention to civic identity from the 
viewpoint of constructivism, centring around the discourse implicitly or explicitly associated 
with a sense of the differences of national interests and identity between the European nations. 
As such, the question of what the civic dialogue may provide as a way of reconciling rationalist 
and constructivist arguments on the issue of state interests and their sources (Lynch, 1999, pp. 3- 
4) needs to be answered in the near future. 
The presentation of an alternative scenario, i. e. civil society democracy, corresponds roughly 
with an increasing optimism as to its likelihood in the near future. Furthermore, policy strategies 
and decision-makers' intentions are important in so far as the scenario under consideration bears 
some relationship to alternative foreign economic policies that have been advocated. At present, 
it is much too early to evaluate the effectiveness of civil dialogue at the crossroads of the 
European institutions and the active forces of civil society. Nevertheless, in the near future, it 
will be pressure from civil society that is likely to produce any progressive realisation of the 
protection of labour treatment and social rights. 
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Appendix 
Appendix 2.1: If pl E Ara and pl E P, then r1=1 and Agreement (i, 1) <T = 1> 
If p2 E bBM and p1 E P, then r2 =1 and Agreement (p2,2) <T = 2> 
Ifpl oP and p2 o P, then Disagreement (0,0) <T = 2> 
Appendix 2.2 (A): r2(p2) = 1, if p2 <a r2(p2) = 0, if p2) a 
Appendix 2.2 (B): rl(pi) = 1, if pl >b rl(pl) = 0, ifpl (b 
Appendix 2.2 (C): rl(pl) = 1, if UB(pl, 1) _UB(a, 2), when 
5B =1 
rl(pj) = 0, if UB(pl, 1) (UB(a, 2), when 8B =1 
Appendix 2.2 (D): pl -b= SB (a - b), -: UB (pl) = pl -b and UB(a, 2) = SB (a - b) 
Appendix 2.2 (E): If a' (a and 5B = 1, then p1=a', UB(a', 2)=a'-b ( Un(a, 2)=a-b, 
while UA(a', 2)=UA(a, 2)=0 
Appendix 2.2 (F): If a'( a and SB= 0, then p1=b, Un(b, 1)with a'=a'-b ( Un(b, 1) 
with a=a -b, while UB (b) with a= UB (b) with a' =0 
pl = b(1-SB) + SB a 
No Affects 
, UB(b, l), if SB =0 
Relatively Negative Affects 
pj=b(148)+8Ba UB(a'), if8B=1 
Appendix 2.2 (G): If b') b and SB = 1, then p1= a, UB (a) with b' =a- b' ( UB (a) 
with b=a -b, while UA (a) with b' = UA (a) with b=0 
Ifb')band SB =0, thenp1=b', UA(b')=a-b' ( UA(b)=a-b, 
while UB (b) = UB (b) =0 
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Relatively Negative Affects 
p1= b' (1-88) + 8B a UA(b', 1), if SB =0 
b'(1- SB a 
No Affects UA(a), if SB =1 
Appendix 2.2 (H): If a' (a and b') b, then p1= b' (1-SB) + SB a' 
Appendix 2.2 (I): If a' (a, b') b, and bb' = a'a, then NB = Nn and ba) Wal 
Appendix 2.2(J): If a' (a, b') b, and bb') a'a, then Nn) NA, Cn (CA, and ba) b'a' 
If a' (a, b') b, and bb' ( then NB ( NA, CB) CA, and ba ) b'a' 
Appendix 5.1: It = 1, if X1=rl-i>0 or -fr -i( -fr 
I2=1, if X2=rl-cl-i>0 or -fl-i( -f, 
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Appendix 5.3 (A) Neutral dynamic capital-labour game with complete information 
Pay-offs 
Labour l Action (P,, P3) 
Action 
Capital , No Action (P 0) 
Action (0, P 
No Action 
Labour 2 No Action (010) 
Appendix 5.3 (B): the case of a biased government 
Pay-offs 
Labour l 
Action (PI + r. P= - r) 
Action () 
Capitall No Action 
P+r, o 
" 
Labour 2: Action (0, Pi - r) 
in favour No Action 
of capital 
No Action o, o) 
Labour 3 Action (P I-r, P3 + r) 
in favour of Action 
labour No Action (PI - r, 0) 
CaPital2 Labour 4. Action (0, P, + r) 
No Action " 
(o No Action , 0) 
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(a) under no capital 
mobility 
0 Yo V1 Y2 
(d) perfect capital 
mobility 
D Yo V1 V2 
(c) under high capital 
mobility 
Note: The IS curve is the schedule that identifies the combinations of income and the interest rate 
at which the commodity market is in equilibrium. The LM curve is the schedule that identifies 
the combinations of income and the interest rate at which the money market is in equilibrium. 
Perfect capital mobility implies that the interest rate differential must remain at zero, the balance 
of payments can be in equilibrium only at a single domestic interest rate equal to the foreign 
interest rate. The balance of payments is in equilibrium, equal to zero, only along the horizontal 
line BP in (d), drawn at the position where the domestic and foreign interest rates are equal. 
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